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INTRODUCTION
The year 2009 saw many changes in U.S. patent law across all three
branches of the government. In the executive branch, following the
historic election of President Obama, the new administration
ushered in changes in personnel and policy at the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Changes in personnel
included many new appointments, the most notable being the
1
appointment of David Kappos as Director of the USPTO. With
changes in personnel came a number of changes in policy. Under
the new director’s leadership, the USPTO removed from its
regulations highly controversial rules regarding claims and
2
continuation practice.
Change also swept across the judicial branch at the U.S. Supreme
Court and at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. On
August 8, 2009, Sonia Sotomayor was sworn in as an Associate Justice
3
of the Supreme Court, becoming the first Hispanic American and
4
the third female to serve on the nation’s highest court. Although the
Court issued no patent decisions in 2009, it heard oral arguments in
5
Bilski v. Kappos in November, setting the stage for a highly
anticipated decision in 2010 that will address the most basic question
6
of patent law: patentable subject matter.

1. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Locke Statement on
Confirmation of David Kappos as Patent and Trade Director (Aug. 7, 2009), available
at
http://www.commerce.gov/NewsRoom/PressReleases_FactSheets/PROD01_
008268 [hereinafter Locke Statement] (announcing Kappos’s confirmation and
summarizing his credentials).
2. See Press Release 09-21, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Rescinds
Controversial Patent Regulations Package Proposed by Previous Administration
(Oct. 8, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/09_21.jsp [hereinafter Press
Release 09-21] (indicating that the USPTO removed the regulations because they
were “highly unpopular from the outset and were not well received by the applicant
community”).
3. U.S. Supreme Court, The Justices of the Supreme Court,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
4. Lisa Desjardins, Kristi Keck & Bill Mears, Senate Confirms Sonia Sotomayor for
Supreme Court, CNN, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/06/
sonia.sotomayor/index.html.
5. No. 08-964 (U.S. argued Nov. 9, 2009).
6. Compare Brief for Petitioners at 20, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. July 30,
2009) [hereinafter Pet’rs’ Brief] (arguing that the Court should not restrict
patentable subject matter beyond the limits expressed by Congress), with Brief for
Respondent at 26, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter
Resp’t’s Brief] (arguing that a patentable “process” is limited to technological and
industrial methods and excludes methods directed to such human activities).
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At the Federal Circuit, Judge Alvin A. Schall took senior status on
7
October 5, 2009, and Chief Judge Paul R. Michel announced that he
8
will retire from the bench as of May 31, 2010. Chief Judge Michel is
applauded for his leadership and contribution to the Federal Circuit,
over two decades of distinguished service to the judiciary, and over
9
four decades of dedication to public service. Judge Randall R. Rader
will succeed him as the next Chief Judge.
In 2009, the Federal Circuit decided two cases en banc, making
10
important changes in the law relating to 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) and
11
product-by-process claims. The Federal Circuit also agreed to hear
another case en banc which concerns the written description
12
requirement.
Change also percolated in the legislative branch as Congress, for
the third consecutive congressional session, tried to effect the most
13
dramatic change in U.S. patent law since 1952. In March, 2009,
members of Congress introduced a set of patent reform bills in both
14
houses of Congress, contributing to an atmosphere of change on
the Hill.

7. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judicial Biographies,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judgbios.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010) [hereinafter
Biographies].
8. See Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
Remarks at the 25th Annual Federal Circuit Bar Association Dinner 3 (Nov. 20,
2009),
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/CJ_Michel_11-20-09.pdf
[hereinafter
Remarks].
9. See Biographies, supra note 7 (noting the judge’s reputation as one of the
most influential people in the field of intellectual property).
10. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1365,
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898, 1911–12 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding that
§ 271(f) does not apply to method patents), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1088 (2010).
11. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1293, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1769, 1777–78 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding that process terms in product-byprocess claims may set limitations in determining whether there is patent
infringement), cert. denied sub nom. Astellas Pharma, Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 130 S. Ct.
1052 (2010).
12. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 332 F. App’x 636, 637 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a rehearing en banc). Just before this Area
Summary went to print, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, confirmed the separate
requirements of written description and enablement, and thereby reversed in part
and affirmed in part its previous panel decision. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., No. 2008-1248, 2010 WL 1007369 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2010) (en banc).
13. See Press Release, Senators Hatch, Leahy Introduce Patent Reform Act of
2009 (Mar. 3, 2009), available at http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=ce28c6f0-1b78-be3e-e028418ea18126e5.
14. Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009) (introduced
simultaneously in the Senate as S. 515 and S. 610).
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SIGNIFICANT CHANGES BY BRANCH

A. The Executive Branch: New Personnel, Old Rules
In 2009, the USPTO underwent important changes in both
personnel and policy. On June 18, 2009, David J. Kappos, then Vice
President and Assistant General Counsel for Intellectual Property
Law at IBM, was nominated for Under Secretary of Commerce for
15
Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO.
He was
16
confirmed on August 7, 2009.
After the appointment of a new Director in June, the rest of the
senior management team transitioned. On October 2, Commerce
Secretary Gary Locke appointed Sharon Barner as the Deputy
17
Director of the USPTO. On the same day, John Doll retired from
the post of Commissioner for Patents after thirty-five years at the
18
agency.
Longtime USPTO executive Robert Stoll took Doll’s
19
Finally, Margaret Focarino became the Deputy
position.
20
Commissioner for Patents.
Catching more headlines than the personnel changes was the
roller-coaster development surrounding the new USPTO rules.
In August, 2007, the USPTO published in the Federal Register changes
to the rules of patent practice pertaining to requests for continued
21
examination, continuing applications, and examination of claims.
Specifically, the rules set a limit of two continuing applications and
15. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama
Announces More Key Administration Posts (Jun. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/president-obama-announces-more-keyadministration-posts-6-18-09/. During Kappos’s sixteen years managing IBM’s
intellectual property portfolio, the company had consistently been the leading
recipient of U.S. patents.
16. Locke Statement, supra note 1. During his confirmation hearing, Kappos
pledged to “completely remake the count system” in order to improve efficiency and
morale at the USPTO. Webcast: Nominations: Hearing on Nominations Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (July 29, 2009), http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4006 (statement of David J. Kappos, Nominee for Under
Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office).
17. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Commerce Secretary Gary
Locke Appoints Sharon Barner Deputy Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (Oct. 2, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2009/
irl_2009oct02.jsp.
18. Press Release 09-14, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Announces
Senior Management Changes (Sept. 3, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/speeches/09-14.htm.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent
Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
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one request for continued examination as a matter of right.
In addition, the rules impose a limit of five independent claims and
twenty-five total claims without any additional effort on the part of
23
the applicant.
The new rules, while intended to deal with the heavy backlog of
patent applications at the USPTO, sent shockwaves through the
24
patent community.
In particular, the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical industries expressed strong concern over the
proposed rules’ detrimental effect on innovation and industry when,
in an unusual turn of events, the published rules became the subject
of litigation. Triantafyllos Tafas, an inventor, sued the USPTO in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, asserting that
25
the agency overstepped its rulemaking authority. In October 2007,
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) also filed a complaint against the USPTO,
26
challenging the rules. The district court consolidated the two cases
27
and enjoined the USPTO from implementing the rules.
28
The USPTO appealed to the Federal Circuit.
After hearing oral arguments in December, 2008, the Federal
Circuit issued a split-panel decision on March 20, 2009, holding that
the rules restricting the number of continuing applications conflicted
29
with 35 U.S.C. § 120 and were thus invalid.
On July 6, 2009,
the Federal Circuit vacated the split-panel decision and heard the
30
case en banc. The court later granted the parties’ Joint Consent
Motion, staying the en banc proceedings until sixty days after the
31
confirmation of the new director of the USPTO. On August 21,

22. Id. at 46,839–41.
23. Id. at 46,836.
24. See Press Release 09-21, supra note 2 (noting that the regulations were
extremely unpopular and were not well received).
25. See Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1623, 1625
(E.D. Va. 2008) (holding that the USPTO exceeded its statutory jurisdiction), aff’d in
part and vacated in part, 559 F.3d 1345, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
26. See Complaint at 2, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652,
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1548 (E.D. Va. 2007) (No. 1:07cv1008) (arguing that the final
rules were “vague, arbitrary and capricious,” and that they prevented the plaintiff
from fully prosecuting and obtaining patents on its inventions).
27. See infra Part IV.A (providing a detailed litigation history).
28. Notice of Appeal, Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1548 (E.D. Va. 2007) (No. 1:07cv1008).
29. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1364, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1143
(Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 328 F. App’x 658, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1153 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (per curiam).
30. Tafas, 328 F. App’x 658, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1153.
31. Tafas v. Doll, 331 F. App’x 748, 748 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (order granting joint
consent motion for a stay of en banc proceedings).
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2009, the court lifted the stay, ordering the parties to file their
32
briefs.
On October 8, 2009, the case reached a dramatic end, however,
when the USPTO announced that the new director, David Kappos,
33
signed a final rule rescinding the controversial regulations.
The USPTO, joined by GSK, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and
34
vacate the district court’s decision. Tafas filed a response, joining in
the joint motion for dismissal of the appeal, but opposing the joint
35
The Federal Circuit ruled in Tafas’s favor,
motion for vacatur.
granting the joint motion to dismiss while denying the motion to
36
vacate.
The USPTO, in addition to rescinding the final rule, unveiled a
series of proposals to bring significant change to the examiner “count
37
system.” The proposals constitute the most significant changes to
38
the count system proposed in more than thirty years. According to
the USPTO, the proposed changes are designed to:
• Set the foundation for long-term pendency improvements.
• Increase customer satisfaction by incentivizing quality work at
the beginning of the examination process.
• Encourage examiners to identify allowable subject matter earlier
in the examination process.
• Rebalance incentives both internally and externally to decrease
rework.
39
• Increase examiner morale and reduce attrition.

32. Tafas v. Kappos, 332 F. App’x 635, 636 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (order requiring the
parties to file their briefs within sixty days).
33. Press Release 09-21, supra note 2.
34. Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
35. Id. at 1371, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694.
36. See id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694 (stating that vacatur is inappropriate
when mootness occurs as a result of actions taken by the losing party).
37. Press Release 09-19, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Joint LaborManagement Task Force Proposes Significant Changes to Examiner Count System
(Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/0919.htm [hereinafter Press Release 09-19].
The count system refers to the
methodology for determining the time a patent examiner has to complete a patent
examination and the amount of credit given for each stage of examination. Id.
For the full proposal, see U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, JOINT LABOR AND
MANAGEMENT COUNT SYSTEM TASK FORCE PROPOSAL (Sept. 30, 2009),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/documents/briefing_for_corpsfinal_draft-093009-external-jrb.pdf.
38. Press Release 09-19, supra note 37.
39. Id.
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B. The Judicial Branch: The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
Bilski at the Supreme Court
For the first time in nearly three decades, the Supreme Court will
address the question of whether a process is patentable subject
40
matter. Despite the Government’s opposition to Bernard L. Bilski’s
petition for a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Bilski on June 1, 2009, and certified two questions presented:

1.

Whether the Federal Circuit erred by holding that a “process” must
be tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or transform a
particular article into a different state or thing (“machine-ortransformation” test), to be eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, despite this Court’s precedent declining to limit the broad
statutory grant of patent eligibility for “any” new and useful process
beyond excluding patents for “laws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas.”
Whether the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation” test for
patent eligibility, which effectively forecloses meaningful patent
protection to many business methods, contradicts the clear
Congressional intent that patents protect “method[s] of doing or
41
conducting business.”
42

Addressing the first issue, Bilski’s brief examined Diamond v. Diehr
43
and Diamond v. Chakrabarty, cases in which the Supreme Court
interpreted § 101 to be extremely broad, only prohibiting the
44
patenting of laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.
According to Bilski, the Court has twice rejected the “machine-or45
transformation” test.

40. The Supreme Court most recently addressed patentable subject matter in
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981). In the category of
“manufacture” or “composition of matter,” the Court later decided that “newly
developed plant breeds fall within the terms of § 101.” J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 145, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1874
(2001).
41. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bilski v. Kappos, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009)
(No. 08-964) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006)).
42. 450 U.S. 175, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981).
43. 447 U.S. 303, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980).
44. See Pet’rs’ Brief, supra note 6, at 18–19 (arguing that principles of statutory
construction mandate a broad reading of the term “process”).
45. Id. at 20–21; see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 n.9, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
193, 197 n.9 (1978) (assuming that process is patent eligible even where the process
is not “tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change materials”); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 676 (1972) (refusing to hold that a
process patent must be “tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate to
change articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing’”).
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46

Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit majority in In re Bilski relied on a
quoted passage from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gottschalk v.
Benson: “[T]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different
state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that
47
does not include particular machines.”
But, Bilski argued, the
Court in Benson expressly did not hold that a process must be tied to
48
a machine or transformation to be eligible for patenting. He urged
that the Federal Circuit erred in In re Bilski by subjecting process
49
claims to additional conditions for patent eligibility.
In response, the Government stressed that § 101, though broad,
50
imposes meaningful limits on the scope of patent protection.
As a result, the Government argued, patent law protects
technological and industrial processes but not methods of organizing
51
52
human activity.
Also citing Benson, Flook, and Diehr, the
Government argued that the Supreme Court has consistently used
the “machine-or-transformation” test to identify patent-eligible
53
processes.
It acknowledged that the Court did not decide the
54
precise outer boundaries of the universe of patent-eligible processes.
The Government stated, however, that the “machine-or55
transformation” test remains “the generally applicable standard.”
On November 9, 2009, the long-awaited oral arguments at the
Supreme Court took place. During the one-hour of arguments,
certain Justices questioned Bilski’s lawyer about hypothetical patents,
such as patenting methods for tax avoidance, estate planning,
resisting a corporate takeover, selecting a jury, winning friends,
56
influencing people, and speed dating.
The Justices also had
questions for the Government. For example, Justice Sotomayor

46. 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc),
cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), and argued sub nom. Bilski v.
Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2009).
47. Id. at 955–56, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70,
175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676).
48. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676 (“We do not hold that
no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior
precedents.”).
49. See Pet’rs’ Brief, supra note 6, at 14 (stating that the Court erred in
demanding a special test for “process” inventions).
50. Resp’t’s Brief, supra note 6, at 11.
51. Id. at 15–19.
52. 437 U.S. 584, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1978).
53. Resp’t’s Brief, supra note 50, at 29–33.
54. Id. at 32.
55. Id.
56. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–7, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964 (U.S. Nov.
9, 2009), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/08-964.pdf.
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asked, “[H]elp us with a test that doesn’t go to the extreme the
57
Federal Circuit did.”
The patent bar eagerly awaits the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bilski, which is expected to be issued in spring 2010. In the
meantime, the Federal Circuit continued to apply the “machine-ortransformation” test in 2009, rejecting claims in two out of three such
58
cases. In the third case, the Federal Circuit applied the “machineor-transformation” test and found that claimed methods of treatment
59
were patent-eligible.
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.
Title 35, § 271(f) of the United States Code creates a cause of
action for patent infringement when “components” of a patented
invention are “supplied” by or from a U.S. entity for assembly abroad.
60
In Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., the Federal Circuit
61
decided that § 271(f) does not apply to method patents.
The Federal Circuit granted St. Jude’s petition for rehearing en banc
to answer a single question: “Does 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) apply to
62
method claims, as well as product claims?” In its opinion, the court
stated that steps are the “components” of a method or process claim
that “meet [the] definitional requirement of Section 271(f), but the
steps are not the physical components used in [the] performance of
63
the method.” The court then held that § 271(f) could not apply
because a method claim has only intangible steps, and because the
term “supplied,” as used in the statute, implies the physical transfer of
64
a tangible object. In so doing, the Federal Circuit overruled its
earlier decision in Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp.
2.

57. Id. at 37.
58. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 981, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1655, 1665 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (rejecting the applicant’s claim which described a method of requiring
and conducting arbitration); In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1366, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1035, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting the applicant’s claim on the grounds
that the applicant’s paradigm claim constituted no more than an abstract idea).
59. See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1349,
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1075, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that the applicant’s
invention of “a series of transformative steps that optimizes efficacy and reduces
toxicity of a method of treatment for particular diseases using particular drugs” was a
patentable subject-matter).
60. 576 F.3d 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1088 (2010).
61. Id. at 1365, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911–12.
62. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 315 F. App’x 273, 274
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (order granting the defendants’ petition for rehearing en banc).
63. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1363, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
64. Id. at 1364, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.

2010]

2009 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

821

65

v. Shell Oil Co., which held that § 271(f) applied to the exportation
66
of catalysts and the use of the patented method abroad.
Noting that Congress enacted § 271(f) to close the loophole that
allowed infringers to ship unassembled patented products abroad for
67
later assembly, and observing that the legislative history of § 271(f)
was “almost completely devoid of any reference to the protection of
68
method patents,” the Federal Circuit explained that its holding is
69
“fully consistent with the legislative history of Section 271(f).”
The court followed the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Microsoft Corp.
70
v. AT&T Corp., and resorted to the presumption against
extraterritoriality before concluding that § 271(f) cannot apply to
71
method claims.
Judge Newman dissented, explaining that the court’s
interpretation of § 271(f) as excluding all process inventions conflicts
72
with the text of the statute. She viewed the statutory term “patented
73
invention” in § 271(f) as “without discrimination or exception.”
Because the original language of § 271(f) expressly listed “a patented
74
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,” while the final
version was changed to “patented invention,” she believed that
75
Congress intended to apply § 271(f) to process claims.

65. 425 F.3d 1366, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2005), overruled by
Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898.
66. Id. at 1380, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714.
67. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1364, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911;
see Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 769
(1972) (holding that making component parts of a patented invention and sending
the parts abroad for assembly did not constitute patent infringement).
68. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1364, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
69. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
70. 550 U.S. 437, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400 (2007). In Microsoft, the Supreme
Court held that a “master disk” is not a “component” for purposes of § 271(f) when it
is copied abroad and then installed to form a system that would allegedly infringe
AT&T’s patent. Id. at 446–47, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406. In other words, under
§ 271(f), software abstracted from a tangible copy is not itself a combinable
component of a tangible manufacture. Id. at 449–50, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1407–08. In reaching that conclusion, the Court stated: “Any doubt that Microsoft’s
conduct [i.e., copying the master disk abroad] falls outside § 271(f)’s compass would
be resolved by the presumption against extraterritoriality.” Id. at 454, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1410. However, the Court in Microsoft did not overrule Union Carbide.
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 303 F. App’x 884, 893 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
71. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
72. Id. at 1366, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912 (Newman, J., dissenting).
73. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912–13.
74. Id. at 1369–70, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915 (quoting S. 2504, 93d Cong. § 2
(1974)).
75. Id. at 1370, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916.
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Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc.
In a portion of the opinion that the court issued en banc sua
76
sponte in Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., the Federal Circuit
clarified the scope of product-by-process claims by applying the rule
77
that it adopted in Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., and by
overruling the holding in Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v.
78
Genentech, Inc. to the extent that the case was inconsistent. That is,
the Federal Circuit held that process terms in a product-by-process
79
claim serve as limitations on the claim. The court cited Supreme
80
Court precedent as well as case law from its sister circuits.
According to the court, the Supreme Court “consistently noted that
process terms that define the product in a product-by-process claim
81
serve as enforceable limitations.”
The court made it clear that it did not question whether product82
by-process claims are permissible claims. Rather, the court limited
the issue only to whether such claims are infringed by products made
by processes other than the one claimed, and it held that they are
83
not.
3.

Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.
On August 21, 2009, the Federal Circuit vacated an earlier panel
decision and granted a petition for rehearing en banc in Ariad
84
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co. In its earlier panel decision,
the court had reversed the district court and granted Eli Lilly and
Company’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc.’s patent failed to meet the written
4.

76. 566 F.3d 1282, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc),
cert. denied sub nom. Astellas Pharma, Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 1052 (2010).
77. See 970 F.2d 834, 846–47, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1491 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(ruling that “process terms in product-by-process claims serve as limitations in
determining infringement”).
78. See 927 F.2d 1565, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he
correct reading of product-by-process claims is that they are not limited to product
prepared by the process set forth in the claims.”), overruled by Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d
1282, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769.
79. Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1293, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
80. See id. at 1291-92, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776 (citing seven Supreme Court
cases and cases from the First and Third Circuits that support the proposition that
process terms are enforceable limitations on patent infringement claims).
81. Id. at 1291, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
82. Id. at 1293, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
83. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
84. 332 F. App’x 636, 637 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Just before this Area Summary went
to print, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, confirmed the separate requirements of
written description and enablement, and thereby reversed in part and affirmed in
part its previous panel decision. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 2008-1248,
2010 WL 1007369 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2010) (en banc).
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85

description requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112. The court ordered
the parties to address the following issues:
(a) Whether 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, contains a
written description requirement separate from an
enablement requirement.
(b) If a separate written description requirement is set forth
in the statute, what is the scope and purpose of the
86
requirement?
Over twenty amicus briefs were filed by bar associations and
87
companies. On December 7, 2009, oral arguments took place, and
88
the decision is anticipated in 2010.
C. The Legislative Branch: 2009 Patent Reform Act
Congress continued its efforts to bring about dramatic change in
U.S. patent law. After the first two unsuccessful attempts at passing
89
the Patent Reform Act, members of Congress again introduced the
90
bill in both houses in 2009 (the “2009 Act”).
The 2009 Act closely resembles the previously proposed legislation.
The most significant provisions of the bill, as introduced, relate to the

85. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1376, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d
1549, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (overruling the jury’s determination that there was an
adequate written description), vacated, 332 F. App’x 636 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
86. Ariad, 332 F. App’x at 637.
87. See Donald Zuhn, Amicus Briefs in Ariad v. Lilly: Regents of Univ. of Cal. et al.,
PATENT DOCS (Dec. 6, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/
12/amicus-briefs-in-ariad-v-lilly-regents-of-university-of-california-et-al.html (listing all
twenty-five amici and noting that nineteen briefs were filed in support of Lilly,
six were filed in support of neither party, and none were filed in support of Ariad).
88. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASSOC., EN BANC CAFC HEARS ARGUMENT IN
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION CASE 1 (Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.aipla.org/Content/
ContentGroups/About_AIPLA1/AIPLA_Reports/20098/091209AIPLAReports.pdf.
89. The Patent Reform Act of 2007 passed in the House but never made it to the
Senate floor.
See Govtrack.us, H.R. 1908:
Patent Reform Act of 2007,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1908 (last visited Apr. 7, 2010);
Govtrack.us, S. 1145: Patent Reform Act of 2007, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=s110-1145 (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). The bill that was introduced in
2005 never made it through congressional committees. See Govtrack.us, S. 3818:
Patent Reform Act of 2006, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s1093818 (last visited Apr. 7, 2010); Govtrack.us, H.R. 2795: Patent Act of 2005,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-2795 (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
90. On March 3, 2009, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Senate bill,
S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:s515rs.txt.pdf., and Representative
John Conyers introduced the House bill, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009). Senator
Jon Kyl introduced another patent reform bill, S. 610, 111 Cong. (2009), on March
17, 2009.
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issues of first to file, damages, reexamination proceedings,
94
95
96
cancellation proceedings, preissuance submissions, and venue.
Despite its many similarities to previous Patent Reform Acts, the
2009 Act removed some controversial sections from the previous
legislation. For example, applicants would no longer be required to
conduct searches before filing an application. Additionally, the
provision requiring patent applicants to act in “good faith” in order
to enforce patents has been dropped from the current bill.
Moreover, the bill does not include a provision granting the USPTO
procedural or substantive rulemaking authority.
On March 10, 2009, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard
testimony from witnesses in a hearing titled, “Patent Reform in the
97
111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court Decisions.” On April
2, 2009, the Committee voted 15-4 to bring the amended Senate Bill
91. S. 515, § 2. The 2009 Act continues to propose the switch from the present
“first-to-invent” system to a “first-to-file” system. The provision would eliminate the
one-year grace period for most cases. Id. The USPTO would no longer permit
patent applicants, by the submission of sworn affidavits and documentary evidence,
to “swear behind” newer references. Additionally, interferences would be abolished.
92. Id. § 4(a). Under the proposed bill, reasonable royalties would be based
upon the “invention’s specific contribution over the prior art.” Id. The “entire
market value” rule would be limited, but the law concerning lost profits would be
unchanged. Id.
93. Id. § 5. Under the proposed bill, reexaminations may be requested based on
published prior art, evidence of prior public use or sale in the United States, or
patentee statements. Id. § 5(a)–(b). Estoppel would bar (1) asserting invalidity of
any claim determined to be valid in inter partes reexamination on any ground raised
in the reexamination, and (2) instituting an inter partes reexamination proceeding
after a district court judgment on patent validity. Id. § 5(h).
94. Id. § 5(h). Under the proposed bill, within twelve months of the issuance of
a patent, a third party may file a cancellation petition based on any ground of
invalidity other than failure to disclose the best mode. Id. There would be no
presumption of validity; instead, the challenging party would bear the burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Limited discovery may be permitted
on order of the Director of the USPTO. Id.
95. Id. § 7. Under the proposed bill, third parties may submit information
relevant to the examination of an application. Id.
96. Id. § 8(a). Under the proposed bill, venue in patent infringement litigation
would be proper only if it is (1) the place of defendant’s principal place of business
or incorporation; “(2) where the defendant has committed substantial acts of
infringement and has a regular and established physical facility that the defendant
controls and that constitutes a substantial portion of the operations of the
defendant;” or (3) the residence of the primary or the sole plaintiff, if it is an
institution of higher education, a nonprofit patent and licensing organization, or an
individual inventor. Id. The court should transfer venue to avoid evidentiary
burdens when transfer can be accomplished without causing undue hardship to the
plaintiff. Id.
97. Hearing on Patent Reform Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
(2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
111_senate_hearings&docid=f:54059.pdf. One of the witnesses was David J. Kappos.
Testifying on behalf of IBM, his former employer, Kappos offered his support for
Senate Bill 515. See id. at 7–8 (statement of David J. Kappos, Vice President and
Assistant General Counsel, Intellectual Property Law and Strategy, IBM Corp.).
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515 before the full Senate. The amended bill includes several
changes to the legislation. For example, the reasonable royalty
proposal has been replaced by the “gatekeeper” provision, giving
98
judges more authority to determine how to assess damages.
Prior use and sale provisions have also been removed from the
99
Further, the proposal for limiting
post-grant review procedure.
venue has been replaced by a provision that allows for the transfer of
patent cases on a showing that the transferee district is clearly more
100
convenient.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary submitted a report on the
amended bill on May 12, 2009, but there has been no progress since
101
then. In the House, the Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the
102
bill on April 30, 2009, but it has not yet marked up its bill or taken
further action.
Various organizations have been active in participating in the
patent reform discussion. One such organization is the Coalition for
Patent Fairness (CPF). Members of CPF include the Business
103
According to
Software Alliance, Apple, Symantec, and Google.
CPF’s website, the organization supports patent reform on issues such
as damages calculation, assessment of willful infringement, post-grant
104
review, and forum shopping.
Another active organization is the
Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform (the “Coalition”). The
Coalition is composed of approximately fifty companies, including
3M, Caterpillar, Eli Lilly, Motorola, Procter & Gamble, Pfizer, and
105
Texas Instruments.
According to the Coalition, “[t]he damages
provision should stay out of the bill . . . because the issue is being
106
Indeed, the Federal Circuit, in a recent
addressed by the courts.”
decision overturning a jury award of over $357 million against
98. See S. 515, § 4.
99. Id. § 5.
100. Id. § 8.
101. S. Rep. No. 111–18 (2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_reports&docid=f:sr018.pdf.
102. The Patent Reform Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1260 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
hear_090430.html.
103. Patentfairness.org, Overview, http://www.patentfairness.org/learn/about/
(last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
104. Patentfairness.org, What Needs To Change, http://www.patentfairness.org/
learn/what/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
105. Patentsmatter.com, Who We Are: The Coalition for 21st Century Patent
Reform, http://www.patentsmatter.com/about/who_we_are.php (last visited Apr. 7,
2010); Patentsmatter.com, Coalition Members, http://www.patentsmatter.com/
about/coalition.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
106. Stephanie Condon, Patent Bill to be Reintroduced in Congress This Week, CNET,
Mar. 2, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10155805-38.html.
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Microsoft, set out to clarify the law on patent damages, including the
107
It is unclear whether
application of the entire-market-value rule.
the court’s explanation will affect the outcome of the debate over the
damages provision in the patent reform bill.
Meanwhile, on September 14, 2009, in his first major speech,
USPTO Director Kappos declared: “The time is now to get patent
108
reform done.”
On October 5, 2009, Commerce Secretary Locke
wrote a five-page letter to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman
Leahy, stating that the Obama administration is committed to
109
working with Congress on patent reform.
Secretary Locke also
stated, “We believe S. 515 incorporates the essential elements of
patent reform; and, therefore, the Department of Commerce
110
supports the bill with additional recommendations.”
Specifically, the Department of Commerce endorses granting the
USPTO authority to adjust patent and trademark fees as well as
substantive rulemaking authority to provide “flexibility in the
111
administration of patent rules and procedures.”
The Department
also supports the shift from the first-to-invent system to a first-to-file
112
system.
Regarding the procedures for post-grant review and inter
partes reexamination, the Department advocates a phased-in
113
On the damages issue, the Department generally
procedure.
supports “reasonable royalty damages through a ‘gatekeeper’
approach reflected in recent court decisions as well as the purpose of
114
the willful infringement and enhanced damages standard.”
The following sections will summarize significant developments in
patent law at the Federal Circuit in 2009. The sections are organized
by issue and discuss key cases.
107. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1555 (Fed. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2010)
(No. 09-1006). Chief Judge Michel, the author of the Lucent Technologies opinion, has
discussed concerns regarding excess damages, stating that fears of patent owners
being compensated based on the entire value of a product rather than on a part
covered by their patent are a myth not reflected in actual cases. See Chief Judge Paul
R. Michel, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Keynote Address at the Federal
Trade Commission Hearings: The Evolving IP Marketplace (Dec. 5, 2008), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/dec5/081205transcript.pdf.
108. David Kappos, Dir. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Remarks to Intellectual
Property Owners Annual Conference (Sept. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/main/homepagenews/2009sep14_kappos_ipo_speech.htm.
109. Letter from Gary Locke, U.S. Sec’y of Commerce, to Sens. Patrick J. Leahy
and Jefferson B. Sessions, III (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/
ogc/legreg/letters/111/S515Oct0509.pdf.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 4.
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II. DISTRICT COURT PRACTICE
A. Transfer
Where one venue would be more convenient or efficient than the
one in which a patent action is filed, a defendant may move to
transfer the action to the more convenient venue pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) provides that, “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
115
division where it might have been brought.”
The Federal Circuit
applies regional circuit law to determine the propriety of a transfer of
a patent infringement action under § 1404(a) because it considers
116
such a determination procedural in nature.
117
In 2008, in In re TS Tech USA Corp., the Federal Circuit held that
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas clearly abused
its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion to transfer the case
to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and
118
granted the defendants’ petition for a writ of mandamus.
In the
wake of this ruling, the Federal Circuit considered four additional
petitions for writs of mandamus in 2009, each filed by parties seeking
to transfer cases out of the Eastern District of Texas.
119
In In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., the Federal Circuit refused to
grant the requested transfer because two other cases pending in the
120
Eastern District of Texas involved the same patents.
The court
applied Fifth Circuit law in considering “the ‘public’ and ‘private’
factors for determining forum non conveniens when assessing whether a
defendant has met its burden of demonstrating the need to
121
transfer.” The court found that “the existence of multiple lawsuits
involving the same issues is a paramount consideration when
122
determining whether a transfer is in the interest of justice.”
Because the court found significant overlap in the issues that were
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
116. See In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1567,
1568 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys. Inc., 329 F.3d 823,
836, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) (applying Fifth Circuit law to
a mandamus petition reviewing the denial of a motion to transfer under § 1404(a)).
117. 551 F.3d 1315, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1567 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
118. Id. at 1322–23, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571.
119. 566 F.3d 1349, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1036 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
120. Id. at 1351, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037–38.
121. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037 (citing In re TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 1319,
89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568–69; In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304,
89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Singleton
v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1336 (2009)).
122. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
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presented in the three lawsuits pending in Texas, it concluded that
familiarity with the patents could preserve time and resources and,
123
therefore, denied Volkswagen’s petition.
124
In In re Genentech, Inc., however, the Federal Circuit granted the
accused infringers’ petition for a writ of mandamus ordering transfer
from Texas to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
125
California.
The Federal Circuit concluded that, because a
substantial number of material witnesses resided in California and no
witnesses resided in Texas, the district court clearly erred in not
concluding that the “convenience for witnesses” factor weighed
126
substantially in favor of transfer. The Federal Circuit found further
that convenience of the parties, availability of compulsory process,
127
and access to evidence weighed in favor of transfer.
The Federal Circuit also rejected the two practical problems that
the district court identified as weighing significantly against transfer.
First, the Federal Circuit held that the district court clearly erred in
relying on Genentech’s earlier decision to file suit in the Eastern
District of Texas; the court explained that Supreme Court precedent
made it clear that each transfer requires “individualized, case-by-case
128
consideration of convenience and fairness.”
Second, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the district court clearly erred when it relied
on the possibility that the Northern District of California lacked
129
personal jurisdiction over Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH.
Section 1404(a), the Federal Circuit explained, does not require that
the transferee court have jurisdiction over the plaintiff; it only
requires that the alternative venue have jurisdiction over the
130
defendants.
Because Genentech and Biogen Idec Inc. met “their
burden of establishing that the district court clearly abused its
discretion in denying transfer . . . and because [the Federal Circuit]
determine[d] that mandamus relief [was] appropriate,” the Federal
131
Circuit granted the petition for a writ of mandamus.
132
In In re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., the Federal Circuit granted a
petition for a writ of mandamus, finding that the Eastern District of
123. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
124. 566 F.3d 1338, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
125. Id. at 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035.
126. Id. at 1343, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031.
127. Id. at 1345–46, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033.
128. Id. at 1346, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034 (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)).
129. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
130. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
131. Id. at 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035.
132. 587 F.3d 1333, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1861 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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Texas abused its discretion in denying a motion to transfer venue to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
133
The Federal Circuit found, as it did in
pursuant to § 1404(a).
TS Tech, Volkswagen, and Genentech, “a stark contrast in relevance,
134
convenience and fairness between the two venues.” The court also
found “no connection between [the] case and the Eastern District of
Texas except that in anticipation of . . . litigation, [plaintiff’s] counsel
in California converted into electronic format 75,000 pages of
documents demonstrating conception and reduction to practice and
135
transferred them to the offices of its litigation counsel in Texas.”
The court reiterated that § 1404(a) “should be construed to prevent
parties who are opposed to a change of venue from defeating a
transfer which, but for their own deliberate acts or omissions, would
136
be proper, convenient and just.”
The Federal Circuit also found
that the district court gave too much weight to its ability to compel a
137
witness’s attendance at trial.
The Federal Circuit pointed out that
the district court in that case could have compelled only one
potential nonparty witness to testify at trial, and that it could have
done so only by inconveniencing that witness and by having the
138
witness travel more than 100 miles to attend. In contrast, the court
found that the Eastern District of North Carolina could “compel at
least four potential nonparty witnesses for both trial and deposition
139
and could do so without similar inconvenience to those witnesses.”
The Federal Circuit stated further that “[t]he district court also
disregarded Volkswagen and Genentech in holding that the Eastern
District of North Carolina had no more of a local interest in deciding
140
[the] matter than the Eastern District of Texas.” The court noted
that, “[w]hile the sale of an accused product offered nationwide does
not give rise to a substantial interest in any single venue, if there are
significant connections between a particular venue and the events
that gave rise to a suit, this factor should be weighed in that venue’s
141
favor.”
Finding that the Eastern District of North Carolina’s
133. Id. at 1334–35, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861–62.
134. Id. at 1336, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
135. Id. 1336–37, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
136. Id. at 1337, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863 (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612, 625 (1964)).
137. Id. at 1338, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
138. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
139. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
140. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
141. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864 (citing In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d
1315, 1321, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1567, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Volkswagen of
Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc),
cert. denied sub nom. Singleton v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1336 (2009)).
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interest was “self-evident,” the court granted the petition and ordered
142
a transfer.
143
The court applied similar reasoning in In re Nintendo Co. when it
granted Nintendo Co. and Nintendo of America, Inc.’s petition for a
144
writ of mandamus.
Nintendo sought transfer from the Eastern
District of Texas to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
145
Washington pursuant to § 1404(a).
The court explained that it
“has held and holds again in this instance that in a case featuring
most witnesses and evidence closer to the transferee venue with few
or no convenience factors favoring the venue chosen by the plaintiff,
146
the trial court should grant a motion to transfer.”
In sum, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the district court:
(1) applied too strict of a standard to allow transfer; (2) gave too
much weight to the plaintiff’s choice of venue; (3) misapplied the
forum non conveniens factors; (4) incorrectly assessed the [Fifth
Circuit’s] 100-mile tenet; (5) improperly substituted its own central
proximity for a measure of convenience of the parties, witnesses,
and documents; and (6) glossed over a record without a single
147
relevant factor favoring the plaintiff’s chosen venue.

In In re Nintendo, all of the key witnesses resided in Washington,
Japan, Ohio, and New York, and no witnesses lived in Texas.
The court applied the Fifth Circuit’s “100-mile” guideline, which
states, “[W]hen the distance between an existing venue for trial of a
matter and a proposed venue under § 1404(a) is more than 100
miles, the factor of inconvenience to witnesses increases in direct
148
relationship to the additional distance to be traveled.”
The court
found that the average travel required for each of the U.S.-based
witnesses to Texas would have been approximately 700 miles more
149
than travel to Washington.
The court concluded that the cost of
150
attendance for willing witnesses clearly favored transfer.
The Federal Circuit also rejected the district court’s hypothesis that
the Eastern District of Texas could serve as a “centralized location”
when sources of proof were situated in distant locations like Japan,

142. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
143. 589 F.3d 1194, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
144. Id. at 1201, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156.
145. Id. at 1197, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1153.
146. Id. at 1198, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
147. Id. at 1200, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
148. Id. at 1199, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154 (quoting In re Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied
sub nom. Singleton v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1336 (2009)).
149. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
150. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
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151

Washington, California, and New York.
Accordingly, the court
granted Nintendo’s petition and ordered transfer of the case to the
152
Western District of Washington.
B. Jurisdiction and Standing
1.

Jurisdiction and standing in declaratory judgment actions
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that, in all cases of actual
controversy where there is federal jurisdiction, district courts may
preside over actions for the declaration of rights and other legal
153
interests between parties.
In 2009, the Federal Circuit considered
several cases that touched on jurisdictional and standing questions in
declaratory judgment actions.
154
In Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Technology Ltd., the Federal
Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision that it lacked declaratory
judgment jurisdiction over a British biotechnology company, Oxford
155
Gene Technology Ltd. In analyzing whether Oxford was subject to
general personal jurisdiction, the court concluded that Oxford’s
contacts with the forum state did not qualify as “continuous and
156
systematic general business contacts.”
Specifically, the court was
not persuaded that Oxford’s attendance at several conferences in
California and the existence of license agreements with a California
157
corporation were evidence of continuous and systematic contacts.
The court also concluded that Oxford did not have minimum
contacts with California sufficient to establish specific personal
158
jurisdiction. In so holding, the court followed the rule set forth in
159
Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten International Co. that courts, when
determining whether specific personal jurisdiction exists in a
declaratory judgment action against a patentee, should consider only
enforcement or defense efforts that relate to the patent and not the
160
commercialization efforts of the patentee.
Although the court
acknowledged its concern that “foreign patentees like Oxford may
151. Id. at 1199–200, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
152. Id. at 1201, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156.
153. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02 (2006).
154. 566 F.3d 1012, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
155. Id. at 1023–24, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018.
156. Id. at 1017, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009–10 (quoting Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)).
157. Id. at 1018, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
158. Id. at 1021, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013.
159. 552 F.3d 1324, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 2796 (2009).
160. Autogenomics, 566 F.3d at 1020, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012 (citing Avocent,
552 F.3d at 1336, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487–88).
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engage in significant commercialization and licensing efforts in a
state while benefiting from the shelter of the Avocent rule,” the court
161
noted that it is “nonetheless bound by Avocent.”
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Newman argued that Oxford
satisfied the minimum contacts requirement because many of
162
Oxford’s contacts directly relate to the patent at issue in the lawsuit.
Judge Newman pointed to Oxford’s ownership of several U.S.
patents, its exercise of patent rights through licensees in California,
its entrance into a manufacturing venture with a California company,
its exhibition of its technology at trade shows in California, its
employees’ travel to California to negotiate with potential licensees,
163
and its sale of products to at least one customer in California.
Moreover, Judge Newman reasoned that even if the showing of
minimum contacts was weak, considerations of fairness and
164
reasonableness tilted the balance toward establishing jurisdiction.
She found that the majority’s holding was inconsistent with the
court’s recent decision in Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com.
165
de Equip. Medico, which concerned a patent infringement suit filed
against a Brazilian entity whose products were offered for sale at
166
trade shows in the United States.
Judge Newman disagreed with
the majority’s conclusion that Synthes was not relevant because the
foreign party was the accused infringer and not the patentee in the
167
declaratory judgment action. She also disagreed that the panel was
168
bound by the Avocent rule.
In Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. (Revolution Eyewear
169
I), the Federal Circuit considered the effect of a “covenant not to
170
sue” on a court’s jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
The covenant was limited to the asserted patent and to activities prior
171
to dismissal of the action.
The accused infringer, Aspex Eyewear,
Inc., objected to the district court’s dismissal of its counterclaims,
arguing that an “actual controversy continued to exist because

161. Id. at 1021, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1012.
162. Id. at 1024–25, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015 (Newman, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1024, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
164. Id. at 1025, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
165. 563 F.3d 1285, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
166. Autogenomics, 566 F.3d at 1026, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
167. Id. at 1027, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016–17.
168. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
169. 556 F.3d 1294, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
170. Id. at 1295, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
171. Id. at 1296, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887.
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Revolution Eyewear’s covenant applied only to past infringement.”
The Federal Circuit concluded that Revolution Eyewear retained the
right to sue for future infringement and, therefore, “the district court
erred in holding that Revolution’s covenant not to sue for past
infringement [divested] the court of jurisdiction [over] Aspex’s
173
In so holding, the court stated that a declaratory
counterclaims.”
action is available when the facts as alleged “show that there is a
substantial controversy, between the parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance
174
of a declaratory judgment.”
175
the Federal Circuit
In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC,
reversed dismissal for lack of declaratory judgment jurisdiction
because “under the totality of the circumstances . . . it was not
unreasonable for HP to interpret Acceleron’s letters as implicitly
176
asserting its rights under [a patent].”
The court explained that,
“[i]n its first letter to HP, Acceleron identified itself as the owner of
[U.S. Patent No. 6,948,021 (“the ‘021 patent”)], which it described as
177
‘relating to Blade Servers.’” In this letter, Acceleron requested that
178
HP “not file suit,” and imposed a two-week deadline to respond.
In its second letter to HP, Acceleron again imposed a two-week
deadline to respond “and insisted that if HP did not respond . . . by
the deadline, it would understand that HP did not ‘have anything to
say about the merits of this patent, or its relevance to [HP’s] Blade Server
179
The court reiterated that the test for declaratory
products.’”
judgment jurisdiction is “objective” and that “conduct that can be
reasonably inferred as demonstrating intent to enforce a patent can
180
create declaratory judgment jurisdiction.”
Because an objective
look at the facts “show[ed] that Acceleron took the affirmative step of
twice contacting HP directly, making an implied assertion of its rights
under the ‘021 patent against HP’s Blade Server products, and [that]
HP disagreed,” the court found “a ‘definite and concrete’ dispute

172. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887.
173. Id. at 1300, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891.
174. Id. at 1297, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888 (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1229 (2007)).
175. 587 F.3d 1358, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1948 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
176. Id. at 1363, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
177. Id. at 1362, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951 (citation omitted).
178. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
179. Id. at 1362–63, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951 (citation omitted).
180. Id. at 1363, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951 (emphasis omitted).
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181

between HP and Acceleron.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
182
reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded.
2.

Jurisdiction over foreign defendants in patent-related actions
The Federal Circuit found the exercise of personal jurisdiction
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) proper in two
cases involving foreign defendants in 2009. Rule 4(k)(2) permits a
court to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if (1) the claim
against the defendant arises under federal law; (2) the defendant is
not subject to the personal jurisdiction of any state court of general
jurisdiction; and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports
183
with due process.
In Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. de Equip. Medico,
184
which Judge Newman discussed in her dissent in Autogenomics,
the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the district court to
dismiss an infringement suit for lack of personal jurisdiction over the
185
defendants.
The Federal Circuit held that, under Rule 4(k)(2),
the defendant’s contacts within the United States as a whole were
186
sufficient to give rise to federal district court personal jurisdiction.
The court found that the claim arose out of federal law, as it was a
187
claim for patent infringement.
Further, the court noted that
neither party disputed G.M. dos Reis’s contention that it is not
188
subject to personal jurisdiction in any forum in the United States.
Under these circumstances, the court applied a due process analysis
under Rule 4(k)(2) and considered G.M. dos Reis’s contacts with the
189
nation as a whole.
The Federal Circuit agreed that the district court did not have
general personal jurisdiction over G.M. dos Reis based on its minimal
contacts, which included attendance at trade shows, purchases of
parts and a machine, the sale of a product to one customer, and a
190
pair of consultations about product development. The court held
that these contacts within the United States were not “continuous and
181. Id. at 1364, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
182. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
183. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
184. 566 F.3d 1012, 1026, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1006, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
185. Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d
1285, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
186. See id. at 1296–300, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616–19 (applying the Rule
4(k)(2) requirements).
187. Id. at 1296, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006)).
188. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.
189. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.
190. Id. at 1297, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
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191

systematic general business contacts.”
The Federal Circuit,
nonetheless, disagreed that the district court lacked specific personal
192
The court determined that by
jurisdiction over G.M. dos Reis.
bringing its product into the United States and by displaying it at a
trade show, G.M. dos Reis purposefully directed its activities toward
the United States, even though it informed the trade show
193
participants that its products were not for sale.
The court
determined further that the claim for patent infringement arose out
of G.M. dos Reis’s activities within the forum and that jurisdiction
194
over G.M. dos Reis was reasonable and fair.
Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing
Synthes’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and remanded
195
for further proceedings.
The court applied similar reasoning when it considered whether
the act of filing an application for a U.S. patent at the USPTO is
sufficient to subject a foreign attorney to personal jurisdiction in a
malpractice claim based on that filing. In Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin &
196
Parr, a panel majority concluded that filing the application was
sufficient to confer jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) for several
reasons. First, the court found that the Canadian attorney and law
firm “purposefully directed their activities at parties in the United
States and thus had ‘minimum contacts’ sufficient to satisfy due
197
process.”
The court found further that the attorney and law firm
entered into a contract to obtain a U.S. patent, thereby availing
198
themselves of the laws of the United States.
The court also
determined that Touchcom’s malpractice claims arose out of the
attorney filing an allegedly deficient U.S. patent application with a
U.S. agency and that the exercise of jurisdiction over the Canadian
199
attorney and law firm was reasonable and fair.
Judge Prost
dissented, stating that this case presented “one of the ‘rare situations’
in which minimum contacts are present but exercising personal
200
jurisdiction would nevertheless violate due process.”
Specifically,
Judge Prost noted that “the plaintiff’s interest and the state’s interest
191. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–16 (1984)).
192. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
193. Id. at 1297–98, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617–19.
194. Id. at 1299, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.
195. Id. at 1300, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619.
196. 574 F.3d 1403, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
197. Id. at 1416, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
198. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
199. Id. at 1417–18, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618–19.
200. Id. at 1419, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619 (Prost, J., dissenting).
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in adjudicating the dispute in the forum are so attenuated that they
are clearly outweighed by the burden of subjecting the defendant to
201
litigation within the forum.”
3.

Standing questions involving universities
The Federal Circuit considered standing in the context of
university research in two cases in 2009 and found that the plaintiffs
lacked standing in both cases.
Defective title in the patents-in-suit deprived a plaintiff of standing
in Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche
202
Molecular Systems, Inc.
In that case, the Federal Circuit
acknowledged that “questions of standing can be raised at any time
and are not foreclosed by, or subject to, statutes of limitation,” and it
considered whether certain patent assignment clauses created an
203
automatic assignment or a mere obligation to assign. The inventorplaintiff in that case signed multiple contracts concerning rights to
his invention; for example, in a 1995 agreement with the Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, the inventor agreed
“to assign or confirm in writing to Stanford and/or Sponsors” the rights
204
to inventions he may conceive or actually reduce to practice.
The Federal Circuit concluded that this language showed only an
agreement to assign the inventor’s invention rights at some future
time and, thus, the university had not obtained title to the inventions,
either at the time of signing the agreement or at the time of
205
A second agreement signed six years earlier, on the
invention.
other hand, recited, “I will assign and do hereby assign to CETUS,
my right, title, and interest in each of the ideas, inventions and
206
improvements.” The court concluded that such language served to
immediately transfer to CETUS equitable title in the inventions and
that legal title vested in CETUS in 1992 when the patent application
207
for the inventions was filed at the USPTO. Accordingly, the court
determined that the inventor had no rights to transfer to the
university in 1995.

201. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619 (quoting Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal
Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1568, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1009 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
202. 583 F.3d 832, 848, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1442, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
203. Id. at 841, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448 (citing Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss
Ry. Prods., 320 F.3d 1354, 1357, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985, 1994 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
204. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448.
205. Id. at 841–42, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1448.
206. Id. at 842, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
207. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449.
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Stanford attempted to take complete rights to the inventions under
35 U.S.C. § 200 and 35 U.S.C. § 202, which allow “the Government to
take title to ‘subject inventions’ under certain circumstances, . . . or
the ‘contractor’ universities or inventors to retain ownership if the
208
Government does not.”
Citing its prior rulings, however, the
Federal Circuit concluded that Stanford’s election of title under the
Patent Act did not have “the power to void any prior, otherwise valid
209
assignments of patent rights.”
Because Stanford’s claim of title
under the Patent Act occurred six years after the inventor’s valid
transfer of rights to CETUS, the court concluded that election under
210
the Patent Act did not give Stanford superior title to the patents.
For these reasons, the court concluded that Stanford lacked standing
to sue for infringement of the patents, and the district court lacked
jurisdiction over Stanford’s infringement claims.
211
In AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Medical, LLC, the Federal Circuit
raised sua sponte the issue of AsymmetRx, Inc.’s lack of standing to
sue for infringement without joining the President and Fellows of
212
Harvard College. Harvard, the owner of rights in patents related to
detecting malignant carcinoma, granted to Biocare Medical, LLC the
213
right to make, use, and sell relevant antibodies.
The Biocare
license stated that it did “not include a license under any U.S. or
214
foreign patents.”
“A few years later, Harvard entered into an agreement with
AsymmetRx . . . [giving AsymmetRx] ‘an exclusive commercial
license’” to the patents-in-suit, but reserving certain rights for
215
Harvard.
AsymmetRx subsequently sued Biocare for patent
infringement. The Federal Circuit concluded that because Harvard
retained substantial interests under the patents-in-suit, including the
right to sue for infringement, AsymmetRx was a mere licensee, and
216
Harvard had to join in any infringement suit. The Federal Circuit
further concluded that joining Harvard pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 19 would not only resolve the standing issue, but

208. Id. at 844, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 202(a), (b), (d)
(2006)).
209. Id. at 844–45, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450–51.
210. See id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450–51.
211. 582 F.3d 1314, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
212. Id. at 1318, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115–16.
213. Id. at 1316, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
214. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114 (quoting the parties’ license agreement).
215. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1114.
216. Id. at 1321, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
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would also facilitate resolution of the relationships between the three
217
parties.
4.

Other jurisdiction and standing issues in patent infringement suits
The question of jurisdiction also arose in the context of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which sets forth the grounds on which
a court may relieve a party from an otherwise final judgment or
218
A judgment may be
order, including “voidness of the judgment.”
declared void if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction, or if
219
the court’s action amounts to a violation of due process.
220
In Garber v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision to deny a Rule 60(b)(4) motion,
holding that a stipulation for dismissal without prejudice filed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) divested the
221
district court of subject matter jurisdiction. The parties had filed a
222
stipulated motion to dismiss the suit without prejudice. In granting
the motion, the district court gave the plaintiff one month “to move
223
to reinstate this case.” After the deadline passed, the district court
224
entered a second order dismissing the case with prejudice.
The plaintiff sought to vacate as void the district court’s first dismissal
order on the ground that the district court lacked subject matter
225
jurisdiction over the case.
The plaintiff argued, and the Federal
Circuit agreed on appeal, that the joint stipulation of the parties was
filed under Rule 41(a)(1), which served to dismiss the case without
226
action from the district court. Because the dismissal orders entered
by the district court were void ab initio, the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for relief and
227
vacated the orders.
The Federal Circuit also considered the appropriateness of a
dismissal with prejudice in the context of standing. In University of
228
Pittsburgh v. Varian Medical Systems, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that
the district court erred when it dismissed with prejudice a suit
217. Id. at 1321–22, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119.
218. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir.
1990) (citing V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224 (10th Cir. 1979)).
220. 570 F.3d 1361, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
221. Id. at 1364–65; 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380.
222. Id. at 1362, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378.
223. Id. at 1363, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378 (citation omitted).
224. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378–79.
225. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
226. Id. at 1364–65, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380.
227. Id. at 1366, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381.
228. 569 F.3d 1328, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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brought by the University of Pittsburgh against Varian Medical
Systems, Inc. Varian had moved for summary judgment, alleging that
Carnegie Mellon University was a co-owner of the patents and, thus,
the University of Pittsburgh alone lacked standing to sue for
229
infringement.
The University of Pittsburgh then moved to join
Carnegie Mellon pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, but
230
the district court denied the motion without explanation.
The district court dismissed the case with prejudice on the grounds
that (1) the University of Pittsburgh should have joined Carnegie
Mellon when it first brought suit, and (2) “Pitt’s attempt to join
231
Carnegie Mellon was ‘untimely and unfair to Varian.’”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied an abuse of discretion
standard and rejected both of the district court’s reasons for
232
dismissing the case with prejudice.
The court held that, although
all patent owners must be joined to maintain an infringement action,
a dismissal for failure to join a necessary party or, more generally,
for lack of standing, is not an adjudication on the merits and thus
233
should not have preclusive effect.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit
held that, although the district court had the discretion to dismiss the
case for lack of standing, or under Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join a
patent co-owner under Rule 19, it lacked the discretion to do so with
234
prejudice.
To determine whether dismissal with prejudice was an appropriate
sanction, the court applied Third Circuit law, which provides that
235
dismissal with prejudice is rarely a proper sanction.
The Third
Circuit instructs courts to analyze four nonexclusive factors to
236
determine whether dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. Because
the Federal Circuit found that the district court failed to discuss or
provide support for any of the relevant factors, and because dismissal

229. Id. at 1330, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253.
230. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253.
231. Id. at 1331, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253–54 (citation omitted).
232. See id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253–54 (citing H.R. Techs., Inc. v.
Astechnologies, Inc., 275 F.3d 1378, 1384, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1271, 1275 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (noting that the Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law in reviewing
cases dismissed with prejudice)).
233. Id. at 1332, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254.
234. Id. at 1333, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
235. Id. at 1334, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256 (quoting Donnelly v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir. 1982)).
236. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256 (explaining that the four factors include
“(1) the degree of the plaintiff’s personal responsibility for the delay; (2) prejudice
to the defendant occasioned by the delay; (3) any history that the plaintiff proceeded
in a dilatory manner; and (4) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal”
(quoting Madesky v. Campbell, 705 F.2d 703, 704 (3d Cir. 1983))).
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with prejudice is a harsh sanction disfavored under Third Circuit law
and not justified on the record, the Federal Circuit concluded that
237
the district court improperly dismissed the case with prejudice.
Accordingly, the court vacated the dismissal and remanded
“with instructions to designate the dismissal as without prejudice to
Pitt’s ability to establish standing through the joinder of Carnegie
Mellon or the assignment of whatever rights Carnegie Mellon may
238
have in the patents in suit.”
The issue of standing also arose in the context of inventorship.
239
In Larson v. Correct Craft, Inc., the Federal Circuit concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of the appeal because Larson
lacked standing in the district court to correct patents where a claim
to correct inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256 was the only basis for
240
removal from state court.
Larson sued Correct Craft, Inc. in Florida state court, asserting
state-law and declaratory judgment claims concerning the parties’
241
rights to the patents.
Correct Craft removed the case to federal
court, citing Larson’s addition of the declaratory judgment claims,
which sought removal of two individuals as coinventors of the
242
patents. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
243
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered two
the defendants.
244
issues related to the basis of federal jurisdiction. First, the Federal
Circuit examined “whether Correct Craft (in removing the case) and
the district court (in exercising jurisdiction) correctly treated
[Larson’s] declaratory-judgment claims as implicating [35 U.S.C.]
245
§ 256,” even though the claims did not actually invoke § 256.
The court concluded that Larson sought a judicial determination
that he, rather than the named coinventors, is the true and sole
246
inventor of the patented invention. Because this “is the same relief
that the patent statute provides in § 256,” the court accepted that
Larson pled an action for correction of inventorship pursuant to
247
federal law.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 1335, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.
Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.
569 F.3d 1319, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1327, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346.
Id. at 1322, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343.
Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343.
Id. at 1323, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343.
Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1344.
Id. at 1324, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1344.
Id. at 1325, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.
Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.
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The Federal Circuit also examined whether Larson, having not yet
prevailed on his separate claim for equitable relief setting aside the
patent assignments, nevertheless had standing to pursue a claim for
248
correction of inventorship in federal court. The court noted that a
plaintiff in an action under § 256 need not have an ownership
interest at stake in the suit to have standing and that a “concrete
financial interest” in the patents was enough to satisfy the
requirements for constitutional standing—namely, injury, causation,
249
The court found that Larson had no concrete
and redressability.
financial interest in the patents, however, because he had
affirmatively transferred title to Correct Craft and thus stood “to reap
250
no benefit from a preexisting licensing or royalties arrangement.”
The court found that “[h]is only path to financial reward under § 256
[depended on] him first succeeding on his state-law claims and
251
obtaining rescission of the patent assignments.”
Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit held that Larson had no constitutional standing to
sue for correction of inventorship in federal court, vacated the
judgment of the district court, and remanded with instructions to
252
return the case to state court.
The Federal Circuit left open the
question of “whether a purely reputational interest is sufficient to
253
confer standing for a § 256 claim.”
Finally, the issue of standing arose in two cases in the context of
patent ownership. In Tyco Healthcare Group LP v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery,
254
Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal without prejudice where
Tyco Healthcare Group LP failed to prove ownership of the asserted
255
patents and thus lacked standing to sue. The court explained that,
“as of March 1999, all necessary rights to enforce the [three patents256
in-suit] resided in [U.S. Surgical Corporation (USSC)].” On April
1, 1999, USSC entered into a Contribution Agreement that
transferred patents to Kendall LLP, except “any and all patents and
patent applications relating to any pending litigation involving
257
258
USSC.” Kendall eventually changed its name to Tyco Healthcare.

248. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.
249. Id. at 1326, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345–46 (citing Chou v. Univ. of Chi.,
254 F.3d 1347, 1359, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
250. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346.
251. Id. at 1326–27, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346.
252. Id. at 1328, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347.
253. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347.
254. 587 F.3d 1375, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1940 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
255. Id. at 1377, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
256. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941.
257. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941–42.
258. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
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The ownership of the patents-in-suit thus rested on the correct
interpretation of the contractual phrase “related to pending
259
litigation” under Third Circuit law. The court construed the phrase
to mean that the patents “could not have been asserted in or affected
260
by any litigation pending as of April 1, 1999.”
Because “Tyco
Healthcare bore the burden of proving that the patents-in-suit [were]
not ‘related to’ any litigation pending at the time the Contribution
Agreement was executed,” but failed to do so, the court affirmed the
261
dismissal.
Turning to the nature of the dismissal, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in dismissing without prejudice because Tyco Healthcare may
262
become able to cure the ownership deficiency. Moreover, because
“the ownership issue was not identified to the court as an issue to be
litigated during trial,” but was first raised during cross-examination of
a witness at trial, the court found no undue prejudice to Ethicon
263
Endo-Surgery, Inc.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Newman stated
that “Tyco established, and Ethicon did not dispute, that the [patentsin-suit] were not related to any litigation pending on April 1, 1999”
and, thus, the “patents were transferred by USSC to Tyco in
264
accordance with the transfer in the Contribution Agreement.”
265
In Sky Technologies LLC v. SAP AG, the Federal Circuit considered
whether the district court correctly determined that patent ownership
266
was properly transferred by operation of state foreclosure law.
The patent owner, Ozro Inc., granted a security interest in the
267
patents-in-suit to a lender.
The court explained that if Ozro
defaulted, the lender “had ‘the right to exercise all the remedies of a
secured party upon such default under the Massachusetts [Uniform
268
Commercial Code].’”
Ozro subsequently defaulted on its loan
obligations and the lender issued a foreclosure notice which
269
“identified the patents-in-suit as those to be sold at public auction.”
In the meantime, the inventor negotiated a transfer of the ownership
270
of the patents-in-suit to his new company, Sky Technologies LLC.
259. Id. at 1378, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942.
260. Id. at 1379, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943.
261. Id. at 1380, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944.
262. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944.
263. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944.
264. Id. at 1385, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948 (Newman, J., dissenting).
265. 576 F.3d 1374, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2009), petition for cert.
filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3419 (U.S. Dec. 24, 2009) (No. 09-819).
266. Id. at 1379, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856–57.
267. Id. at 1376–77, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
268. Id. at 1377, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855 (internal citation omitted).
269. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
270. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
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The lender purchased all of Ozro’s assets at an auction and assigned
271
all of its rights in the patents-in-suit to Sky. After Sky sued SAP, SAP
272
moved to dismiss Sky’s complaint for lack of standing. The Federal
Circuit agreed with the district court, however, that because the
lender properly complied with the Massachusetts UCC foreclosure
requirements, title was transferred on the date of foreclosure and
273
then transferred to Sky. Because the court found that the chain of
title had not broken from Ozro to Sky, the court concluded that Sky
274
had standing to sue for patent infringement.
C. Standards of Pleading
1.

Inequitable conduct
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that, “[i]n alleging
fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” The Federal Circuit in
2009 reinforced the principle that inequitable conduct, while a
broader concept than fraud, must be pled with particularity under
Rule 9(b).
275
In Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for
276
leave to amend its answer to allege inequitable conduct.
In so
doing, the court held that “in pleading inequitable conduct in patent
cases, Rule 9(b) requires identification of the specific who, what,
when, where, and how of the material misrepresentation or omission
277
committed before the [US]PTO.”
Further, the court held that
while
knowledge and “intent” may be averred generally, a pleading of
inequitable conduct under Rule 9(b) must include sufficient
allegations of underlying facts from which a court may reasonably
infer that a specific individual (1) knew of the withheld material
information or of the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and
(2) withheld or misrepresented this information with a specific
278
intent to deceive the [US]PTO.

The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the
allegations of defendant S.A.A.T. Systems Application of Advanced
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 1378, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
See id. at 1380–81, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858.
See id. at 1382, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859.
575 F.3d 1312, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1316, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
Id. at 1327, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
Id. at 1328–29, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
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Technology, Ltd. (SAAT) were “deficient with respect to both the
particularity of the facts alleged and the reasonableness of the
279
inference of scienter.” The court noted three factual deficiencies.
First, SAAT’s pleading referred generally to “Exergen, its agents
and/or attorneys,” and failed “to identify the ‘who’ of the material
280
omissions and misrepresentation.”
That is, the pleadings “fail[ed]
to name the specific individual associated with the filing or
prosecution of the application . . . who both knew of the material
281
information and deliberately withheld or misrepresented it.”
Second, SAAT’s pleading failed to identify “the ‘what’ and ‘where’ of
the material omissions,” namely, “which claims, and which limitations
in those claims, the withheld references [were] relevant to, and
282
where in those references the material information [was] found.”
Third, SAAT’s pleading did not explain “‘why’ the withheld
information [was] material and not cumulative, and ‘how’ an
examiner would have used this information in assessing the
283
patentability of the claims.”
Further, the Federal Circuit found that the facts alleged in SAAT’s
pleading—that Exergen became aware of the withheld references
during the prosecution of its prior applications—did not give rise to a
reasonable inference of scienter because SAAT provided no factual
basis to infer that any specific individual who owed a duty of
284
disclosure knew of the allegedly material information.
As for
deceptive intent, while “[p]leading on ‘information and belief’ is
permitted under Rule 9(b) when essential information lies uniquely
within another party’s control,” the court held that the pleading must
set “forth the specific facts upon which the belief is reasonably
285
based.” The court found that SAAT’s pleading “provid[ed] neither
the ‘information’ on which it reli[ed] nor any plausible reasons for its
286
The court explained that “[t]he mere fact that an
‘belief.’”
applicant disclosed a reference during prosecution of one
application, but did not disclose it during prosecution of a related
application, [was] insufficient to meet the threshold level of
deceptive intent required to support an allegation of inequitable

279. Id. at 1329, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668–69.
280. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669.
281. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669.
282. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1570, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
283. Id. at 1329–30, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669.
284. Id. at 1330, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669.
285. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
286. Id. at 1331, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
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287

conduct.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the district
court “did not abuse its discretion in denying SAAT’s motion for
288
leave to add these allegations to [its] original answer.”
D. Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata, known as “claim preclusion” in
modern parlance, “precludes the relitigation of a claim, or cause of
action, or any possible defense to the cause of action which is ended
289
by a judgment of the court.” In a patent case, the doctrine of claim
preclusion requires an accused infringer to demonstrate that the
accused product or process in the second suit is “essentially the same”
290
as the accused product or process in the first suit.
The Federal Circuit in 2009 considered a question of first
impression—“whether [an] accused infringer may assert claim
preclusion when [the product in a second suit] remain[s]
unchanged” with respect to the sole claim limitations at issue in the
first suit, even if there are changes with respect to other claim
291
limitations. The court had previously emphasized that the focus for
claim preclusion should be on “material differences” between the two
292
accused devices, “but [had] not addressed directly whether the
focus of the ‘material differences’ test is on the claim limitations at
293
294
In Nystrom v. Trex Co., the court
issue in each particular case.”
found that the same claim limitations were at issue in the first and
second suits, that the constructions for those terms in the second suit
were the same as the constructions in the first suit, and that the bases
295
of noninfringement in the first suit were those constructions.
Thus, even though defendants, for purposes of summary judgment,
had conceded material differences between the products in the first
and second suits as to other limitations, the court focused on the
296
Concluding that the
claim limitations at issue in the first suit.
devices in the two cases were “insubstantially different” with respect
to the pertinent claim elements involved in the first suit, the Federal
287. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
288. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
289. Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 476, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1246
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18, 19 (1982)).
290. Id. at 479–80, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
291. Nystrom v. Trex Co., 580 F.3d 1281, 1285, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1060, 1062
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
292. See Foster, 947 F.2d at 480, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
293. Nystrom, 580 F.3d at 1285, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062–63.
294. 580 F.3d 1281, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
295. Id. at 1285, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063.
296. Id. at 1285–86, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063.
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Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the plaintiff was
precluded on res judicata grounds from litigating an infringement
297
claim.
E. Awards of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Attorneys’ fees are warranted for litigation misconduct or “if both
(1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the
298
litigation is objectively baseless.”
The Federal Circuit upheld
several awards of attorneys’ fees in 2009 in circumstances involving
litigation misconduct or willfulness.
299
In ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, Inc., the Federal
Circuit held that the district court did not commit clear error in
awarding attorneys’ fees. Applying its own precedent, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees under
300
35 U.S.C. § 285 for a portion of the litigation. The Federal Circuit
found that “[t]he district court applied the appropriate legal
standard and articulated several bases in support of the award, none
301
of which ICU [showed] to be clearly erroneous.”
The court
explained, for example, that “the district court found that ICU made
‘multiple, repeated misrepresentations . . . regarding its own patents
302
in an effort to conceal . . . errors.’”
Further, the Federal Circuit
held that the district court appropriately exercised its discretion in
holding that ICU’s misconduct warranted Rule 11 sanctions, and that
303
some of the misconduct warranted an award of attorneys’ fees.
In Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. (Revolution Eyewear
304
II), facts considered in an equitable intervening rights analysis—
facts that would normally be considered under a willful infringement
analysis—did not amount to “clear and convincing” evidence of
305
willfulness to support finding the case “exceptional.”
After a jury
trial, “the district court concluded that Revolution Eyewear was
entitled to absolute intervening rights and reduced the damages

297. See id. at 1286, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063.
298. Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381,
73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Prof’l Real Estate Investors
v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993)).
299. 558 F.3d 1368, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
300. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079.
301. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079.
302. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079 (citation omitted).
303. Id. at 1381, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080.
304. 563 F.3d 1358, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1733 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
305. Id. at 1372–74, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743–44 (citing Diego, Inc. v.
Audible, Inc., 505 F.3d 1362, 1366–67, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1246, 1248 (Fed. Cir.
2007)).
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award.” The district court, however, rejected Revolution Eyewear’s
equitable intervening rights defense, finding that the company acted
with unclean hands after it learned of the district court’s summary
307
judgment orders.
The district court also denied the motion for
attorneys’ fees filed by the counterclaimants, Contour Optik, Inc.,
Manhattan Design Studio, Inc., and Asahi Optical Co. (collectively
“Contour”), based on Revolution Eyewear’s alleged willful
308
infringement of the patent.
On appeal, Contour argued that there was “no distinction between
‘intervening rights’ willfulness and ‘exceptional case’ willfulness and,
therefore, the district court committed reversible error in denying
309
[its motion for] attorney fees based on willful infringement.”
The Federal Circuit noted that the issue of equitable intervening
rights was entirely equitable in nature and, as such, issues of fact
underlying the equitable intervening rights were matters for court,
310
not jury disposition. In contrast, the Federal Circuit noted that the
311
issue of willful infringement remained with the fact-finder.
The court explained that “Contour [had] failed to plead willful
312
infringement, and the fact finder did not examine the issue.”
This did not prevent the district court “from taking into account,
as dictated by the equities, facts that would normally be considered
313
under willful infringement analysis.”
But the court held that
“such a limited finding [of willfulness] on an equitable issue [would
not be] a sufficient clear and convincing finding of willfulness to
314
support finding the case exceptional.”
Finding no clear error in
the district court’s conclusion that the case was not exceptional, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Contour’s
315
motion for attorneys’ fees based on willful infringement.
316
In Wedgetail, Ltd. v. Huddleston Deluxe, Inc., the Federal Circuit
found that a lack of detailed analysis by the district court did not
warrant reversal and that the district court’s decision not to award
317
attorneys’ fees was, at most, harmless error.
The Federal Circuit

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id. at 1365, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737.
Id. at 1373, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
576 F.3d 1302, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1307, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
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reminded that, “because of the high level of deference owed to
district courts on this issue and the limited circumstances that could
qualify as exceptional, this court has not imposed a blanket
requirement that a district court provide its reasoning in attorney fee
318
cases.”
The Federal Circuit concluded that because Huddleston
Deluxe, Inc. could point to nothing in the record to support a
finding of exceptionality or otherwise suggest a need for the district
court to provide its reasoning, no useful purpose would be served by
319
a remand.
The Federal Circuit also considered the issue of costs in the
context of joint discovery. In Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v.
320
Mylan Laboratories Inc., the Federal Circuit remanded an award of
costs attributed to joint discovery for apportionment to prevent
double recovery. As the prevailing party, Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co.
submitted a bill of costs to the district court pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 seeking approximately
321
$2.2 million from Mylan Laboratories, Inc.
Mylan objected to
Daiichi’s bill of costs on several grounds, for example, by pointing
out the fact that certain discovery had been conducted jointly in this
action and in a separate action against Teva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in
322
a different court. Mylan asserted that “costs of the [joint] discovery
323
should be apportioned between the two actions.”
On appeal, the
Federal Circuit reviewed the award of costs for abuse of discretion
using Fourth Circuit law, under which Rule 54(d) “creates the
324
presumption that costs are to be awarded to the prevailing party.”
The Federal Circuit found that the Teva action had settled and that
the district court, in its order dismissing it, stated that the parties
325
would bear their own costs and attorneys’ fees. The Federal Circuit
relied on general principles of law from other circuits, noting that in
a case of joint discovery conducted in multiple actions pending in
different district courts, there is a risk of impermissible double
326
recovery.
318. Id. at 1305, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784.
319. Id. at 1307, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785–86.
320. 569 F.3d 1353, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
321. Id. at 1355, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275.
322. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275.
323. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275.
324. Id. at 1356, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276 (citing Cherry v. Champion Int’l
Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 1999)).
325. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276.
326. Id. at 1357, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277 (citing Marmo v. Tyson Fresh
Meats, Inc., 457 F.3d 748, 763–64 (8th Cir. 2006); EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v.
Century Indem. Co., 452 F.3d 44, 58 (1st Cir. 2006); In re Derailment Cases, 417 F.3d
840, 844 (8th Cir. 2005); Anderson v. Griffin, 397 F.3d 515, 522–23 (7th Cir. 2005);
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The Federal Circuit concluded that Daiichi had, in effect, already
recovered some costs through its settlement with Teva by agreeing
not to seek actual payment of costs as consideration for Teva
327
foregoing its appeal.
The court further concluded that Daiichi
could not recover more than its total entitlement by obtaining the
328
Accordingly, the court vacated the
same costs from Mylan.
judgment of the district court with respect to the award of costs
attributed to the joint discovery and remanded to the district court to
329
apportion the disputed costs.
F.

Discovery Practices and Sanctions
330

Under the Hatch-Waxman Act,
final Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval of an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) is automatically stayed for thirty months when a
patent owner files suit for patent infringement within forty-five days
331
of receiving a Paragraph IV notice letter. The purpose of the stay is
to allow the parties to litigate the patent infringement claims while
the ANDA filer pursues FDA approval of its generic drug. Pursuant
to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), a district court may shorten or
lengthen the thirty-month stay if “either party to the action failed to
332
reasonably cooperate in expediting the action.”
333
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the Federal
Circuit affirmed a holding that the statutory thirty-month stay may be
extended based on a party’s uncooperative discovery practices,
334
postponing the FDA’s final approval of Teva’s ANDA. In May 2006,
Teva filed an ANDA and Lilly subsequently sued Teva for patent
335
infringement.
The FDA then stayed approval of Teva’s ANDA for
336
thirty months. Thereafter, the district court set a trial date after the
337
end of the thirty-month period.
Less than two months before the
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 309 F.3d 494, 496–97 (8th Cir. 2002);
Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 517 n.13 (4th Cir.
2002); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 469 (3d Cir. 2000); Chisholm v.
UHP Projects, Inc., 205 F.3d 231, 237 (4th Cir. 2000); Camarillo v. Pabey, No. 2:05CV-455 PS, 2007 WL 3102144 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 22, 2007)).
327. Id. at 1358, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
328. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277.
329. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278.
330. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
331. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006).
332. Id.
333. 557 F.3d 1346, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
334. Id. at 1347–48, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922.
335. Id. at 1348–49, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
336. Id. at 1349, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
337. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
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discovery deadline, Teva amended its ANDA and produced one batch
sample before and two batch samples and related documentation
338
Lilly moved the district court to
after the discovery deadline.
extend the statutory thirty-month stay due to Teva’s alleged discovery
339
violations, and the district court granted the motion.
Teva then
340
filed a motion for an expedited appeal with the Federal Circuit.
On appeal, a panel majority determined that the record contained
sufficient evidence to support the order and that the district court
341
did not abuse its discretion in extending the thirty-month stay. In a
dissenting opinion, Judge Prost argued that the majority misapplied
the standard of review and granted too much deference to the district
342
court in extending the stay.
Discovery misconduct was also at issue in ClearValue, Inc. v. Pearl
343
River Polymers, Inc., where withholding relevant test results of an
344
accused product was considered sanctionable misconduct.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of attorneys’
fees under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37 as to the
345
appellants, but reversed the sanction as to their attorney.
ClearValue, Inc. and the inventor of the patent-in-suit filed an
infringement suit in which the district court determined that
ClearValue withheld, for over a year and a half, test results relevant to
346
a critical issue in the case. The district court imposed the “severest
sanctions” by striking the pleadings of ClearValue and the inventor,
by entering judgment for the appellees, and by imposing monetary
sanctions against ClearValue, the inventor, and their attorney, jointly
347
and severally, in the amount of $2,717,098.34.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first considered the district court’s
imposition of sanctions under Rules 26 and 37, and affirmed its
348
finding of sanctionable conduct.
The Federal Circuit also
considered the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees under Rule 37
and found no abuse of discretion in the award as to ClearValue and
338. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
339. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
340. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
341. Id. at 1350, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924.
342. See id. at 1352–53, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1925–27 (Prost, J., dissenting)
(arguing that interpretation of an ANDA stay is a “question of law reviewed without
deference” (citing Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1375,
61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1414, 1419 (Fed. Cir. 2002))).
343. 560 F.3d 1291, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
344. Id. at 1303, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366.
345. Id. at 1310, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
346. Id. at 1296, 1298, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361, 1363.
347. Id. at 1301, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364–65.
348. Id. at 1304, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366–67.
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the inventor because the “[a]ppellees submitted affidavits as to the
349
The Federal
reasonableness of the attorney’s fees they incurred.”
Circuit concluded, however, that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing joint and several liability on the attorney
350
under Rule 37.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that the
district court erred by failing to consider that the attorney did not
have the ability to pay when it fashioned the sanction against him as
351
required by the Fifth Circuit.
The Federal Circuit also found that
the appellants’ misconduct was a discovery violation properly
addressed under Rule 37 and that the district court abused its
discretion by resorting to its inherent powers to impose sanctions on
352
the appellants.
In a separate opinion, Judge Newman dissented with respect to the
panel’s exoneration of the attorney from the monetary consequences
353
of his admittedly improper actions. Agreeing that “ability to pay is a
factor that a court can consider,” Judge Newman found no evidence
354
that the attorney could not pay any share of the reduced award.
Accordingly, Judge Newman recommended that the matter be
remanded to the district court so that the court could consider the
355
attorney’s asserted inability to pay.
In ICU Medical, the Federal Circuit held that the district court did
356
not commit clear error when it granted Rule 11 sanctions.
The Federal Circuit noted that “the Supreme Court has advised all
appellate courts to ‘apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing
357
all aspects of a district court’s Rule 11 determination.’” Under this
standard, “[a] district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it
based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly
358
erroneous assessment of the evidence.”
The Federal Circuit
applied Ninth Circuit law in determining whether a sanctions award
under Rule 11 was appropriate, explaining that “a district court must
conduct a two-prong inquiry to determine (1) whether the complaint
[or relevant document] is legally or factually ‘baseless’ from an
349. Id. at 1305, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367–68.
350. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368.
351. Id. at 1305–06, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368 (quoting United States v.
Garrett, 238 F.3d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 2000)).
352. Id. at 1309, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371.
353. Id. at 1311, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
354. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
355. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
356. ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1381, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1072, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
357. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080 (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,
496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)).
358. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080 (citing Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405).
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objective perspective, and (2) if the attorney has conducted
359
‘a reasonable and competent inquiry’ before signing and filing it.”
Applying these laws, the Federal Circuit found that the district court
properly determined that ICU’s frivolous construction and assertion
of certain claims in its amended complaint justified sanctions under
360
Rule 11. The Federal Circuit also noted the district court’s decision
not to award monetary sanctions for the violations of Rule 11,
because the amount of the award of Rule 11 sanctions was
“subsumed” by the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded under § 285,
which “ha[d] sufficiently admonished ICU and its counsel for any
361
improper conduct under Rule 11.”
G. Appointment of Expert Witnesses
Federal Rule of Evidence 706 allows courts to appoint expert
witnesses in the interest of the people or to clarify existing
362
testimony. In Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. v. O2 Micro International
363
Ltd., the Federal Circuit found that a district court did not abuse its
discretion on expert witness appointment when that court was
confronted by an unusually complex and conflicting set of
364
consolidated cases.
Before trial commenced, the district court
considered appointing an independent expert under Federal Rule of
365
The parties ultimately agreed upon an expert who
Evidence 706.
366
testified at trial.
The jury found the patent invalid under
Monolithic Power Systems, Inc.’s “obviousness and on-sale bar
367
The expert’s testimony was largely consistent with
theories.”
368
Monolithic’s theory of the case.
On appeal, O2 Micro International Ltd. argued that the district
court’s appointment of the expert unduly burdened its Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial and violated Ninth Circuit precedent
establishing that there is no “complexity exception” to the Seventh
369
Amendment right. Upon review of the record, the Federal Circuit
found “no denial or encumbrance of O2 Micro’s jury demand or
359. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080 (quoting Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d
1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002)).
360. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080.
361. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080 (citation omitted).
362. FED. R. EVID. 706.
363. 558 F.3d 1341, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
364. Id. at 1348, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
365. Id. at 1345, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
366. Id. at 1345–46, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
367. Id. at 1346, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
368. Id. at 1345–46, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004.
369. Id. at 1347, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
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370

Seventh Amendment rights.” The court explained that the district
court properly permitted the parties to show cause why an expert
371
witness should not be appointed pursuant to Rule 706. Moreover,
the Federal Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has consistently
372
acknowledged the constitutionality of court-appointed experts.
Accordingly, although it recognized “that Rule 706 should be invoked
only in rare and compelling circumstances,” the Federal Circuit
found no abuse of discretion in appointing an independent expert in
this case “where the district court was confronted by what it viewed as
an unusually complex case and what appeared to be starkly
373
conflicting expert testimony.”
III. FEDERAL CIRCUIT PRACTICE
A. Writ of Mandamus
A writ of mandamus is drastic relief available only in extraordinary
374
circumstances to correct a clear abuse of discretion.
A party
seeking the relief bears the burden of proving that the grounds for
375
the issuance of a writ are “clear and indisputable.”
Courts have
used the writ of mandamus to correct a patently erroneous denial of
376
transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). A court may transfer
venue of a case “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
377
In 2008, for example, the Fifth Circuit, sitting
interest of justice.”
en banc, issued a writ of mandamus to transfer from the Marshall
Division of the Eastern District of Texas to the Dallas Division of the
Northern District of Texas a products liability suit arising out of a
378
fatal automobile accident in Dallas.
Following that decision, the

370. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
371. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005.
372. Id. at 1348, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
373. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
374. See, e.g., In re Calmar, Inc., 854 F.2d 461, 464, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1713, 1715
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (granting mandamus where the district court abused its discretion
in sanctioning counsel when counsel’s statements of law were correct).
375. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980) (citing Bankers
Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953)).
376. See, e.g., In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1317–18, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1567, 1567–68 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that it was clear error for the district
court to not consider the cost of witness travel and the importance of having local
interests decided locally).
377. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
378. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501
(5th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Singleton v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 1336 (2009).
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Federal Circuit in 2008 granted extraordinary relief to transfer a case
379
out of the Eastern District of Texas.
In 2009, the Federal Circuit addressed petitions for writs of
mandamus to transfer cases out of the Eastern District of Texas in
380
four cases.
On a single day in May, the Federal Circuit issued
rulings in two cases—one granting and the other denying the writ.
In the first case, In re Genentech, Inc., the Federal Circuit granted the
accused infringer’s petition for a writ of mandamus to direct the
Eastern District of Texas to transfer the case to the Northern District
381
of California. The petition arose out of a patent infringement suit
382
brought by Sanofi against California-based Genentech and Biogen.
The two biotechnology companies filed a related declaratory
judgment action in the Northern District of California and then filed
a motion to transfer the suit to California under 28 U.S.C.
383
§ 1404(a). Upon denial of the motion to transfer, Genentech and
384
Biogen sought a writ of mandamus.
The Federal Circuit determined that the convenience for the
witnesses weighed substantially in favor of a transfer because a
substantial number of material witnesses resided in California, and
385
no witnesses resided in Texas.
The court rejected a rigid
application of the “100-mile” rule, because it would give undue
weight to the inconvenience to European witnesses at the expense of
creating unnecessary inconvenience for witnesses in the United
386
States. Similarly, the court concluded that the convenience for the
parties supported transfer because both Genentech and Biogen are
California companies and European-based Sanofi would have to
387
travel a great distance regardless of the venue.
The court also
rejected the district court’s rationale that the physical location of
documents had diminished relevance in light of electronic storage
388
and transmission technology.

379. See TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 1317–18, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567–68 (issuing a
writ of mandamus to transfer a patent case from the Eastern District of Texas to the
Southern District of Ohio when none of the key witnesses resided in Texas and the
pertinent evidence was located mainly in Ohio).
380. See supra Part II.A.
381. 566 F.3d 1338, 1340, 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027, 1029, 1035 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
382. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029.
383. Id. at 1341, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029.
384. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030.
385. Id. at 1345, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032–33.
386. Id. at 1344, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1032.
387. Id. at 1345, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033.
388. Id. at 1345–46, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033.
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In the second case, In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., the Federal
Circuit denied a petition for a writ of mandamus to transfer a case
389
MHL, Tek, LLC,
from the Eastern District of Texas to Michigan.
a small Texas company operating out of Michigan, initiated two
lawsuits in the Eastern District of Texas asserting patent infringement
against thirty foreign and U.S. automobile companies, including
390
Volkswagen.
Volkswagen filed a declaratory judgment action
against MHL on the same patents in the Eastern District of Michigan,
which transferred the case to Texas “to avoid wasting judicial
391
resources and risking inconsistent rulings on the same patents.”
The Federal Circuit upheld the denial of the transfer to Michigan
under these circumstances based on the rationale that judicial
392
economy is served by having the same court try the same patents.
Later, in December 2009, the Federal Circuit granted petitions for
writs of mandamus in two additional cases. In In re Hoffmann-La Roche
393
Inc.,
Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc., a company
headquartered in California, brought a patent infringement action in
the Eastern District of Texas against the makers of a commercial HIV
394
inhibitor drug.
The Federal Circuit issued a writ of mandamus
directing the Eastern District of Texas to transfer the case to the
395
In granting the writ of
Eastern District of North Carolina.
mandamus, the court noted “a stark contrast in relevance,
396
convenience, and fairness between the two venues.”
The court
relied on a number of factors that favored transfer to the Eastern
District of North Carolina, including the fact that the accused drug
was developed and tested there, that the documents and sources of
proof were located there, that there existed strong local interest in
the case, that four party witnesses resided within 100 miles of the
397
court, and that the transferee court had a less congested docket.
Furthermore, the court found that there was “no connection
between [the] case and the Eastern District of Texas except [the]
398
anticipation of this litigation.”
The court viewed the plaintiff’s
electronic transfer of 75,000 pages of documents to its Texas local
counsel as “a fiction which appears to be have been [sic] created to
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

566 F.3d 1349, 1350, 1352, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1036, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036–37.
Id. at 1351, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037.
Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
587 F.3d 1333, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1861 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1334–35, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861–62.
Id. at 1335, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861.
Id. at 1336, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
Id. at 1336–37, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
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399

manipulate the propriety of venue.”
The court similarly found
unpersuasive the district court’s reliance on its ability to compel a
witness to attend trial because the witness resided more than
100 miles away from the court, and the Eastern District of Texas
400
lacked “absolute subpoena power.”
Similarly, in In re Nintendo Co., the Federal Circuit held that the
Eastern District of Texas clearly abused its discretion when it denied
the accused infringer’s motion to transfer venue to the Western
401
District of Washington.
Motiva LLC sued Nintendo Co., Ltd. and
Nintendo of America Inc. in the Eastern District of Texas, asserting
that the Nintendo Wii infringed Motiva’s patent relating to a human
402
movement measurement system.
Citing Volkswagen, TS Tech,
Genentech, and In re Hoffman-La Roche, the Federal Circuit stated that
“[t]his court has held and holds again in this instance that in a case
featuring most witnesses and evidence closer to the transferee venue
with few or no convenience factors favoring the venue chosen by the
403
plaintiff, the trial court should grant a motion to transfer.”
According to the court, “[n]o parties, witnesses, or evidence ha[d]
404
any material connection to the venue chosen by the plaintiff.”
For example, all identified key witnesses resided in Washington,
405
Japan, Ohio, and New York, and no witnesses lived in Texas.
In concluding that Nintendo had met the difficult burden of showing
406
“a clear and indisputable right to a writ,” the Federal Circuit
detailed the district court’s clear abuse of discretion as follows:
The district court: (1) applied too strict of a standard to allow
transfer; (2) gave too much weight to the plaintiff’s choice of
venue; (3) misapplied the forum non conveniens factors;
(4) incorrectly assessed the 100-mile tenet; (5) improperly
substituted its own central proximity for a measure of convenience
of the parties, witnesses, and documents; and (6) glossed over a
record without a single relevant factor favoring the plaintiff’s
407
chosen venue.

399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

Id. at 1337, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
Id. at 1337–38, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
589 F.3d 1194, 1196, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1152, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1153.
Id. at 1198, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
Id. at 1199, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
Id. at 1200, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
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B. Recall of Mandate
When an appellate court “modifies or reverses a judgment with a
direction that a money judgment be entered in the district court,
the mandate must contain instructions about the allowance of
408
interest.” Although the power to recall a mandate is exercised only
409
in extraordinary circumstances,
recall is appropriate when a
410
mandate lacks instructions on interest, as Rule 37(b) requires.
411
In Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., the Federal Circuit recalled its
original mandate because it did not instruct the district court to
award postjudgment interest to which Mars, Inc. was entitled under
412
Rule 37(b). In its original mandate, the Federal Circuit determined
that Mars lacked standing to recover damages from 1996 to 2003 and
413
therefore reduced the amount of the district court’s damages.
The court affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part the district court’s
judgment and remanded for “recalculation of damages for the period
414
prior to 1996 and for further proceedings.”
The mandate was
defective in that it did not contain any directive governing an award
of interest, so the court recalled the mandate to determine whether
415
Mars was entitled to the award. The court applied Third Circuit law
under which plaintiffs are generally entitled to postjudgment interest
416
when a decision is closer to an affirmance than a reversal.
The parties did not dispute that the Federal Circuit’s decision was
closer to an affirmance; thus, the Federal Circuit recalled the original
mandate and issued a new one, awarding postjudgment interest at
417
the statutory rate as of the date of the district court judgment.
C. Administrative Procedure Act
Although
dictates the
action, the
reached on

the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) generally
limited standards and grounds for review of agency
Federal Circuit has found that decisions can be
grounds beyond those considered by the USPTO.

408. FED. R. APP. P. 37(b).
409. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 550 (1998).
410. FED. R. APP. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (1967).
411. 557 F.3d 1377, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
412. Id. at 1379, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063.
413. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063.
414. Id. at 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062 (quoting Mars, Inc. v. Coin
Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1374, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1076, 1087 (Fed. Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 653 (2008)).
415. Id. at 1379, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063.
416. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063 (citing Loughman v. Consol. Penn. Coal
Co., 6 F.3d 88, 97 (3d Cir. 1993)).
417. Id. at 1379–81, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063–64.
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418

In In re Comiskey, the Federal Circuit affirmed the examiner’s
419
rejections based on grounds not even addressed by the USPTO.
In so doing, the court rejected Comiskey’s argument that its review
420
should be limited to the record before the USPTO under the APA.
The Federal Circuit held that “a reviewing court can (and should)
affirm an agency decision on a legal ground not relied on by the
421
agency if there is no issue of fact, policy, or agency expertise.”
The Federal Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in SEC v.
422
Chenery Corp., stating that a lower court’s decision “must be affirmed
if the result is correct although the lower court relied upon a wrong
423
ground or gave a wrong reason.” The Federal Circuit emphasized
the Chenery Court’s reasoning that “[i]t would be wasteful to send a
case back to a lower court to reinstate a decision which it had already
made but which the appellate court concluded should properly be
based on another ground within the power of the appellate court to
424
formulate.”
Thus, although the USPTO Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences (“Board”) had affirmed the examiner’s rejections
based on prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Federal Circuit did not
consider that reasoning and instead affirmed the rejections of
Comiskey’s method claims on the ground that they did not recite
425
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. As to the machine
claims, the court remanded the case to the USPTO to consider the
426
§ 101 question in the first instance.
D. Frivolous Appeal
An appellate court may award damages or impose sanctions for a
427
frivolous appeal.
An appeal is “‘frivolous as filed’ when an
appellant grounds his appeal on arguments or issues ‘that are beyond
the reasonable contemplation of fair-minded people, and no basis for

418. 554 F.3d 967, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1655 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
419. Id. at 973, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
420. Id. at 973–74, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659–60.
421. Id. at 974, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943)).
422. 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
423. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 974, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659 (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Chenery, 318 U.S. at 80).
424. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Chenery,
318 U.S. at 88).
425. Id. at 981, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
426. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
427. FED. R. APP. P. 38.
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reversal in law or fact can be or is even arguably shown.’”
An appeal is “‘frivolous as argued’ when an appellant has not dealt
fairly with the court, [or] has significantly misrepresented the law or
429
facts.”
430
In E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3Com Corp., the Federal Circuit
granted PalmSource, Inc.’s motion for sanctions against E-Pass
431
Technologies, Inc. for filing a frivolous appeal.
The court
concluded that the appeal was frivolous at least because E-Pass failed
to explain how the trial court erred or to present cogent or clear
432
arguments for reversal.
The court also found that E-Pass made
433
significant misrepresentations of the record and the law.
The Federal Circuit imposed a sanction against E-Pass “equal to the
amount of fees PalmSource incurred in defending th[e] appeal,
434
including the filing of the motion for sanctions.” Although he did
not take issue with most of the majority’s criticisms of E-Pass, Judge
Bryson dissented because he identified one issue that was reasonable
for E-Pass to pursue on appeal against PalmSource—whether the
district court abused its discretion for awarding fees “for periods
435
prior to the alleged misconduct.”
IV. AGENCY PRACTICE
A. United States Patent and Trademark Office
At the USPTO, the biggest news of 2009 was the Federal Circuit’s
decision to uphold three of the four Final Rules in the controversial
August 2007 rules package and the USPTO’s subsequent withdrawal
of the rules package. In one of the most anticipated decisions of the
year, a panel of the Federal Circuit in March 2009 upheld three out
of the four Final Rules in the USPTO’s new continuation rule

428. Abbs v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting State Indus.,
Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 948 F.2d 1573, 1578, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1738, 1742
(Fed. Cir. 1991)).
429. Id. (citation omitted).
430. 559 F.3d 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
431. Id. at 1376, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
432. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172 (“The tactics employed by E-Pass in
this appeal, including both the misrepresentations made and the failure to cogently
identify any reversible error of the district court, far outweigh any non-frivolous
argument that may be lurking in its briefs.”).
433. Id. at 1377, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170.
434. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
435. Id. at 1381, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
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436

package. The panel considered new Final Rules that set threshold
limits of two continuing applications and one request for
437
The rules also permit applicants to present five
continuation.
independent claims and twenty-five total claims and require
applicants who wish to exceed those limits to file an examination
438
support document.
Shortly after the Final Rules were published in the Federal Register,
Triantafyllos Tafas, Smithkline Beecham Corporation and Glaxo
439
Group Ltd. (collectively “Tafas”) filed suit against the USPTO.
Tafas moved for summary judgment, claiming that the Final Rules
440
were invalid and seeking a permanent injunction.
In April 2008,
the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment on the
grounds that four of the Final Rules were invalid because they were
“substantive rules that change[d] existing law and alter[ed] the rights
441
of [the] [appellees] under the Patent Act,” and therefore exceeded
the USPTO’s rulemaking authority. The USPTO appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit in March 2009 first addressed
whether the USPTO’s rulemaking authority is subject to a
procedural/substantive distinction. The court found that section
2(b)(2) of the Patent Act does not vest the USPTO with any general
442
substantive rulemaking power.
The court then considered what
level of deference it should give to the USPTO’s interpretation of
statutes pertaining to procedural rules within the agency’s delegated
443
authority and concluded that Chevron deference was appropriate.
The Federal Circuit then turned to whether the final rules were
substantive or procedural in nature and held that the four rules
under consideration were procedural in nature rather than
444
substantive.
Having found that the final rules are procedural, the Federal
Circuit then decided whether each of the rules is consistent with the
Patent Act. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the
continuation application rule (Rule 78) was invalid because it added

436. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
reh’g en banc granted, 328 F. App’x 658, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
stay granted and appeal held in abeyance, 331 F. App’x 748 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
437. Id. at 1350, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
438. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
439. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
440. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132.
441. Id. at 1350–51, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1132 (quoting Tafas v. Dudas,
541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814 (E.D. Va. 2008)).
442. Id. at 1352, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134.
443. Id. at 1353, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134.
444. Id. at 1356, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.

2010]

2009 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

861

an additional requirement that applicants could only claim the
benefit of an earlier filing date if the application contained no
amendments, arguments, or evidence that could have been
445
submitted earlier.
The court stated that such a requirement
conflicted with the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 120, which
provides that qualifying applicants “shall have” the benefit of the
446
earlier priority date.
Turning to the Request for Continued
Examination (RCE) rule (Rule 114), the Federal Circuit overturned
the district court’s ruling that it was invalid, holding that the Patent
Act did not unambiguously require the USPTO to grant unlimited
447
RCEs. Thus, the court held that the RCE rule did not conflict with
448
Lastly, the Federal Circuit held that the
the Patent Act.
pre-examination search and examination support document rules
(Rules 75 and 265) were valid and did not conflict with the Patent Act
or existing precedent because they do not set an absolute limit on the
number of claims and they do not alter the USPTO’s ultimate burden
449
to prove claims unpatentable.
The Federal Circuit reversed the
district court determination that Rules 75 and 265 violated the Patent
Act.
In summary, the Federal Circuit concluded that Rules 75, 78, 114,
and 265 were all procedural rules within the scope of the USPTO’s
rulemaking authority. The court found, however, that Rule 78
450
conflicts with 35 U.S.C. § 120 and is therefore invalid.
The court
451
ultimately remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.
On July 6, 2009, the Federal Circuit granted the USPTO’s petition
452
for rehearing en banc and vacated the Tafas panel ruling.
In a
motion filed on July 24, 2009, the private plaintiffs and the
government jointly asked the Federal Circuit to stay its en banc
review, including the briefing and oral argument schedules, until
sixty days after the U.S. Senate confirmed David Kappos as the new
453
director of the USPTO.
In October 2009, approximately two months after the confirmation
of Director Kappos, the USPTO announced that it was rescinding the
disputed rules package—a move that was universally applauded by
445. Id. at 1360, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139–40.
446. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140 (citation omitted).
447. Id. at 1363, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141–42.
448. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
449. Id. at 1363–64, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142–43.
450. Id. at 1364, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
451. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
452. Tafas v. Doll, 328 F. App’x 658, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
stay granted and appeal held in abeyance, 331 F. App’x 748 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
453. Tafas v. Doll, 331 F. App’x 748 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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the patent community.
In the notice, the USPTO noted that the
rule package included “provisions that were objectionable to a large
segment of the patent user community,” and that “the [USPTO] is
now considering other initiatives that would garner more of a
consensus with the patent user community to address the challenges
455
Thus, the USPTO announced that it is no
it currently faces.”
longer interested in pursuing the rules changes that were the subject
of the Tafas litigation.
456
In the case In re McNeil-PPC, Inc., the Federal Circuit examined
the issue of whether the date that triggers the start of the two months
457
to appeal is the date stamped on the decision or the mailing date.
In that case, the timeliness of McNeil-PPC, Inc.’s appeal from a Board
458
of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) decision was at issue.
On August 1, 2008, McNeil filed a notice of appeal from a Board
459
The Board’s order
decision rejecting McNeil’s claims as obvious.
included a typed date of decision of May 30, 2008, while the order’s
460
mailing sheet was dated June 2, 2008.
Under 35 U.S.C. § 142,
a party enjoys sixty days to file a written notice of appeal, meaning
that the timeliness of McNeil’s filing depended on whether May 30 or
461
June 2 was considered “the date of the decision.”
The Federal Circuit ultimately found that the appeal was timely,
462
holding that the date of decision was the mailing date. The court
noted that there was little guidance from the USPTO regulations or
463
The court
procedures as to what is meant by “date of decision.”
commented that “there is little that indicates whether we should or
464
must attribute any meaning” to that May 30 date.
On appeal,
the director did not provide any explanation of the Board’s internal
procedure for issuing opinions or whether the mailing date reflects
the decision’s public release. Nor did the director provide any
explanation of why the “Transaction History” conflicted with the
mailing sheet. With little guidance from the USPTO, the Federal
Circuit looked to the declaration of a retired member of the Board,

454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.

74 Fed. Reg. 52,686 (Oct. 14, 2009).
Id. at 52,687.
574 F.3d 1393, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1576 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1397–98, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
Id. at 1397, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578.
Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578.
Id. at 1396–97, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578.
Id. at 1397, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578–79.
Id. at 1398, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579–80.
Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
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465

submitted by McNeil.
The declaration explained that,
“[h]istorically, the date the PTO mailed a document was the date that
466
The declaration also explained
triggered any response period.”
that it was unclear why the opinion states May 30 but was not mailed
until June 2 and suggested that perhaps the mailroom was slow or
one of the Board members decided to revise or reconsider the
467
opinion between May 30 and June 2.
The Federal Circuit found
that the declarant’s explanation was the “most plausible explanation
for the conflicting evidence of when the Board took action,” and that
468
the date of decision was therefore the June 2, 2008 mailing date.
469
Thus, the court held that McNeil’s appeal was timely.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Dyk opined that the majority’s use
of the mailing date was “contrary to the plain language of the
regulation and precedent interpreting the nearly identical language
470
of the predecessor rule.” Judge Dyk asserted that the date listed on
an opinion’s front page conclusively shows when Board members
471
author, sign, and decide the opinion.
Additionally, Judge Dyk
argued that both Congress and the USPTO clearly rejected the
mailing date when they chose the relevant date as the “date of
472
decision.”
Judge Dyk noted that the USPTO, for example,
specifically prescribes the “mailing date” as the time from which an
appeal is due in the situation of petitions, but did not do so for Board
473
decisions.
Judge Dyk also cited previous decisions that had
addressed the precise issue presented in McNeil and “uniformly
474
rejected the majority’s approach.”
Contrary to the majority’s
holding, Judge Dyk believed the date of decision should be May 30,
475
2008.
In Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, the Federal Circuit reviewed
whether the filing of a U.S. patent application subjects a foreign
attorney to personal jurisdiction in federal district court in Virginia
for malpractice claims. The Federal Circuit, in limiting its analysis to
465. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
466. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
467. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
468. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
469. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
470. Id. at 1402, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
471. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
472. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
473. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
474. Id. at 1402–03, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582–83 (citing Barbacid v. Brown,
223 F. App’x 972, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Reese, 359 F.2d 462, 463, 149 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 362, 363 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (per curiam); Burton v. Bentley, 14 App. D.C. 471
(1899)).
475. Id. at 1403, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1583.
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specific jurisdiction, found that merely filing a U.S. patent
application and making related filings and communications with the
USPTO in Virginia is insufficient to meet constitutional “minimum
476
contacts” under Rule 4(k)(1)(A).
The Federal Circuit also
addressed personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), finding that the
patentee had made a prima facie case that the appellees were not
subject to personal jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general
477
jurisdiction.
The Federal Circuit noted that this issue could be
revisited on remand, and then turned to due process considerations,
finding that the exercise of jurisdiction in this case met due process
478
requirements.
B. International Trade Commission
Under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the International
Trade Commission (ITC) has the authority and obligation to
investigate and prohibit importation based on unfair competition
479
derived from patent, trademark, and copyright infringement. The
ITC has increasingly gained popularity in recent years. Substantive
decisions of the ITC are discussed elsewhere in this Area Summary;
this Section focuses on changes in practice and procedure at the ITC.
480
In Amgen, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, the Federal
Circuit granted a petition for rehearing to revise a portion of its 2008
481
decision.
The court’s 2009 decision modified the second part of
the earlier decision but left the first part unchanged. In the first part,
the court affirmed the ITC’s ruling that the safe harbor statute,
35 U.S.C. § 271(g), applies to process patents in actions under
section 337 “when the imported product is used for the exempt
482
purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).” In the revised second part, the
court declined to answer whether the ITC had jurisdiction to address
483
“imminent importations” in the absence of a contract for sale.
The ITC argued that it has jurisdiction under 19 U.S.C. § 1337
“only when there is an importation, sale for importation, or sale
484
within the United States after importation.”
Amgen argued that

476. 574 F.3d 1403, 1412, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1614 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
477. Id. at 1415, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
478. Id. at 1416, 1418, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617, 1619; see supra Part II.B.2.
479. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).
480. 565 F.3d 846, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
481. Id. at 848 n.1, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844.
482. Id. at 852, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
483. Id. at 853, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.
484. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.
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“an imminent importation will violate Section 337.” The court did
not address the issue because it found jurisdiction based upon
Amgen’s assertion of actual importation rather than upon the
486
imminent importation theory.
V. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
The Federal Circuit has explained that “[i]t is a ‘bedrock principle’
487
of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention.’”
The court will generally give the words of a patent claim their
ordinary and customary meaning, as understood from the perspective
488
of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.
To understand those words, the court looks to “those sources
available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art
489
would have understood [the] claim . . . to mean.”
Those public
sources include the language of the claims, the specification,
490
the prosecution history, and any relevant extrinsic evidence.
Over the past year, the Federal Circuit has issued a number of
decisions regarding claim construction, relying on each of these
different public sources. In addition, the court issued several key
decisions that clarified claim construction in special circumstances,
491
including product-by-process claims and copied claims in patent
492
interferences.
A. Claim Language
The claim itself can provide substantial guidance as to the meaning
493
of the particular terms of the claim.
In particular, the context in
494
which a term is used in the asserted claim can be instructive. In Ball
495
Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., the patent at
485. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.
486. Id. at 853–54, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.
487. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water
Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
488. Id. at 1313–14, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326–27.
489. Id. at 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc.,
381 F.3d at 1116, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005).
490. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
491. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1291–95, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1769, 1776–79 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Astellas Pharma, Inc. v.
Lupin Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 1052 (2010).
492. Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d 1366, 1374–75,
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1166–67 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
493. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
494. Id. at 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327–28.
495. 555 F.3d 984, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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issue involved “a candle tin with a removable cover that also acts as a
496
base for the candle holder.” The patent also claimed protrusions,
or feet, on the bottom of the candle holder that rest on top of the
497
cover when used as a base. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s construction of “to seat” to mean “either rest on or fit into the
498
That is, the Federal Circuit held that the term did not
cover.”
require an engagement between the candle holder and the cover,
499
as the defendants argued.
In construing the claim term, the Federal Circuit first looked at the
claim language. The claims recited “protrusions formed on the
closed end of the holder and extending therefrom, the protrusions
resting upon the closed end of the cover to seat the holder on the
500
cover.” Thus, the court reasoned that, contrary to the defendants’
argument, the language of the claims made it clear that the feet were
501
what would engage the cover, not the candle holder.
The language of other claims of the patent can also provide
502
guidance as to the meaning of a claim term.
For example,
the doctrine of claim differentiation teaches that “a dependent claim
that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the
503
limitation in question is not present in the independent claim.”
Accordingly, the court in Ball Aerosol noted that dependent “claim 2
specifically require[d] some engagement between the feet and a
504
recess in the cover.” Thus, the court held that the term “to seat” as
used in independent claim 1 did not require an engagement between
505
the feet and the cover.
Similarly, the Federal Circuit in Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn,
506
Inc. applied the doctrine of claim differentiation to determine
whether the asserted claims required a “single login” feature, which
allowed a person to access multiple courses and multiple roles in an
507
Internet-based educational support system.
The court held that
“[p]erhaps the strongest evidence” that the asserted claim did not
require the “single login” feature was the fact that the dependent
496. Id. at 986, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)at 1872.
497. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
498. Id. at 988, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
499. Id. at 989, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
500. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
501. Id. at 989–90, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
502. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
503. Id. at 1314–15, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
504. 555 F.3d at 990, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
505. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
506. 574 F.3d 1371, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
507. Id. at 1376, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
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claims (from a different independent claim with identical language as
508
Thus, the court held
the asserted claim) included the limitation.
that the asserted claim did not require the feature, because if the
court required otherwise, the dependent claims would be
509
redundant.
510
In ICU
Claim differentiation, however, is not a “rigid rule.”
511
Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, Inc., the parties disputed
whether the claimed spike element had to be pointed and whether it
512
had to be shaped so that it could pierce a fluid seal. The patentee
relied on claim differentiation to support a broad construction that
did not require that the spike be pointed so that it could pierce a
513
seal. Dependent claim 13 stated, in part, “wherein said end of said
514
spike is pointed so that it can pierce said seal.”
The patentee
argued that construing “spike” to require a pointed tip for piercing a
515
But as the Federal
seal would render “claim 13 superfluous.”
Circuit explained, the district court rejected this argument, noting
that the dependent claim was added late in prosecution after the
516
introduction of the allegedly infringing products.
The Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.
517
Similarly, in Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., the Federal
Circuit held that the claims directed to intraluminal grafts for
treating blood vessel diseases required that the devices include
518
wires.
Even though the patent included dependent claims that
recited “a wire structure,” the Federal Circuit refused to apply the
doctrine of claim differentiation because the specification made it
519
clear that the claimed devices required wires. The court stated that
“claim differentiation is a rule of thumb that does not trump the
520
clear import of the specification.”

508. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
509. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
510. Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1538, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
511. 558 F.3d 1368, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
512. Id. at 1373, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074.
513. Id. at 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
514. Id. at 1376, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
515. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
516. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
517. 582 F.3d 1322, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1599 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
518. Id. at 1331–32, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605–06.
519. Id. at 1332, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606.
520. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606.
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B. Specification
The claims of a patent do not stand alone—they are part of a
521
“fully integrated written instrument,” mainly the specification.
The Federal Circuit has made it clear that the specification “is always
highly relevant to the claim construction analysis” and “is the single
522
best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”
The court has
recognized the difficulty involved in using the specification to
interpret the claims while refraining from importing limitations from
523
the specification into the claims.
But the court maintains that
“the line between construing terms and importing limitations can be
discerned with reasonable certainty and predictability if the court’s
focus remains on understanding how a person of ordinary skill in the
524
art would understand the claim terms.”
Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit has often found that the specification could not limit a broad
construction. But, where appropriate, the Federal Circuit did not
hesitate to find the specification limiting to justify a narrow claim
525
construction.
1.

Cases where specification was found not limiting
Where the specification describes multiple embodiments, the
Federal Circuit often interprets the claim terms broadly. In Ball
Aerosol, for example, the figures of the specification illustrated feet
both resting on the candle holder cover and locking into recesses in
526
the cover.
As such, the court concluded that the correct
construction of the term “to seat” did not require an engagement
527
between the feet and the cover.
But even where the examples and embodiments of the
specification were in line with the narrower construction, the Federal
Circuit has not necessarily limited the scope of the claims. In Linear
528
Technology Corp. v. International Trade Commission, the patent at issue
related to switching-type voltage regulators. The ITC construed the
claim terms “first state of circuit operation” and “second state of
521. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d
967, 978, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
522. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
523. Id. at 1323, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334.
524. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334.
525. Id. at 1324, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334–35.
526. 555 F.3d 984, 990, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870, 1874 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
527. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
528. 566 F.3d 1049, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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circuit operation” to mean “that the first state of operation can be
linked to high load currents, and the second state can be linked to low
load currents, although the states of operation do not necessarily have
529
to be linked to a high or low load current.” The alleged infringer
argued that the first state of circuit operation occurred at high load
currents, whereas the second state occurred only at low load
530
currents.
The Federal Circuit rejected this narrow construction.
Although the patent at issue provided examples and embodiments
where the “first state of circuit operation” may occur at high load
currents and the “second state of circuit operation” may occur at low
load currents, the court found that there was no “‘clear intention to
limit the claim scope using words or expressions of manifest
exclusion or restriction,’ which is necessary to further narrow the
531
claim language.”
The Federal Circuit noted that it has repeatedly
held that even where only one embodiment is described, the “claims
generally should not be narrowed to cover only the disclosed
532
embodiments.”
533
Likewise, in Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., the Federal
Circuit held that the district court erred in limiting the term “animal”
534
to exclude humans.
The court held that because the patentee
explicitly defined “animal” in the specification to include humans,
535
that definition controlled. Moreover, the court refused to limit the
construction of the term based on the specification’s disclosure of
only nonhuman animals in its preferred embodiments. The court
noted that the embodiments were simply preferred embodiments
536
and did not amount to a disavowal of claim scope. The court held
that “the patentee has used no words or expressions that manifestly
exclude coverage of humans, and thus, it would be improper to
override the patentee’s express definition of ‘animal’ to limit the
537
scope of the claims.”
The Federal Circuit also looks at the description of the invention in
the specification to determine whether there is a clear intent to limit

529. Id. at 1057, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (internal quotation marks omitted).
530. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
531. Id. at 1057–58, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v.
Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2004))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
532. Id. at 1058, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
533. 579 F.3d 1363, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
534. Id. at 1379–80, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159.
535. Id. at 1380, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159 (“When a patentee explicitly
defines a claim term in the patent specification, the patentee’s definition controls.”).
536. Id. at 1380–81, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160.
537. Id. at 1381, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160.
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538

the claim scope. In i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit
rejected Microsoft’s arguments when the corporation sought to limit
539
The court held that the term
the meaning of the term “distinct.”
did not require storage of the data in separate “files,” as the
specification consistently used broader, generic language that did not
540
suggest a particular format. Moreover, the court held that the term
541
did not require independent manipulation of the data.
Although
the specification referred to working “solely” on one type of data, the
court found that the specification’s permissive language, “could be,”
“can be,” and “ability to,” did not clearly disclaim systems lacking
542
these benefits.
2.

Cases where specification was found limiting
Despite the general rule that the claims should not be limited to
the disclosed embodiments, the Federal Circuit has found the
specification limiting in several cases.
In ICU Medical, the patented technology involved medical valves
used in transmitting fluids to or from a patient, such as when
543
The medical valve receives fluid from a medical
using an IV.
544
device, such as a syringe, without the use of an external needle.
The asserted claims could be categorized into three groups: spike
545
The parties disputed
claims, spikeless claims, and tube claims.
whether the spike must be shaped such that it could pierce the seal
546
for fluid to be transmitted through the valve.
The district court
rejected the patentee’s broad proposed construction of “an upward
projection” and construed “spike” to mean “an elongated structure
having a pointed tip for piercing the seal, which tip may be sharp or
547
slightly rounded.”
The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting, as the
district court did, that the specification “repeatedly and uniformly
describe[d] the spike as a pointed instrument for the purpose of
548
piercing a seal inside the valve.”
538. 589 F.3d 1246, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009), superceded on reh’g
by No. 2009-1504, 2010 WL 801705, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
539. Id. at 1257, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
540. Id. at 1258, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
541. Id. at 1258, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
542. Id. at 1260, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
543. ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1372, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1072, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
544. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074.
545. Id. at 1372–73, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074.
546. Id. at 1373, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074.
547. Id. at 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075 (internal quotation marks omitted).
548. Id. at 1374–75, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Recognizing that the court should not import limitations from the
specification into the claims, the Federal Circuit, citing Phillips v.
549
AWH Corp., noted that the court should focus on how a person of
skill in the art would understand the claims “after reading the entire
550
patent.” Because the patent specification never suggested that the
spike could be anything other than pointed, as seen by each of the
figures, the Federal Circuit held that the district court properly
551
construed the term “spike” narrowly.
552
Similarly, in Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Medical Group, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit rejected the defendants’ proposed construction of
“wound” as overly broad. The patents at issue related to treating a
553
wound with negative pressure.
The specification described
numerous examples of types of wounds that could be treated,
including open wounds, infected wounds, burn wounds, skin-graft
and skin-flap wounds, decubitus ulcer wounds, and incisional
554
wounds.
While the defendants argued that the specification’s
broad language supported a broad definition of “wound” consistent
with the definition found in a medical dictionary, the majority agreed
with the plaintiffs that all of the examples described in the
555
specification involved skin wounds.
The majority held that to
construe the term “wound” to include anything other than skin
wounds would “expand the scope of the claims far beyond anything
556
described in the specification.”
557
Likewise, in Felix v. American Honda Motor Co., the Federal Circuit
limited the construction of “mounted” to mean “securely affixed or
fastened to,” based, in part, on the fact that the specification
repeatedly used “mounted” to describe structures that must be
558
securely affixed or fastened together. Although the plaintiff argued
that the specification did not provide a specific method of mounting
one item on or to another, the court noted that each of the examples
described in the specification required securely affixing or fastening
559
the structures together or else they would fall apart due to gravity.
549. 415 F.3d 1303, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
550. ICU Med., 558 F.3d at 1375, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076 (quoting Phillips,
415 F.3d at 1321, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332) (internal quotation marks omitted).
551. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
552. 554 F.3d 1010, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub
nom. Medela AG v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 624 (2009).
553. Id. at 1014, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
554. Id. at 1018, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806.
555. Id. at 1018–19, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806.
556. Id. at 1019, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806.
557. 562 F.3d 1167, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
558. Id. at 1178–79, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531.
559. Id. at 1178, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530.
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Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
narrower construction.
560
In Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., the district court construed
the term “crystalline” to mean “Crystal A as outlined in the
561
specification.”
The patent at issue related to crystalline cefdinir
(using its chemical name) and claimed priority to a Japanese patent
application that described and claimed two crystalline forms of
562
cefdinir, Crystal A and Crystal B. But the specification of the patent
at issue differed from the Japanese patent application in that it
omitted the disclosure regarding Crystal B and drafted broader
563
claims during prosecution.
Claim 1 of the patent recited crystalline cefdinir as defined by
564
seven powder x-ray diffraction (PXRD) angle peak limitations.
PXRD is a method for identifying and distinguishing different
crystalline compounds. The method beams X-rays at a powdered
chemical and measures the diffraction angles of the X-rays as they
565
reflect upon contact with the chemical.
In contrast, claims 2–5
recited crystalline cefdinir without PXRD peak limitation, but with
566
descriptions of processes used to obtain crystalline cefdinir.
The court noted that “[t]he parties agreed that ‘crystalline’ ordinarily
567
means exhibiting ‘uniformly arranged molecule[s] or atoms.’”
Relying on the intrinsic evidence, however, the district court
construed the term using the more specific meaning disclosed in the
568
specification.
Specifically, the specification referred repeatedly to “Crystal A of
the compound (I),” defined as “any crystal of the compound (I)
which shows substantially the same diffraction pattern [as in the table
569
in col.1/claim 1].”
Although the Federal Circuit recognized that
construing “crystalline” in claim 1 to mean “Crystal A” where “Crystal
A” incorporated the seven PXRD peak limitations “arguably
render[ed] the remainder of that claim redundant,” the specification
did not suggest that the disclosed processes could produce

560. 566 F.3d 1282, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc),
cert. denied sub nom. Astellas Pharma, Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 1052 (2010).
561. Id. at 1286, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (internal quotation marks omitted).
562. Id. at 1287, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
563. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
564. Id. at 1286, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
565. Id. at 1286–87, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
566. Id. at 1286, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
567. Id. at 1289, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
568. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (internal quotation marks omitted).
569. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1774.
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570

non-Crystal A compounds.
This was particularly significant where
the Crystal B formulation—as seen in the Japanese priority
571
The Federal Circuit therefore
application—was known in the art.
concluded that the patentee chose to claim only the Crystal A form in
the patent-in-suit and that the district court correctly construed the
572
term “crystalline.”
As for claims 2–5, which did not recite PXRD peak limitations,
the court held that “crystalline,” as used in these claims, was properly
construed to be limited to “Crystal A.” The process steps recited in
claims 2–5 corresponded to the processes for making Crystal A
573
described in the specification.
The Federal Circuit acknowledged
that the mere fact that the specification disclosed only Crystal A did
574
not justify limiting the meaning of “crystalline” to “Crystal A.”
But the court found that the rest of the intrinsic evidence, mainly the
575
prosecution history, supported this construction.
576
In Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., the patent was directed to a
refrigerator shelf made of a one-piece open frame and a glass
577
panel. The claimed shelf secured the glass panel in the frame using
“relatively resilient” fingers so that the glass panel could be “snap
578
secured” into place. Accordingly, the claims recited that the frame
must include a “relatively resilient end edge portion which
temporarily deflects and subsequently rebounds to snap-secure one
579
of [the] glass piece front and rear edges.”
The issue for claim construction was when the frame must be
580
flexible to satisfy the “relatively resilient” limitation.
The Federal
Circuit found that the claim language and the specification
consistently focused on the characteristics of the frame during
581
assembly.
The specification lacked any discussion of the value of
582
the “relatively resilient” frame for anything other than assembly.
Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction of
570. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
571. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
572. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
573. Id. at 1290, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
574. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
575. Id., 90 U.S.Q.P.2d (BNA) at 1775.
576. 572 F.3d 1371, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1409 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
78 U.S.L.W. 3396 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-778).
577. Id. at 1378, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413–14.
578. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413–14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
579. Id. at 1377, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413 (emphasis and internal quotation
marks omitted).
580. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413.
581. Id. at 1377–78, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
582. Id. at 1378–79, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
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the limitation to mean “the end edge portion must be sufficiently
resilient [such] that it can temporarily deflect and subsequently
583
rebound when glass is being inserted into the frame.”
In Edwards Lifesciences, the Federal Circuit construed the term
“graft” to mean intraluminal in patents related to intraluminal grafts
584
for treating blood vessel disease.
The court noted that the
specification used the terms “graft” and “intraluminal graft”
interchangeably, and that the only devices described in the
585
specification were intraluminal grafts.
Moreover, the specification
frequently described an “intraluminal graft” as “the present
invention” or “this invention,” indicating an intent to limit the
586
invention to intraluminal devices. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s construction limiting “graft” to mean an
587
“intraluminal graft.”
C. Prosecution History
In addition to consulting the specification, courts consider the
prosecution history, which is also intrinsic evidence. Because it
represents the patentee’s attempts to explain and obtain the patent,
the “prosecution history provides evidence of how the [US]PTO and
588
the inventor understood the patent.”
But the Federal Circuit also
recognizes that the “prosecution history represents an ongoing
negotiation between the [US]PTO and the applicant, rather than the
589
final product of that negotiation.”
Accordingly, for claim
construction purposes, the prosecution history is not as useful as the
590
specification.
Nevertheless, the prosecution history may reveal
whether the inventor limited the invention to obtain the patent,
591
making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.
The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held, however, that a prosecution
history disclaimer requires “a clear and unmistakable surrender of
592
subject matter.”
But the court has cautioned that even when an

583. Id. at 1379, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1414.
584. Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1329, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1599, 1604 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
585. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
586. Id. at 1330, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
587. Id. at 1331, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
588. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
589. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
590. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
591. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
592. Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1251, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
1711, 1717 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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isolated statement appears to surrender subject matter, the
593
prosecution history as a whole may show that the patentee did not.
In Abbott Laboratories, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
594
court’s narrow construction of “crystalline” to mean “Crystal A.”
To support this narrow construction, the court looked to the
prosecution history, including the Japanese patent application to
595
which the patent at issue claimed priority. The court noted that the
district court did not rely on statements made during prosecution of
the Japanese patent application to support the construction because
such statements have “a narrow application to U.S. claim
596
construction.” Instead, the district court relied on the contents of
597
Because the Japanese application
the foreign priority application.
established that the patentee knew and could describe both Crystal A
and Crystal B, the patentee could have included disclosure of Crystal
598
B to support a broader construction.
Instead, the Federal Circuit
found it highly significant that the patentee chose to disclose and
599
claim only Crystal A.
Moreover, the court found that the prosecution history of the
patent-in-suit showed a “clear and intentional disavowal of claim
600
scope beyond Crystal A.”
One inventor submitted a declaration
stating that he prepared a sample of Crystal A and that Crystal A was
601
more stable than the prior art samples.
Furthermore, in its
response to an office action, the applicant specifically limited the
invention to Crystal A by arguing that “the method of preparation of the
crystalline form of the presently claimed compounds is not
considered the heart of the present invention,” and that “[t]he
crystalline form of the compound represents the inventive concept
hereof, and it is clear that [the prior art] does not anticipate or
602
suggest said crystalline form.” Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded
that the exclusive focus on Crystal A in the specification along with

593. Elbex Video, Ltd. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 508 F.3d 1366, 1372–73,
85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1137, 1141–42 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
594. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1289–91, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1769, 1774–76 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Astellas Pharma, Inc. v.
Lupin Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 1052 (2010).
595. Id. at 1290, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
596. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
597. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
598. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
599. Id. at 1297, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
600. Id. at 1290, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
601. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
602. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 (internal citation omitted).
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the prosecution history warrants a narrow construction of
603
“crystalline.”
Similarly, the Federal Circuit in Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex
604
Corp. found that the applicant had clearly limited the scope of the
claimed invention.
The patent-in-suit disclosed an exercise
monitoring system that included a “data acquisition unit,” which itself
included both an “electronic positioning device” and a “physiological
605
monitor.”
The district court construed “data acquisition unit” to
mean “one structure that includes the electronic positioning device
606
and the physiological monitor.”
On appeal, the parties disputed
whether the data acquisition unit had to be a single structure or
607
whether it could consist of multiple, physically separate structures.
Both the claim language and the specification supported a
608
construction that included multiple structures.
While the district
court found that the applicants had disavowed the concept of an
assemblage of interrelated parts, the Federal Circuit disagreed with
609
the district court’s interpretation of the prosecution history. After
its own review of the prosecution history, the court found that the
applicants, in response to a rejection over prior art that disclosed a
single structure, had “clearly and unmistakably disavowed a single
structure” that included an electronic positioning device,
610
a physiological monitor, and a display unit. Accordingly, the court
concluded that the claimed “data acquisition unit” was not limited to
a single structure, “but may comprise multiple physically separate
611
structures.”
In Edwards Lifesciences, the Federal Circuit applied a prosecution
history disclaimer where the inventors canceled claims that required
“malleable wires” and replaced them with claims requiring only
612
“wires.”
Although the claims were arguably broadened, the court
found that the inventors “conducted the prosecution as if the wires
613
were required to be malleable.”
Thus, the court held that the
change in claim language did not “affect the breadth of the claims

603. Id. at 1291, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775–76.
604. 566 F.3d 1075, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
605. Id. at 1078, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083.
606. Id. at 1083, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087.
607. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087.
608. Id. at 1084–85, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087–88.
609. Id. at 1085, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088.
610. Id. at 1085–86, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089.
611. Id. at 1086, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089.
612. Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1332–33,
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1599, 1606–07 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
613. Id. at 1333, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
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because the inventors’ statements indicated that the claims remained
614
narrow.”
615
In Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., the Federal Circuit held that there
was no prosecution history disclaimer where the applicants’
statements were not sufficiently clear and unmistakable to limit the
claim scope. The patents-in-suit recited the use of an antimicrobial
compound called peracetic acid (PAA) as a sanitizer in beef and
616
poultry processing.
The parties disputed whether the patentee
disclaimed the use of compositions containing multiple antimicrobial
617
agents during prosecution of the patent-in-suit.
To overcome a
prior art rejection, the applicants argued, among other things, that its
invention used sanitizing solutions containing PAA as the only
antimicrobial agent, whereas the prior art did not teach the use of
618
PAA alone as a sanitizer. In response, the examiner noted that the
claims recited the use of a composition “which consists essentially of”
PAA and were therefore not limited to compositions containing PAA
619
as the sole antimicrobial agent.
Afterwards, the applicants never
made the allegedly disclaiming argument again and instead offered
620
different reasons to overcome the prior art rejection.
The
examiner ultimately allowed the claims with the “consists essentially
621
The Federal Circuit held that while a reasonable
of” language.
reader of the prosecution history could interpret the applicants’
initial statements as “hyperbolic or erroneous,” the prosecution
history as a whole did not show that the statements were “clear and
622
unmistakable enough” to disclaim that subject matter.
In Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., the Federal Circuit held
623
The defendants
that there was no prosecution history disclaimer.
argued that the district court misconstrued the term “non-chloride
sodium salt” to include sodium hydroxide, contending that the
624
patentee disclaimed sodium hydroxide during prosecution.
The court held that while the statements in the two pages of
prosecution history cited by the defendants arguably supported its

614. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
615. 569 F.3d 1335, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2009), amended in part on
reh’g, Nos. 2008-1228 & 2008-1252, 2009 WL 5865679 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2009).
616. Id. at 1340, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
617. Id. at 1342, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
618. Id. at 1343, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
619. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
620. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
621. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
622. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
623. 579 F.3d 1363, 1377, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1148, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
624. Id. at 1376–77, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157.
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construction, the statements were undercut by other statements in
the prosecution history that explicitly stated that sodium hydroxide is
a non-chloride sodium salt, thus distinguishing the prior art on
“alternative grounds unrelated to the way [sodium hydroxide] was
625
used in the prior art.”
Taking the prosecution history as a whole,
the Federal Circuit held that the patentee “committed no clear and
626
unmistakable disavowal of claim scope.”
Similarly, in i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit found that
arguments in the prosecution history did not limit the scope of the
627
term “distinct.”
The court noted that, “[i]n evaluating whether a
628
patentee has disavowed claim scope, context matters.” Accordingly,
the court found that the statements that Microsoft “pluck[ed] from
the prosecution history” did not clearly and unmistakably disavow
629
claim scope.
D. Extrinsic Evidence
The Federal Circuit has acknowledged that district courts may rely
630
on extrinsic evidence in claim construction.
Extrinsic evidence
“consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution
history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and
631
learned treatises.” But the court has cautioned that while extrinsic
evidence may be useful in shedding light on the relevant art, it is
“less significant” than intrinsic evidence in determining the meaning
632
of claim language.
The Federal Circuit has noted that dictionaries, particularly
technical dictionaries, are especially useful in helping the court
better understand the underlying technology and the way “in which
633
one of skill in the art might use the claim terms.” Accordingly, in
634
Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., the Federal Circuit
625. Id. at 1377, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158.
626. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158.
627. 589 F.3d 1246, 1258, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
superceded on reh’g by No. 2009-1504, 2010 WL 801705, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
628. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
629. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
630. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (authorizing district courts to rely on extrinsic
evidence, despite the importance of intrinsic evidence in claim construction).
631. Id. at 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (quoting Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc)).
632. Id. at 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
633. Id. at 1318, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
634. 554 F.3d 982, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. dismissed, 130
S. Ct. 50 (2009).
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affirmed the district court’s construction of “non-thrombogenic” as
claimed in the patent-in-suit, which related to a drug-eluting
expandable stent with a coating that has a non-thrombogenic
635
surface.
The Federal Circuit found that the specification and the
636
prosecution history supported the district court’s construction.
The accused infringer argued, however, that the district court erred
because it relied on dictionary definitions of “thrombogenic” and
637
“thrombolytic” that did not appear in the claim.
The Federal
Circuit rejected the accused infringer’s argument, holding that the
district court permissibly looked to these definitions to inform the
meaning of “non-thrombogenic,” particularly where the dictionary
638
definitions did not contradict the intrinsic evidence.
In Felix, the Federal Circuit noted that “it is improper to read [a
claim] term to encompass a broader definition simply because it may
639
be found in a dictionary, treatise, or other extrinsic source.”
The court in that case rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
definition of “mount” includes “to put or have in position,” which
640
supported its broad proposed construction of “positioned.”
First, the court noted that the plaintiff misquoted the definition by
641
omitting language from the definition. The actual definition in the
642
cited dictionary was “to put or have (as artillery) in position.”
But the court also noted that the more general definition of “to
attach to a support” was consistent with the patent’s use of the term
643
“mounted.”
Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district
court’s definition of “mounted” as “securely affixed or fastened to”
644
was correct.
In Ultimax Cement Manufacturing Corp. v. CTS Cement Manufacturing
645
Corp.,
the district court construed the term “soluble CaSO4
anhydride” to mean “a compound formed from an acid by removal of
water,” but the court relied heavily on a single dictionary definition to
646
reach its construction. On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the
635. Id. at 983–84, 86, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706, 1708.
636. Id. at 987, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
637. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
638. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
639. Felix v. American Honda Motor Co., 562 F.3d 1167, 1178, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1524, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Nystrom v.
TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1145, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
640. Id. at 1178, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530.
641. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530.
642. Id. at 1178–79, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530.
643. Id. at 1179, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531.
644. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1531.
645. 587 F.3d 1339, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
646. Id. at 1346, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869.
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district court erred in relying on the dictionary definition without
647
properly considering the intrinsic evidence. As the Federal Circuit
noted, “courts may ‘rely on dictionary definitions when construing
claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict
any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent
648
documents.’” Moreover, the court stated that “[a] claim should not
rise or fall based upon the preferences of a particular dictionary
editor, or the court’s independent decision, uninformed by the
649
specification, to rely on one dictionary rather than another.”
Accordingly, when read in context in light of the claim language and
the specification, the court construed the disputed term to mean
650
“soluble anhydrous calcium sulfate.”
The Federal Circuit has also acknowledged the value of expert
testimony for a variety of different purposes. For example, experts
may provide background on the relevant technology, “explain how an
invention works,” ensure that the court’s understanding is “consistent
with that of a person of skill in the art, or establish that a particular
term in the patent or the prior art has a particular meaning in the
651
pertinent field.”
In Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., the parties disputed
652
the meaning of the term “sanitize.” The patent specification stated
that the term “sanitize” “denote[s] a bacterial population reduction
653
to a level that is safe for human handling and consumption.”
The accused infringer argued that its product could not infringe
because it alone did not make raw poultry safe for human
654
consumption, as cooking was also required.
The Federal Circuit
found that the definition of “sanitize” was ambiguous in that it did
not indicate when consumption took place—immediately after the
655
PAA was applied or at a later time after the meat was cooked.
The Federal Circuit noted that the testimony of the accused
infringer’s expert who admitted that in-plant inspectors examine
poultry that has been treated with PAA to determine if it is “fit for
647. Id. at 1347–48, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869–70.
648. Id. at 1347, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
415 F.3d 1303, 1322–23, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc)).
649. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869–70 (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322,
75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333).
650. Id. at 1348, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
651. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
652. Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1344, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225,
1230 (Fed. Cir. 2009), amended in part on reh’g, Nos. 2008-1228 & 2008-1252, 2009 WL
5865679 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2009).
653. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (alteration in original).
654. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
655. Id. at 1345, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
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656

human consumption.”
The court found that the inspectors must
not require that the poultry be fit for human consumption in its
657
uncooked state. Thus, the Federal Circuit held that “sanitize” must
mean that “the treated meat has become safe for human handling
658
and postcooking consumption.”
659
the claim
Similarly, in Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co.,
construction issue related to whether the term “cover layer having a
Shore D hardness” in the asserted patents directed to multilayer golf
balls required the Shore D hardness measurement to be made on the
660
golf ball or on a sample of the cover layer off the ball.
After
reviewing the specification and finding that it supported requiring
on-the-ball measurements, the Federal Circuit noted that the
defendant’s own vice president of development testified that
technical people in the golf-ball industry typically measured hardness
661
The court stated that “[s]uch evidence of accepted
on the ball.
practice within the art, when not at variance with the intrinsic
evidence, is relevant to the question of how a person of skill in the
662
pertinent field would understand a term.” Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s interpretation of the phrase
“cover layer having a Shore D hardness” as one that refers to an
663
“on-the-ball hardness measurement.”
Another source of extrinsic evidence is the accused products
themselves. A court may not rely on the accused product for claim
construction just so that it can include or exclude the accused
664
product.
But a court may rely on the accused product to provide
665
meaningful context for claim construction. As such, in Every Penny
666
Counts, Inc. v. American Express Co., the Federal Circuit rejected the
patentee’s argument that the district court erred by “tailoring its
667
claim construction to fit the dimensions of the accused product.”
656. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
657. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
658. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
659. 576 F.3d 1331, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
78 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2010) (No. 09-702).
660. Id. at 1337, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710.
661. Id. at 1338, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710.
662. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
663. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
664. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 442 F.3d 1322,
1331, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that courts may not
construe claims to exclude or include specific features of the accused product or
process).
665. Id. at 1326–27, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
666. 563 F.3d 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 565 (2009).
667. Id. at 1383, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
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To elicit the parties’ views on the meaning of the term “excess cash,”
the district court asked the parties what “excess cash” meant in a
series of hypothetical transactions, including ones that involved the
668
accused products. The Federal Circuit held that this was acceptable
and that the patentee’s argument that this was improper was
669
“way wide of the mark.” The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the
670
district court’s construction.
E. Special Claim Construction Issues
In 2009, the Federal Circuit addressed very specific claim
construction issues in two cases. First, in Abbott Laboratories, the
Federal Circuit addressed prior inconsistent precedent and, in an
en banc portion of the opinion, clarified the proper claim
671
construction analysis for product-by-process claims.
Second, in
672
Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., the Federal Circuit
clarified the proper claim construction analysis to determine whether
claims that have been copied from another patent to provoke an
673
interference have sufficient written description support. These two
cases and the special claim construction issues addressed therein are
discussed in detail below.
1.

Product-by-process claims
In Abbott Laboratories, the patent at issue related to crystalline
674
cefdinir, an antibiotic. Claim 1 recited crystalline cefdinir (using its
chemical name) and defined its unique characteristics with seven
675
Claims 2–5 recited
powder X-ray diffraction (PXRD) angle peaks.
crystalline cefdinir but did not claim any PXRD peak limitations;
instead, they claimed descriptions of processes used to obtain
676
crystalline cefdinir.
As an initial matter, the Federal Circuit held
that the district court correctly categorized claims 2–5 as product-by677
process claims.
On appeal, in a portion of the opinion that the
court heard en banc sua sponte, the Federal Circuit clarified the
668. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
669. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
670. Id. at 1384, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
671. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1291–95, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1769, 1776–79 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Astellas Pharma, Inc. v.
Lupin Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 1052 (2010).
672. 567 F.3d 1366, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
673. Id. at 1374–75, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165–68.
674. Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1286, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
675. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
676. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
677. Id. at 1291, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
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scope of product-by-process claims by adopting the rule in Atlantic
Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp. and, to the extent the case was
inconsistent, overruling the holding in Scripps Clinic & Research
678
Foundation v. Genentech.
That is, the Federal Circuit held that
process terms in a product-by-process claim serve as limitations of the
679
claim.
To support its decision, the majority cited Supreme Court
680
precedent and case law from its sister circuits.
According to the
majority, the Supreme Court has “consistently noted that process
terms that define the product in a product-by-process claim serve as
681
enforceable limitations.” Moreover, the majority reasoned that the
Federal Circuit’s binding predecessor courts, the U.S. Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals and the U.S. Court of Claims,
682
followed the same rule, and it noted that its sister courts followed
683
The majority made clear that it did
this general rule as well.
“not question at all” whether product-by-process claims are
684
permissible claims.
Rather, the majority stated that the issue here
was only whether such claims are infringed by products made by
processes other than the one claimed, and the court held that they
685
are not.
The primary concern raised by the two dissenting opinions was that
for certain inventions, the precise structure of a new product may not
be known from the information available when the patent application
686
was filed.
According to the dissents, the law allowed applicants to
claim such products through a process whereby validity and
infringement were determined as a product independent of any
687
process term that was used to describe and define the product.
The majority dismissed the dissents’ concerns, stating that if an
applicant invents a product that has a structure that is not fully
known or is too complex to analyze, the applicant may still use the
688
process steps to define the product. But because the inventor chose
to define its product in terms of its process, the majority reasoned

678. See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text.
679. Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1291–93, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776–78.
680. Id. at 1291–92, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776–77.
681. Id. at 1291, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
682. Id. at 1291–92, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
683. Id. at 1292, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776.
684. Id. at 1293, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
685. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
686. Id. at 1300, 1320, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783, 1798–99 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
687. Id. at 1319–20, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798.
688. Id. at 1294, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778 (majority opinion).
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that that definition must govern the enforcement of the bounds of
689
Accordingly, the majority held that it “cannot
the patent right.
simply ignore as verbiage the only definition supplied by the
690
inventor.”
Thus, the majority affirmed the district court’s
construction of claims 2–5 as requiring the recited process steps for
691
any infringement analysis.
2.

Copied claims in an interference for written description
In Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., the plaintiff sought
review in district court of an adverse decision of the USPTO Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) from an interference
692
action under 35 U.S.C. § 146.
To provoke the interference,
the defendant copied claims from the plaintiff’s patent into its patent
693
application.
During the interference, the plaintiff challenged the
defendant’s copied claims, asserting that they lacked written
description support in the defendant’s patent application
694
specification.
In determining the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment on written description, the district court
construed the claims. In doing so, the district court construed the
copied claims in light of the host application specification, rather
695
than the patent specification from which the claims were copied.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed the impropriety of the
696
district court’s claim construction analysis.
697
The court examined two of its prior decisions in its analysis.
698
In In re Spina, the applicant copied a claim from a patent to
699
provoke an interference.
To determine whether the applicant’s
specification contained an adequate written description of the copied
claim, the Board viewed the claim in light of the patent
700
specification.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s approach,
stating, “[w]hen interpretation is required of a claim that is copied
for interference purposes, the copied claim is viewed in the context
701
of the patent from which it is copied.”
689.
690.
691.
692.
693.
694.
695.
696.
697.
698.
699.
700.
701.

Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779.
567 F.3d 1366, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1368–69, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
Id. at 1373, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
Id. at 1374, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
Id. at 1375, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
Id. at 1374, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
975 F.2d 854, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Id. at 855, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
Id. at 857, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
Id. at 856, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
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In Rowe v. Dror, on the other hand, although the applicant copied
claims from the patent, the Federal Circuit interpreted the copied
claims in light of the applicant’s specification for purposes of
703
determining patentability over prior art.
The Rowe court
distinguished Spina, noting that in Spina, the court considered
“whether an applicant was eligible to copy a patentee’s claim and
thereby challenge priority of invention, a question that turned on
whether the copying party’s specification adequately supported
704
In that context,
the subject matter claimed by the other party.”
the claims must be construed in light of the originating
705
specification. In contrast, the court noted that the Spina rule does
not apply in cases like Rowe, “where the issue is whether the claim is
706
patentable to one or the other party in light of prior art.” In such
cases, the claims must be construed in light of the specification in
707
which they appear.
In Agilent, the Federal Circuit held that the case at hand called for
application of the Spina rule because the question was whether the
applicant’s specification adequately supported the subject matter
708
claimed by the patentee. Although 37 C.F.R. § 41.200(b) states that
“[a] claim shall be given its broadest reasonable construction in light
of the specification of the application or patent in which it appears,”
the Federal Circuit noted in Agilent, as it did in Rowe, that
709
“administrative regulations cannot trump judicial directives.”
As such, the court held that “when a party challenges written
description support for an interference count or the copied claim in
an interference, the originating disclosure provides the meaning of
710
the pertinent claim language.” However, “when a party challenges
a claim’s validity under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103, . . . [the] court and
the Board must interpret the claim in light of the specification in
711
which it appears.”

702.
703.
704.
705.
706.
707.
708.
709.
710.
711.

112 F.3d 473, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Id. at 479, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
Id., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
Id., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
Id., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
Id., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554.
567 F.3d 1366, 1375, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
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VI. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
This Section covers all aspects of patentability (for pending
applications) and validity (for litigated patents) treated by the
Federal Circuit in 2009. It opens with cases directed to patentable
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an area garnering quite a bit of
attention this year, and then moves into several of the formal
requirements for patent specifications governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112.
The Section then treats prior art-based issues of patentability/validity,
and concludes with a discussion of the cases addressing doublepatenting and inventorship issues.
A. Patentable Subject Matter
Patent eligibility starts with 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section 101 provides
that an applicant may obtain a patent for discovering or inventing a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
712
matter.”
For many years, or at least before the advent of business
method inventions, much of the developing jurisprudence relating to
§ 101 arose out of the chemical and biological technology areas.
That jurisprudence focused on the usefulness requirement of § 101
when assessing the patent eligibility of, for example, new chemical
compounds or biotechnology inventions for which no utility or an
713
incredible utility was provided (e.g., curing cancer).
Like all things “living,” technology evolved and new technologies
emerged. The information technology era was born. It dramatically
affected the world in many ways, including how business is
conducted. It was inevitable that information technology would
make its mark on the patent law landscape. “Business method
inventions” arose out of this era of change. These inventions, and
others of similar ilk, have garnered attention in several areas of the
patent law, including § 101, and have raised questions concerning
their eligibility for patent protection.
The Federal Circuit has already weighed in on the question in
714
In re Bilski, but it will not have the final word. The Supreme Court
715
granted certiorari on June 1, 2009. The oral hearing took place on
712. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
713. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35, 148 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 689, 695
(1966) (requiring an invention to have “substantial utility” and “specific benefit . . .
in currently available form”); Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1050–51, 224 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 739, 747–48 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that practical utility may be established
by in vitro testing of a compound).
714. 545 F.3d 943, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc),
cert. granted sub. nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
715. Bilski, 129 S. Ct. 2735.
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November 9, 2009, and the case is now under advisement. While
patent practitioners worldwide anxiously await the Supreme Court’s
ruling, the Federal Circuit’s decision remains the law for now and was
applied in several cases in 2009.
1.

Patent eligibility of process and system claims
In In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled its
earlier decisions in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
716
717
Group, Inc. and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., to the
extent that they relied on a “useful, concrete, and tangible result” as
718
the test for patent eligibility under § 101. The court then redefined
the patent eligibility standard for process claims, articulating the
719
Arguably making it
so-called “machine-or-transformation” test.
more difficult to patent business-method claims and system or
paradigm claims, the “machine-or-transformation” test would find a
process patent eligible only “if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine
or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different
720
state or thing.”
In 2009, the Federal Circuit applied the In re Bilski test several
times. In each case, the Federal Circuit applied the “machine-ortransformation” test as the sole test for determining patent eligibility
for process inventions.
In the first case, In re Comiskey, the applicants claimed methods and
systems for performing mandatory arbitration resolution regarding
721
one or more legal documents. In a revised opinion, the court held
that the claims reciting methods for mandatory arbitration
resolution, which Comiskey admitted did not recite any computer or
other apparatus, were impermissible attempts “to patent the use of
722
human intelligence in and of itself.” Regarding Comiskey’s system
claims, the court’s revised decision omitted the original holding that
the system claims, which did recite computer components, recited
723
patentable subject matter under § 101.
Instead, the court
remanded the case to the USPTO to consider in the first instance

716.
717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.
723.

149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
172 F.3d 1352, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959–60, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395–96.
Id., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395–96.
Id. at 954, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
554 F.3d 967, 970, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1655, 1656–57 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 981, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
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whether the recitation of computer components in those claims
724
satisfied the In re Bilski test and complied with § 101.
725
In the second case, In re Ferguson, the applicants’ process claims
(directed to a method of marketing a product) and paradigm claims
(directed to a paradigm for marketing software) suffered a similar
726
fate upon application of the “machine-or-transformation” test.
In rejecting Ferguson’s argument that the method claims are tied to
the use of a shared marketing force, the court emphasized that a
machine or apparatus is “a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of
727
certain devices and combination of devices,” and concluded that a
728
shared marketing force is not a machine or an apparatus.
The court stated: “At best it can be said that Applicants’ methods are
directed to organizing business or legal relationships in the
729
structuring of a sales force (or marketing company).” Regarding its
paradigm claims—which were clearly not a process, a manufacture,
or a composition of matter—the court noted that the methods were
730
also not a machine and not patent eligible. They “d[id] not recite
‘a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and
combination of devices,’” and therefore were no more than an
731
abstract idea.
Finally, in a case dealing with diagnostic tools and pharmaceuticals,
732
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, the Federal
Circuit applied the “machine-or-transformation” test from In re Bilski
and found that claimed methods of treatment were patent eligible
because the claims covered transformative methods of treatment,
which were a particular application of natural processes, and not
733
The claims in Prometheus generally
simply the correlation itself.
included two steps: “(a) ‘administering’ a drug that provides
[6-thioguanine (“6-TG”)] to a subject, and (b) ‘determining’ the
levels of the drug’s metabolites, 6-TG and/or [6-methyl734
mercaptopurine (“6-MMP”)], in the subject.”
The claims further
recited comparing the metabolite levels to predetermined metabolite
724. Id. at 981–82, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
725. 558 F.3d 1359, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
726. Id. at 1363–66, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1037–42.
727. Id. at 1366, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040 (quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d
1346, 1355, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495, 1502 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
728. Id. at 1363–64, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038–39.
729. Id. at 1364, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038.
730. Id. at 1365–66, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039–40.
731. Id. at 1366, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040 (quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at
1355, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502).
732. 581 F.3d 1336, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
733. Id. at 1349, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084–85.
734. Id. at 1339, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077.
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levels, where “the measured metabolite levels ‘indicate a need’ to”
vary the amount of drugs administered to maximize efficacy and
735
minimize toxicity. The Federal Circuit concluded that the claimed
methods of treatment were directed to “patentable subject matter
because they ‘transform an article into a different state or thing,’
and this transformation is ‘central to the purpose of the claimed
736
process.’” The court held that the transformation occurred in the
human body where the administered drug underwent various
chemical and physical changes, enabling its metabolite
737
concentrations to be determined.
Moreover, the court noted that
methods of treatment “are always transformative when a defined
group of drugs is administered to the body to ameliorate the effects
738
of an undesired condition.” Because the claimed methods met the
transformation prong under In re Bilski, the court did not consider
739
whether they also met the machine prong.
The Federal Circuit also acknowledged that the claims contained
740
some mental steps that were “not patent-eligible per se.”
But it
noted that a “mental step does not, by itself, negate the
741
transformative nature of prior steps.”
The data generated in the
administering and determining steps for use in the mental step were
obtained by an overall process that fell “well within the realm of
742
patentable subject matter.” The court observed that “even though a
fundamental principle itself is not patent-eligible, processes
743
incorporating a fundamental principle may be patent-eligible.”
B. Indefiniteness
The second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that the claims
of a patent particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject
744
matter the inventor regards as his invention.
The statutory
mandate to distinctly claim the subject matter of the invention has
developed into a definiteness or clarity requirement for the claimed
735. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077.
736. Id. at 1345, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943,
962, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1396 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub.
nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009)).
737. Id. at 1346, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082.
738. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082.
739. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082.
740. Id. at 1348, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
741. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
742. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
743. Id. at 1349, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943,
958, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub.
nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009)).
744. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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invention. Definiteness is evaluated both at the time of filing and
through the eyes of one skilled in the art who has both the
specification and the knowledge in art at their disposal at the time of
745
filing.
Establishing indefiniteness requires an exacting standard,
showing the claim to be either not amenable to construction or
746
If the claims are discernible but the
“insolubly ambiguous.”
interpretation is one over which reasonable persons may differ,
the claims are not insolubly ambiguous and not invalid for
747
indefiniteness.
748
In In re Skvorecz, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the
Board’s decision rejecting a claim for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, ¶ 2. Skvorecz sought to reissue U.S. Patent No. 5,996,948
(“the ‘948 patent”), which was directed to a wire chafing stand used
749
for supporting a chafer (i.e., a device for keeping food warm).
The claim recited a wire chafing stand, “wherein said plurality of
offsets are welded to said wire legs at the separation of the upright
750
sections into segments.”
The USPTO asserted two independent
bases for its finding of indefiniteness: (1) the phrase “at the
separation” lacked antecedent basis; and (2) the phrase “at the
separation” rendered the term “segments” indefinite because
751
“segments” was not defined in the specification.
The Federal
Circuit noted that “[s]ome latitude in the manner of expression and
the aptness of terms should be permitted even though the claim

745. See, e.g., Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1370,
77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1625, 1628 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Claim definiteness is analyzed ‘not in a
vacuum, but always in light of the teachings of the prior art and of the particular
application disclosure as it would be interpreted by one possessing the ordinary level
of skill in the pertinent art.’” (quoting In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1236, 169 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 236, 238 (C.C.P.A. 1971))).
746. See Marley Mouldings Ltd. v. Mikron Indus., Inc., 417 F.3d 1356, 1361,
75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1954, 1957 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“When a claim ‘is not insolubly
ambiguous, it is not invalid for indefiniteness.’” (quoting Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v.
Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1372, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1996, 1999
(Fed. Cir. 2004))); Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1338,
68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that the definiteness requirement
mandates only “that the claims be amenable to construction, however difficult that
task may be” (quoting Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371,
1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).
747. See Exxon Research & Eng’g Co., 265 F.3d at 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276
(“If the meaning of the claim is discernible, even though the task may be formidable
and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons will disagree, we have
held the claim sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on indefiniteness grounds.”).
748. 580 F.3d 1262, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
749. Id. at 1263, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1021–22.
750. Id. at 1266, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023.
751. Id. at 1268–69, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025.
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752

language is not as precise as the examiner might desire.” It found
that the phrase “at the separation” did “not require further
antecedent basis” and was not indefinite because a person of ordinary
skill in the art would understand the claim in view of the
753
specification.
754
In Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s finding that the patents at issue were not
invalid for indefiniteness, holding that the definitions of
erythropoietin (EPO) and the source limitations in the claims were
definite because the product-by-process nature of the claims allowed
755
Amgen to define the claimed product by its source. Roche argued
that, at the time of the invention, a person having ordinary skill in
the art did not know the exact amino acid sequence of human
756
EPO. Roche also argued that the source limitation of the claims at
issue was indefinite because the claim on its face did not distinguish
757
functional and structural differences from the prior art. Relying on
expert testimony, however, the court rejected Roche’s argument,
noting that an ordinarily skilled person may still know the scope of
the invention even though he may not know the exact components of
758
the invention.
The court reasoned that where the differences
between the claimed product and the prior art are not susceptible to
definition, “the product-by-process format allows the patentee to
obtain a patent on the product even though the patentee cannot
adequately describe the features that distinguish it from prior art
759
products.”
Finding that the claims were not invalid for
indefiniteness, the Federal Circuit stated that, “to call the process
limitation indefinite in this situation would defeat one of the
purposes of product-by-process claims, namely permitting product-by760
process claims reciting new products lacking physical description.”
761
In Source Search Technologies LLC v. LendingTree, LLC, the Federal
Circuit refused to “load the indefiniteness requirement with this
unreasonable baggage” and underscored that the definiteness of

752. Id. at 1269, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025 (quoting MANUAL
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2173.02 (2008)).
753. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025.
754. 580 F.3d 1340, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
755. Id. at 1372–74, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315–16.
756. Id. at 1371, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313.
757. Id. at 1373, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315.
758. Id. at 1372, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314.
759. Id. at 1373, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315.
760. Id. at 1374, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315.
761. 588 F.3d 1063, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1907 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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762

claims is viewed with the knowledge of one skilled in the art.
The patent-in-suit claimed a computerized “service for matching
potential buyers with potential vendors [of goods and services] over a
763
network.” During the litigation, the district court construed “goods
and services” to be “standardized articles of trade and performances of
764
The accused infringer argued that the district
work for another.”
court’s use of “standardized” introduced a subjective element
rendering the claim indefinite because a skilled person would not be
able to differentiate between “standard” and “non-standard” “goods
765
or services.” In rejecting that argument, the Federal Circuit stated
that indefiniteness is judged “according to an objective measure that
recognizes [that] artisans of ordinary skill are not mindless
‘automatons,’” and that the subjective impression of any particular
766
user of the claimed system is not relevant. From that vantage point,
the court found that the skilled person “will understand the markets
and the system enough to determine what is a ‘standard’ item” and
767
ultimately rejected the indefiniteness challenge.
The mere act of claiming an invention broadly will not render the
768
claim indefinite.
The Ultimax decision also explained that, under
certain circumstances, a court can correct a patent when evaluating
769
In that case, the patent-in-suit
the definiteness of the claims.
claimed a high strength cement that contained a particular crystalline
compound, denoted as “crystal X” in the specification, and another
chemical compound that seemingly required the presence of both a
fluorine and a chlorine atom, a combination that could not actually
770
exist in nature.
The claim defined “crystal X” using a complex
chemical formula that encompassed over 5000 possible
771
combinations.
The district court held that the claimed invention
772
was indefinite because the formula for “crystal X” was too broad.
It also held that the claim was indefinite for lacking a comma
separating the fluorine and chlorine atoms in the definition of the
other compound, “(f cl),” ostensibly requiring the presence of both
762. Id. at 1076, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916.
763. Id. at 1066, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
764. Id. at 1075, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916 (emphasis added).
765. Id. at 1076, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916.
766. Id. at 1077, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc, 550 U.S. 398, 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1397 (2007)).
767. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
768. Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1352
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1873 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
769. Id. at 1353, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
770. Id. at 1344–45, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867–68.
771. Id. at 1345, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
772. Id. at 1350–51, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
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773

fluorine and chlorine in that compound. Although the lower court
acknowledged that the skilled person would have recognized the
774
error caused by the missing comma, it refused to correct the patent.
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court on both holdings of
775
indefiniteness.
The court stated that “[m]erely claiming broadly
does not render a claim insolubly ambiguous, nor does it prevent the
776
public from understanding the scope of the patent.”
The court
held that the crystal structure formula, though complex and broad,
was not ambiguous because the skilled person could determine
whether its activities fell inside or outside of the formula’s defined
777
boundaries.
Regarding the missing comma between fluorine and
chlorine, the Federal Circuit took a more expansive view of a court’s
authority to correct a patent. It stated that while a court cannot
correct material errors in claims, it can correct obvious typographical
errors that the skilled person would not reasonably dispute after
having considered the claim language, the specification, and the
778
prosecution history. Because the district court acknowledged that a
compound with both fluorine and chlorine corresponded to
“no known mineral,” and the ordinary skilled person would have also
known that the formula should contain a comma, the Federal Circuit
found the formula not indefinite and directed the district court to
779
enter judgment accordingly.
C. Written Description
1.

Possession of the claimed invention
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 requires a patent specification to “contain a
780
written description of the invention.”
Federal Circuit decisions
have historically held that this requirement is separate from the
enablement requirement, which is also part of § 112, ¶ 1 and states
that “[t]he specification shall contain . . . the manner and process of
making and using [the claimed invention], in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
781
which it pertains . . . to make and use the same.”
With broadly
773. Id. at 1351, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
774. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
775. Id. at 1353, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
776. Id. at 1352, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
777. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
778. Id. at 1353, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
779. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
780. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
781. Id.; see Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1326,
71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J., dissenting) (describing
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drafted claims, particularly those that cover chemical and
biotechnology inventions, written description issues often arise
regarding whether the specification establishes that the inventors
782
were in possession of the invention as claimed.
Claiming an
invention by what it does (i.e., functionally), rather than by what it is,
783
has run afoul of the written description requirement.
784
In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Federal Circuit
reversed a jury finding that the Ariad patent-in-suit provided
785
an adequate written description of the invention claimed.
In reversing, the court found that the specification did not show that
the inventors had possession of the broadly claimed invention—
effectively a method of reducing a cellular activity known as NF-κB
786
activity.
Although the claims recited achieving the reduction by
“reducing binding of NF-κB to NF-κB recognition sites on genes,”
the court looked to the specification for molecules capable of
787
reducing the claimed activity.
The specification disclosed three
788
Yet, in the primitive and uncertain field to
classes of molecules.
which the invention pertained, the Federal Circuit remained
unconvinced that the disclosed molecules and a hypothesis that they
the primary role of the written description but critiquing a construction of § 112 that
requires a separate written description beyond the enablement requirement);
Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560–61, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111,
1114–15 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (exploring the historical origins of the dual written
description and enablement requirements and canvassing policy rationales
supporting the continuation of the dual requirements).
782. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 924, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d
1886, 1892–96 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that the applicant did not provide adequate
description to show that inventors had possession or knowledge of the compound at
issue); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1562,
43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398, 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (asserting that in order to
meet the written description requirement, the specification must describe an
invention in enough detail so that one skilled in the art could easily know that the
inventor actually invented what is claimed); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169–71,
25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601, 1605 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (emphasizing that an applicant’s
mere reference to a potential method for isolating DNA was not enough to show that
he was in possession of the DNA and thus insufficient to satisfy the written
description requirement).
783. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406
(“A definition by function, as we have previously indicated, does not suffice to define
the genus because it is only an indication of what the gene does, rather than what it
is.” (citing Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169–71, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605–06)).
784. 560 F.3d 1366, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1549 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Just before this
Area Summary went to print, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, confirmed the
separate requirements of written description and enablement, and thereby reversed
in part and affirmed in part its previous panel decision. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., No. 2008-1248, 2010 WL 1007369 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2010) (en banc).
785. Id. at 1376, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
786. Id. at 1370–71, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550–51.
787. Id. at 1370, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551.
788. Id. at 1373, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553.

2010]

2009 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

895

could reduce NF-κB activity showed possession of the full scope of
789
Accordingly,
the invention covered by the generic claims.
the Federal Circuit held that the claims were invalid under § 112, ¶ 1
790
for lacking written descriptive support.
The court’s rationale in Ariad Pharmaceuticals may seem more
reflective of an enablement violation than a transgression of the
written description requirement. Indeed, in his concurrence, Judge
Linn seems to suggest as much: “Because the court relies upon [the
written description] requirement to reverse the district court, it does
791
not reach the important enablement issue raised by Lilly.”
Judge
Linn’s concurrence goes further, however. It specifically raised the
question of whether written description should be a separate
requirement from enablement and lamented a lost opportunity for
the court to resolve it: “I write separately to emphasize, as I have
before, my belief that our engrafting of a separate written description
792
requirement onto section 112, paragraph 1 is misguided.”
Judge
Linn went on to state: “This is an important issue that we have left
unresolved. It is an issue that we would have been compelled to
793
reach had the case been decided on enablement grounds.”
On August 21, 2009, the entire court answered Judge Linn,
vacating the earlier opinion of April 3, 2009 and ordering an en banc
794
hearing. The order requested the parties to address the following
issues:
(a) Whether 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, contains a
written description requirement separate from an
enablement requirement.
(b) If a separate written description requirement is set forth
in the statute, what is the scope and purpose of the
795
requirement?
In another case turning on whether the specification conveyed that
the patentee had possession of a claimed invention, the Federal
Circuit found that claims broadened to omit an element lacked

789. Id. at 1376–77, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555–56.
790. Id. at 1373, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553.
791. Id. at 1381, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559 (Linn, J., concurring).
792. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
793. Id. at 1381, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560.
794. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 332 F. App’x 636 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Just before this Area Summary went to print, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc,
confirmed the separate requirements of written description and enablement, and
thereby reversed in part and affirmed in part its previous panel decision.
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 2008-1248, 2010 WL 1007369 (Fed. Cir.
Mar. 22, 2010) (en banc).
795. Ariad Pharms., 332 F. App’x at 637.
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written description support and were therefore invalid under § 112, ¶
796
1. In ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, Inc., a patent-in-suit
was directed to a valve used with a syringe to transmit fluids to a
797
medical patient (such as through an intravenous line).
During
prosecution of the patent, ICU modified the claims to make a spike
798
It did this after Alaris
used as a component of the valve optional.
799
introduced its spikeless valve on the market.
In other words, the
spike-optional claims covered “valves that operate with a spike and
800
This aspect of the case is
those that operate without a spike.”
discussed at Part V.B.2.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment ruling that held that the ICU’s spike-optional claims were
801
invalid for lack of written description support.
Alaris had argued
that “the specification clearly limited ICU’s invention to valves with a
spike and does not demonstrate that the inventor possessed a medical
802
valve without a spike.”
The Federal Circuit agreed, noting that
“the specification describes only medical valves with spikes” and
rejecting ICU’s contentions that “the figures and descriptions that
include spikes somehow demonstrate that the inventor possessed a
803
medical valve that operated without a spike.”
ICU also argued, as
support for its spike-optional claims, that a person skilled in the art
would have recognized that the specification’s disclosure of a pre-cut
804
seal in the valve would eliminate the need for a spike. The Federal
Circuit countered, however, stating that “[i]t is not enough that it
would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill that a [pre-cut]
seal could be used without a spike,” for ICU did not “point to any
disclosure in the patent specification that describes a spikeless valve
805
with a [pre-cut] seal.”
It is well established that the language of a claim need not have
806
ipsis verbis support to satisfy the written description requirement.
But the specification must still convey that the inventor possessed the

796. 558 F.3d 1368, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
797. Id. at 1372, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073–74.
798. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074.
799. Id. at 1376, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
800. Id. at 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078.
801. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078.
802. Id. at 1377, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077.
803. Id. at 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078.
804. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078.
805. Id. at 1379, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078.
806. See Martin v. Johnson, 454 F.2d 746, 751, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 391, 395
(C.C.P.A. 1972) (“[T]he description need not be in ipsis verbis [i.e., “in the same
words”] to be sufficient.”).
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807

invention recited in the claims.
In Martek Biosciences Corp. v.
Nutrinova, Inc., the patentee, Martek Biosciences Corp., sought to rely
on the filing date of its priority application to avoid intervening prior
808
art. Martek’s patent related to specified microorganisms useful for
809
the commercial production of docosahexaenoic acid (DHA).
The issue was whether the priority application provided written
description support for two limitations: “mixed culture” and “food
810
product.”
In holding that Martek’s priority application supported
the claims of the patent, the Federal Circuit reiterated that
“the earlier application need not describe the claimed subject matter
811
in precisely the same terms as found in the claims at issue.”
The Federal Circuit determined that the test is “whether the disclosure of
the application relied upon ‘reasonably conveys to the artisan that
the inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject
812
matter.’”
Regarding the “mixed culture” limitation, the Federal Circuit
found that Martek’s expert explained how a person of ordinary skill
in the art would recognize that at least one passage in the priority
application disclosed the process of extracting lipids from a mixed
813
culture of fermenting microorganisms. Noting that a patent claim
does not necessarily lack written description support because it is
broader than the specific examples disclosed, the court rejected the
defendants’ argument that the expert’s interpretation of the parent
application was not reasonably reliable because the application did
not contain any working examples that consolidated cells from
814
different strains. Further, the court disagreed with the defendants’
argument that the parent application taught away from growing the
815
two strains together. The court found no evidence to suggest that
816
the two strains could not be grown together. Therefore, the court
807. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the test for sufficiency of support in
a parent application is whether the disclosure of the application that was relied upon
reasonably conveys that the inventor had possession at the time of the later claimed
subject matter).
808. 579 F.3d 1363, 1369–70, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1148, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
809. Id. at 1367, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
810. Id. at 1370, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
811. Id. at 1369, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152 (quoting Tech. Licensing Corp. v.
Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1331, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1877 (Fed. Cir.
2008)).
812. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152 (quoting Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co,
Inc., 772 F.2d. 1570, 1575, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 177, 179 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
813. Id. at 1370–71, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152–54.
814. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152–54.
815. Id. at 1371, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
816. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
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found substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that the
parent application adequately described the “mixed culture”
817
limitation of the claims.
Regarding the “food product” limitation, the court found that the
priority application disclosed “vegetable or other edible oil” and
818
“food additives.”
In addition, Martek’s expert explained that
819
vegetable and edible oils are understood to be “food materials.”
Accordingly, the court held that substantial evidence supported the
jury’s finding that the patent claims were entitled to the date of the
820
priority application.
2.

Failure of the claims to satisfy identified problems in the art
In Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. (Revolution Eyewear
821
II), the claim under attack for violation of the written description
requirement dealt with one of the two problems that the invention
822
Revolution Eyewear, however,
disclosed in the specification.
argued that the problems alleged to be addressed by the invention
823
were tied to each other and were directly related. In affirming the
district court’s finding of a sufficient written description in support of
the claim, the Federal Circuit stated that “when the specification sets
out two different problems present in the prior art, it is unnecessary
824
for each and every claim in the patent to address both problems.”
The court then dismissed Revolution Eyewear’s attempt at “tying” the
two problems together, noting that Revolution Eyewear’s argument
“is based on the false premise that if the problems addressed by the
invention are related, then a claim addressing only one of the
825
problems is invalid for lack of sufficient written description.”
The court further noted that “[i]nventors can frame their claims to
address one problem or several, and the written description
requirement will be satisfied as to each claim as long as the
description conveys that the inventor was in possession of the
826
invention recited in that claim.”

817.
818.
819.
820.
821.
822.
823.
824.
825.
826.

Id. at 1372, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
Id. at 1374, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
563 F.3d 1358, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1733 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1362–63, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735–36.
Id. at 1367, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739 (citations omitted).
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739.
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3.

Written description in an interference
As a general matter, courts construe claims in light of the
specification of the patent in which they exist. In the special
circumstances of an interference, however, that might not be the
case. In Agilent, the Federal Circuit addressed an interesting question
of which specification should be used to construe claims when those
claims are copied from another party’s specification and when
827
written description support for the copied claims is challenged.
Affymetrix copied claims from Agilent’s patent to provoke an
828
interference against that patent. During the subsequently declared
interference, Agilent challenged Affymetrix’s written description
829
support for the claims it copied.
As previously discussed,
the Federal Circuit held that the sufficiency of Affymetrix’s
specification to support its claim would be assessed after construing
that claim in light of the specification of the Agilent patent—the
830
specification from which the claim was copied and originated.
The claim construction holding placed Affymetrix in a particularly
vulnerable position, and it ultimately failed in its attempt to prove
that its specification provided written description support for a claim
831
originating from Agilent’s patent.
In In re Skvorecz, discussed above, the Federal Circuit also reversed a
finding by the Board that a reissue patent application for a wire
832
chafing stand did not meet the written description requirement.
Despite the USPTO’s contention that the claim element “plurality of
offsets located . . . in said first rim” was not described in the
specification, the court noted that “[a]n applicant’s disclosure
obligation varies according to the art to which the invention
833
pertains.” The court found that certain figures, although they did
not show the full structure of the chafing stand, showed sufficient
detail in conjunction with other figures of the specification to provide
834
support for the offsets in the rim.
D. Enablement
The enablement requirement embraced by 35 U.S.C. § 112 has two
components: “how to make” and “how to use” the invention claimed.
827.
828.
829.
830.
831.
832.
833.
834.

567 F.3d 1366, 1374, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1165–66 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
Id. at 1373–74, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
Id. at 1375, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
Id. at 1383, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173.
580 F.3d 1262, 1270, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1269–70, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1026.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1026.
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The “how to use” aspect of enablement is closely tied to the utility
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101. A specification failing to provide
basic utility in compliance with § 101 will not satisfy the use aspect of
the enablement requirement. In In re ‘318 Patent Infringement
835
Litigation, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision
to invalidate a patent for lack of enablement by essentially finding
836
that the specification did not provide a utility for the invention.
The patent at issue, U.S. Patent No. 4,663,318 (“the ‘318 patent”),
is directed to a method for treating Alzheimer’s disease, which was
comprised of administering an effective amount of galantamine to
837
the patient. The specification was fairly short, being just over one
page in length and providing “short summaries of six scientific
papers in which galantamine had been administered to humans or
838
animals.” The Federal Circuit stated that the specification did not
provide analysis or insights connecting the results of any of these six
studies to galantamine’s potential to treat Alzheimer’s disease in
839
humans.
Nor did the specification provide any in vitro test results
or animal test results involving the use of galantamine to treat
840
Alzheimer’s-like conditions.
According to the court, there was no
“evidence that a person skilled in the art would infer galantamine’s
utility from the specification, even if inferences could substitute for
841
an explicit description of utility.”
The Federal Circuit recognized the close link between the
requirement of utility and enablement, stating that “[i]f a patent
claim fails to meet the utility requirement because it is not useful or
operative, then it also fails to meet the how-to-use aspect of the
842
It found that “at the end of the day,
enablement requirement.”
the specification, even read in the light of the knowledge of those
skilled in the art, does no more than state a hypothesis and propose
843
testing to determine the accuracy of that hypothesis.”
As a result,
the Federal Circuit held that the ‘318 patent did not satisfy the
844
enablement requirement because it did not establish utility.

835.
836.
837.
838.
839.
840.
841.
842.
843.
844.

583 F.3d 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1327, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392.
Id. at 1320, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
Id. at 1321, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
Id. at 1325, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
Id. at 1326, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
Id. at 1324, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389 (emphasis and citation omitted).
Id. at 1327, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392.

2010]

2009 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

901

E. Qualifying as Prior Art
1.

Printed publication
In general:
A document is publicly accessible if it has been disseminated or
otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and
ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable
diligence, can locate it and recognize and comprehend therefrom
the essentials of the claimed invention without need of further
845
research or experimentation.

Consistent with this statement, the Federal Circuit previously noted
that “[w]here professional and behavioral norms entitle a party to a
reasonable expectation” that information will not be copied or
further distributed, a document disseminated in such a community
may not render the document a printed publication even in the
846
absence of a confidentiality agreement. On the facts in Cordis Corp.
847
848
v. Boston Scientific Corp., the Federal Circuit held exactly that.
The inventor distributed two monographs, which would otherwise
qualify as 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) art, to academic and research colleagues
849
and two commercial entities.
The Federal Circuit, however,
recognized the importance of “‘preserv[ing] the incentive for
inventors to participate in academic presentations or discussions’ by
noting that professional norms may support expectations of
850
confidentiality.”
The court found that the record contained clear
evidence that “such academic norms gave rise to an expectation that
disclosures will remain confidential,” and ultimately concluded that
the distribution to the two commercial entities did not render the
monographs printed publications within the meaning of 35 U.S.C.
851
§ 102(b). Whether or not they were legally obligated to do so, the
entities had kept their copies confidential, and the district court
noted that there was no evidence that the entities would have
distributed, or in fact did distribute, the document outside of the

845. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1333, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1401, 1411 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 749 (2009).
846. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350–51, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117,
1120–21 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
847. 561 F.3d 1319, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 749 (2009).
848. Id. at 1332–35, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1411–13.
849. Id. at 1333, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
850. Id. at 1334, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
851. Id. at 1334–35, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412–13.
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company.
Nor was there any showing that these or similar
commercial entities had made similar documents in the past available
853
to the public. The court concluded that “[t]he mere fact that there
was no legal obligation of confidentiality—all that was shown here—is
not in and of itself sufficient to show that [the patentee’s]
854
expectation of confidentiality was not reasonable.”
The Federal Circuit also evaluated the requirements for a “printed
855
publication” in In re Lister.
The “printed publication” at issue in
that case was a manuscript by the inventor that described his
856
invention of a new method of playing golf.
The inventor had
submitted the manuscript to the United States Copyright Office with
857
After
the objective of obtaining intellectual property protection.
learning that he needed to obtain a patent rather than a copyright to
protect his invention, he filed a patent application describing the
same invention in the USPTO more than two years after he submitted
858
the manuscript to the Copyright Office.
In determining whether the manuscript qualified as a printed
publication, the court noted that there were three relevant databases
to consider: the Copyright Office’s automated catalog and thirdparty databases Westlaw and Dialog, which obtained their data from
859
Whereas the Copyright Office’s catalog was
the Copyright Office.
searchable only by an author’s last name or the first word of the
work’s title, Westlaw and Dialog allowed for keyword searches of the
860
full titles but not the full texts of the works.
The government
conceded that the search format of the Copyright Office’s catalog
would not have guided a researcher interested in the inventor’s
861
golfing method to the manuscript.
However, the Federal Circuit
concluded that a reasonably diligent researcher could have found the
manuscript in the Westlaw and Dialog databases, making it publicly
accessible as of the date the manuscript was included in either
862
Westlaw or Dialog.
Turning then to the question of whether the manuscript was
publicly accessible in Westlaw or Dialog more than one year prior to
852.
853.
854.
855.
856.
857.
858.
859.
860.
861.
862.

Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412–13.
Id. at 1335, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1413.
583 F.3d 1307, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1309, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225–26.
Id. at 1309–10, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226.
Id. at 1315, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
Id. at 1315–16, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230–31.
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the critical date, the court noted that there was no other evidence
regarding the timing or process used by Westlaw or Dialog to
863
Absent such
incorporate the Copyright Office’s information.
evidence, the court determined that it could not conclude that the
864
manuscript was publicly accessible prior to the critical date.
The court also rejected the government’s argument that it made a
prima facie showing that the manuscript was included in the
commercial databases shortly after the Copyright Office granted the
certificate of registration that justified shifting the burden to
865
Dr. Lister to present evidence to the contrary.
In sum, the court
found that all the evidence showed was that, at some point in time,
the commercial databases incorporated the Copyright Office’s
automated catalog information about the Lister manuscript into their
866
own databases.
The court concluded that, absent any evidence
pertaining to the general practices of Westlaw and Dialog regarding
the timing of updates from the Copyright Office, the government’s
presumption that the manuscript was added to Westlaw and Dialog
867
prior to the critical date would be “pure speculation.”
In Iovate Health Sciences, Inc. v. Bio-Engineered Supplements &
868
Nutrition, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether an
advertisement published in a magazine anticipated the claimed use of
869
certain health supplements.
The claims at issue were directed to
“[a] method for enhancing muscle performance or recovery from
870
fatigue” using specified nutritional supplements. The district court
ruled that the claims were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by advertisements published before the critical date in
871
Flex Magazine.
The ads included a list of ingredients, which
identified the claimed nutritional supplements, directions for
administering the supplements orally to humans, as well as claims
and testimonials from bodybuilders regarding the supplements’
effectiveness in promoting muscle protein synthesis and growth,
building thick, dense muscle mass, and accelerating muscle
872
recovery.

863.
864.
865.
866.
867.
868.
869.
870.
871.
872.

Id. at 1316, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
Id. at 1316–17, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
Id. at 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231–32.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231–32.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
586 F.3d 1376, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1380, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674.
Id. at 1378, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673.
Id. at 1379–80, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673–74.
Id. at 1379, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674.
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On appeal, Iovate argued mainly that the ads did not disclose each
and every limitation of the claims or enable one of skill in the art to
873
practice the claimed invention before the critical date. Specifically,
Iovate relied on the preamble of the claims (enhancing muscle
performance or recovery from fatigue) to argue that the ad’s
disclosure of promoting muscle synthesis and growth was not
synonymous with “enhancing muscle performance,” and that the ad’s
general concepts of muscle recuperation and postworkout recovery
874
did not address the claim term enhancing “recovery from fatigue.”
The court rejected Iovate’s argument as bordering on “frivolous,”
particularly noting that the specification and Iovate’s infringement
allegations refer to muscle strength as a proxy for “enhancing muscle
875
performance.”
The court also rejected Iovate’s attempt to avoid
anticipation by reading an effectiveness requirement into the
preamble, stating that the claims do not require any further
measurement or determination of any result achieved by
876
administering the claimed composition.
The court found,
moreover, that the ad’s disclosure of a certain composition taken for
a certain purpose with specific instructions regarding the
administration and dosage of the supplement was sufficient for the
877
purpose of anticipation.
Regarding the enablement issue, Iovate argued that the ad lacked
878
any guidance on appropriate ingredient dosages. The court again
disagreed, stating that “all one of ordinary skill in the art would need
to do to practice an embodiment of the invention is to mix together
the known ingredients listed in the ad and administer the
879
composition as taught by the ad.”
Even if the claims required an
effectiveness element, “one of skill in the art would have been able to
determine such an amount based on” the knowledge at the time and
the ad’s disclosure of the amount or dosage of the claimed
880
components. The court concluded that, “[b]ecause no reasonable
fact-finder could conclude other than that the . . . ad discloses each
limitation of the claimed method in an enabling manner,” the ad

873.
874.
875.
876.
877.
878.
879.
880.

Id. at 1380–81, 1383, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675–77.
Id. at 1380–81, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675.
Id. at 1381 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675.
Id. at 1382, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
Id. at 1382–83, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
Id. at 1383, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
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qualified as a printed publication that invalidated the asserted
881
claims.
2.

On sale or public use
a.

Experimental use

The Federal Circuit has applied a “totality of the circumstances”
test to determine whether precritical date activity is experimental or
882
commercial.
It has catalogued a set of instructive, and in certain
cases dispositive, factors to determine the issue:
(1) [T]he necessity for public testing, (2) the amount of control
over the experiment retained by the inventor, (3) the nature of the
invention, (4) the length of the test period, (5) whether payment
was made, (6) whether there was a secrecy obligation, (7) whether
records of the experiment were kept, (8) who conducted the
experiment, . . . (9) the degree of commercial exploitation during
testing[,] . . . (10) whether the invention reasonably requires
evaluation under actual conditions of use, (11) whether testing was
systematically performed, (12) whether the inventor continually
monitored the invention during testing, and (13) the nature of
883
contacts made with potential customers.

Of course, the outcome of applying such a thirteen-factor test,
which necessarily involves certain balancing among the factors, is
unpredictable and depends highly on the specific factual pattern of
the case. In each specific case, the court does not necessarily
consider all thirteen factors.
884
In Clock Spring, L.P. v. Wrapmaster, Inc., the Federal Circuit found
several factors dispositive and affirmed a district court’s grant of
885
summary judgment of invalidity due to a prior demonstration.
The court noted that the demonstration lasted after the patent
application was filed, and that no report of the demonstration in any
way suggested that the demonstration of the claimed invention was
designed to test durability for the purposes of the patent application
886
Moreover, the Federal Circuit observed that the
to the USPTO.

881. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
882. See, e.g., TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972,
220 U.S.P.Q. 577, 582 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[A] decision on whether there has been a
‘public use’ can only be made upon consideration of the entire surrounding
circumstances.”).
883. Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d
1269, 1779 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
884. 560 F.3d 1317, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
885. Id. at 1324–29, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215–19.
886. Id. at 1328, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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reports clearly stated that the demonstration was to seek “input from
people in the industry on the performance of the bands and the
887
Accordingly, the
practicality of their installation techniques.”
Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s judgment that the
demonstration for “acceptance by regulators and the pipeline
888
industry” constituted commercial use that invalidated the patent.
F.

Novelty

1.

An anticipatory reference
It has long been recognized that to destroy the novelty of a claimed
invention, a reference must not only disclose each and every
limitation of the claim, it must enable the subject of the invention it
discloses. In the chemical context, for example, “[t]he mere naming
of a compound in a reference, without more, cannot constitute a
889
description of the compound.”
However, the question arose as to
whether being enabled means enabled for both “how to make” and
“how to use” a chemical. The Federal Circuit addressed this question
890
in In re Gleave, and held that anticipation requires only that the
prior art enable the making of the invention without undue
891
There is no additional requirement of enabling
experimentation.
892
the use of the claimed invention.
Gleave claimed antisense oligonucleotides generally “of sufficient
length to act as an antisense inhibitor” of both human insulin growth
factor binding protein-2 (IGFBP-2) and human IGFBP-5 synthesis
893
(i.e., bispecificity).
The Federal Circuit effectively read the prior
art, a PCT application to Wraight, to disclose all of the claimed
894
elements.
All that remained with respect to the issue of
887. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
888. Id. at 1328–29, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218–19.
889. In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538, 543, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 421, 425 (C.C.P.A.
1973).
890. 560 F.3d 1331, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
891. Id. at 1335, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238–39.
892. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
893. Id. at 1333, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237.
894. Id. at 1336, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239 (emphasis added). Wraight
disclosed a list of every fifteen-base-long sense oligonucleotide in the IGFBP-2 gene.
Id. at 1333, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237. Although that list included more than
1400 sequences, Wraight disclosed “the general concepts that antisense
oligonucleotides are preferably between fifteen and twenty-five bases in length, and
that some antisense oligonucleotides may be bispecific (i.e., capable of inhibiting
‘an IGFPB such as IGFPB-2 and/or IGFBP-3’).” Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1237.
Wraight disclosed “that ‘[a]ntisense oligonucleotides to IGFPB-2 may be selected
from molecules capable of interacting with one or more’ of the sense
oligonucleotides described in the long list.” Id. at 1333–34, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1237 (alteration in original).
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anticipation was enablement of the claimed invention by Wraight.
For “composition of matter” claims, such as Gleave’s antisense
oligonucleotides, the Federal Circuit stated that “a reference satisfies
the enablement requirement of [35 U.S.C.] § 102(b) by showing that
one of skill in the art would know how to make the relevant
895
sequences disclosed in Wraight.” The court continued, explaining
that “[a] thorough reading of our case law . . . makes clear that a
reference need disclose no independent use or utility to anticipate a
896
claim under § 102.”
Since Gleave admitted that one of ordinary
skill in the art can “make any oligodeoxynucleotide sequence,”
the court found that Wraight provided an “enabling disclosure
897
sufficient to anticipate Gleave’s invention under § 102(b).”
In addition, the Federal Circuit distinguished the facts before it
898
from the broad statement in In re Wiggins that the “mere naming of
a compound in a reference, without more, cannot constitute a
899
description of the compound.”
The court indicated that
“‘[w]ithout more’ is the key phrase,” and read the “more” as the
900
ability of one skilled in the art to make the claimed compound.
According to the Federal Circuit, “a person of ordinary skill in the art
equipped with an IGFBP sequence is admittedly capable of
901
envisioning how to make any antisense sequence.”
A claim that includes the transition term “comprising” does not
preclude anticipation by a reference that discloses the claimed
elements as well as certain features not expressly present in the
902
903
claim.
In Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the claim at issue
was directed to “[a] method of detecting temperature of biological
tissue comprising,” among other steps, “electronically detecting the
peak radiation from the multiple areas to obtain a peak temperature
904
signal.”
At trial, Exergen’s expert admitted that a prior art
reference disclosed all limitations of the claim at issue except the
905
electronically detecting step.
Exergen argued that the prior art
895. Id. at 1336, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239.
896. Id. at 1335, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
897. Id. at 1336, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239.
898. In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 421 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
899. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d at 1337–38, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240–41 (quoting
In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d at 543, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 425).
900. Id. at 1337, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240.
901. Id. at 1338, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1240.
902. See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1318–30,
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656, 1660–69 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining that the term
“comprising” means “including but not limited to” in the context of patent law).
903. 575 F.3d 1312, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
904. Id. at 1318, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660.
905. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660.
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method heated the probe unit to 98ºF and that it was the radiation
given off by the heated probe in addition to radiation from the
906
The Federal Circuit rejected this
patient that was detected.
argument, finding that the use of the term “comprising” in the claim
at issue did not require detection of radiation solely from the
biological tissue, and thus did not prevent the reference from
907
anticipating the claim.
Regarding the claimed requirement that
radiation be detected from multiple areas, the Federal Circuit also
rejected Exergen’s contention that the reference method detected
908
radiation only from a single spot. The court noted that Exergen’s
expert admitted that the reference inherently disclosed this
limitation because the device necessarily detected radiation from the
patient’s face, outer ear, and ear canal as the probe unit was moved
909
into position in the ear canal. Accordingly, the court held that the
910
claim at issue was anticipated.
Conversely, in reversing a determination of anticipation by the
Board, the Federal Circuit pointed out that “comprising” does not
render a claim to be anticipated by a device that contains less than
911
what is claimed.
2.

Product-by-process claims
In F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., discussed above, the Federal Circuit
addressed the question of whether the product patent claims at issue
were anticipated by the prior art teaching of an erythropoietin (EPO)
912
The Federal Circuit
purified from a different source.
acknowledged that an old product is not patentable even if it is made
by a new process, but pointed out that “a new product may be
patented by reciting source or process limitations so long as the
913
product is new and unobvious.”
The district court construed
the claims at issue to include a source limitation wherein said
914
EPO is “purified from mammalian cells grown in culture.”
The specification, prosecution history, and expert testimony
indicated that EPO purified from mammalian cells had a higher
906. Id. at 1318–19, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660–61.
907. Id. at 1319, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
908. Id. at 1319–20, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
909. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
910. Id. at 1316, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659.
911. In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1268, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020, 1024
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
912. Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1366–67,
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1309–10 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
913. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310.
914. Id. at 1367, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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molecular weight and different charge than urinary EPO due to
915
differences in carbohydrate composition. The court found that this
916
distinction was sufficient to impart novelty on the claimed products.
3.

Subject matter incorporated by reference
For the purpose of anticipation, “[m]aterial not explicitly
contained in the single, prior art document may still be
considered . . . if that material is incorporated by reference into the
917
document.”
To incorporate matter by reference, “[a] host
document must identify with detailed particularity what specific
material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is
918
found in the various documents.”
In Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet
919
Co., the Federal Circuit considered whether and what subject
matter from an incorporated patent could be used in assessing
920
novelty based on the main prior art patent.
The court
acknowledged that “language nearly identical to that used in
[the main prior art patent] (‘[r]eference is made to’) can be
sufficient to indicate to one of skill in the art that the referenced
921
material is fully incorporated in the host document.”
After considering the passages of the prior art patent, the court
found that the patent identified with specificity both what material
was being incorporated by reference and where it could be found
922
(in the referenced patent).
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held
that the prior art patent incorporated by reference the material
described in the referenced patent and remanded the case for
further proceedings to decide whether the prior art patent with the
923
incorporated subject matter anticipated the claimed invention.
G. Obviousness
In 2007, the Supreme Court, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex
924
Inc., significantly tempered the impact on the so-called “teaching,

915. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310.
916. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310.
917. Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1346, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1705, 1716–17 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (citation omitted), cert. denied,
78 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2010) (No. 09-702).
918. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717.
919. 576 F.3d 1331, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
78 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2010) (No. 09-702).
920. Id. at 1346–48, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716–18.
921. Id. at 1346, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717 (second alteration in original).
922. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717.
923. Id. at 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718.
924. 550 U.S. 398, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007).
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suggestion, motivation” test when assessing the obviousness of a
925
claimed invention under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The Court implemented
a more flexible approach centered around four factors articulated in
926
the seminal case of Graham v. John Deere Co. : (1) the scope and
content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the claimed
invention and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art,
and (4) objective evidence (sometimes referred to as secondary
927
considerations) of nonobviousness. Though tempered, motivation
to make a claimed invention is still a necessary component to the
obviousness determination. A prima facie case of obviousness
requires a showing of both “motivat[ion] to combine the teachings of
the prior art . . . to achieve the claimed invention, and . . . a
928
reasonable expectation of success in doing so.”
This Section covers cases dealing with these two requirements, as
well as those touching on questions of “obvious to try,” which
constitute an important change in the obviousness calculus wrought
by KSR. The Section concludes with a discussion of cases that involve
objective evidence or indicia of nonobviousness.
1.

Lack of motivation
929
In Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the
Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision that a new
compound for treatment of osteoporosis was not obvious over a
930
related positional isomer “because a person having ordinary skill in
the art would not have had reason to make [the new compound]
931
based on the prior art.”
The patent-in-suit, U.S. Patent
No. 5,583,122 (“the ‘122 patent”), claimed risedronate, a 3-pyr
EHDP, as the active ingredient of an osteoporosis drug marketed
932
under the trademark ACTONEL. Teva alleged that the ‘122 patent
was invalid as obvious in light of another Proctor & Gamble patent,
933
The ‘406 patent
U.S. Patent No. 4,761,406 (“the ‘406 patent”).
identified the positional isomer, 2-pyr EHDP, in a list of eight

925. Id. at 399, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
926. 383 U.S. 1, 17–18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467 (1966).
927. 550 U.S. at 399, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
928. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994,
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947, 1949 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
929. 566 F.3d 989, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
930. Positional isomers are chemical compounds that contain the same atoms
arranged in different ways.
931. Procter & Gamble Co., 566 F.3d at 995, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950.
932. Id. at 992, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948.
933. Id. at 992–93, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948.
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934

compounds as preferred to treat osteoporosis. Thus, the issue was
the obviousness of the claimed 3-pyr EHDP in view of the known
isomer, 2-pyr EHDP.
Essentially, the difference between the
compounds resided in the relative position of a nitrogen atom.
The Federal Circuit recognized that “[s]tructural relationships
often provide the requisite motivation to modify known compounds
935
to obtain new compounds.” Although that might occur, it did not
occur here where the structural similarity was contrasted with
unpredictable properties for the class of compounds at issue
936
(biphosphonates).
The court found that “[b]ecause the nitrogen
atom is in a different position in the two molecules, they differ in
three dimensional shape, charge distribution and hydrogen bonding
937
properties.”
It also noted that biphosphonates are compounds of
938
That unpredictability was
“extremely unpredictable nature.”
confirmed by the closely structurally related 4-pyr EHDP, which
showed no activity in an assay used to screen a compound’s ability to
939
treat osteoporosis.
Quoting Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories,
940
Ltd., the Federal Circuit stated that, “[t]o the extent an art is
unpredictable, as the chemical arts often are, KSR’s focus on []
‘identified, predictable solutions’ may present a difficult hurdle
because potential solutions are less likely to be genuinely
941
predictable.”
Agreeing with the district court that Teva failed to
clear the unpredictability hurdle, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
lower court’s ruling that Teva established an “insufficient motivation
for a person of ordinary skill to synthesize and test [the claimed 3-pyr
942
EHDP].”
Not all patents are so well-served by an unpredictable field of art.
Post-KSR, patents in more predictable fields seem to have fallen on
difficult times. Indeed, in reversing a trial court’s denial of summary
judgment of invalidity on a patent directed to a candle tin,
the Federal Circuit in Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd.
943
Brands, Inc., referred to the lower court’s characterization of the

934. Id. at 993, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948–49.
935. Id. at 995, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950 (quoting In re Mayne, 104 F.3d 1339,
1343, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
936. Id. at 995–96, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950–51.
937. Id. at 995, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950.
938. Id. at 993, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949.
939. Id. at 996, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
940. 533 F.3d 1353, 1359, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1452, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
941. Proctor & Gamble Co., 566 F.3d at 996, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
942. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951.
943. 555 F.3d 984, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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patented technology as “simple and easily understandable.”
The patent-in-suit claimed a candle tin with a removable cover and
945
protrusions (or feet) on the bottom of the tin. The cover also acted
946
as a base for the candle tin.
The patent also claimed putting the
947
candle tin (protrusion side) on top of the cover. That arrangement
was said to minimize scorching that could otherwise occur if a lit
948
candle tin was placed directly on a surface. Citing KSR, the Federal
Circuit found that putting feet on the bottom of the candle tin and
using the cover as a base was a predictable variation that was obvious
to the skilled person, particularly since the prior art taught raising a
949
candle holder off of a supporting surface to avoid scorching.
950
In Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s denial of Cordis’s motion for judgment as
a matter of law, finding the patented invention obvious in view of a
prior art patent showing two adjacent figures that together disclosed
951
all the elements of that claim. The claim at issue was directed to a
stent coated with an undercoat that incorporated a biologically active
material and a topcoat comprising a non-thrombogenic material that
provided “long term non-thrombogenicity . . . during and after
952
release of the biologically active material.” Specifically, Figure 3B of
the prior art document “Wolff” showed “a polymer stent made of a
953
drug-eluting polymer with a barrier topcoat.”
Figure 4 of Wolff
954
showed “a metallic stent with a drug-eluting polymer coating.”
The court found that all of the limitations of the claim at issue were
found in two separate embodiments pictured side-by-side in Wolff,
955
not in one embodiment.
Nevertheless, the court explained that
“[c]ombining two embodiments disclosed adjacent to each other in a
956
prior art patent does not require a leap of inventiveness.”
The court concluded that a person of ordinary skill would have been
motivated to coat the metal stent of Figure 4, including its layer of

944. Id. at 992, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876 (internal quotation marks omitted).
945. Id. at 986, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
946. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
947. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
948. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
949. Id. at 992–93, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
950. 554 F.3d 982, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. dismissed,
130 S. Ct. 50 (2009).
951. Id. at 988–92, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710–13.
952. Id. at 984, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
953. Id. at 988, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710.
954. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710.
955. Id. at 991, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
956. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
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drug-containing polymer, with a second layer of polymer, like the
957
layer depicted in Figure 3B, to arrive at the patented invention.
Even scintillating new chemical technology used to increase
lubricity of sexual devices did not avoid the post-KSR obviousness rub.
958
In Ritchie v. Vast Resources, Inc., the patent at issue claimed a “sexual
aid . . . fabricated of a generally lubricious glass-based material
containing an appreciable amount of an oxide of boron to render it
lubricious and resistant to heat, chemicals, electricity and bacterial
959
absorptions.”
Until the patentee began manufacturing the
patented sexual devices, “glass sexual devices were made out of soda960
lime glass, the most common form of glass.”
In the court’s view,
“[t]his class of inventions is well illustrated by efforts at routine
experimentation with different standard grades of a material used in
a product-standard in the sense that their properties, composition,
and method of creation are well known, making successful results of
961
the experimentation predictable.”
The court concluded that,
because borosilicate glass (an oxide of boron) is a “standard product
with well-known properties,” including those listed in the patent,
“to experiment with substituting borosilicate glass for ordinary glass
962
in a sexual device was not a venture into the unknown.”
963
discussed
In Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter International, Inc.,
previously, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s
determination that Fresenius had failed to demonstrate the required
motivation to combine prior art elements in support of the jury’s
964
obviousness determination.
Although the district court issued its
opinion before KSR was decided, the Federal Circuit noted that it
remains appropriate post-KSR “to determine whether there was an
apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion
965
claimed by the patent at issue.”
The patented inventions covered “a hemodialysis machine
966
integrated with a touch screen user interface.”
In support of its
957. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
958. 563 F.3d 1334, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1668 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 269 (2009).
959. Id. at 1335–36, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668 (alteration in original).
960. Id. at 1335, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
961. Id. at 1337, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669.
962. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669.
963. 582 F.3d 1288, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2009), petition for cert.
filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 09-1096).
964. Id. at 1301–02, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173–74.
965. Id. at 1300, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1396 (2007)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
966. Id. at 1300, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
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obviousness argument, Fresenius presented a prior art publication
that disclosed a touch screen interface on an anesthesia-delivery
967
The publication mentioned that advancing areas of
system.
medicine, such as hemodialysis, could benefit from an improved user
968
interface.
Fresenius also presented evidence describing the ease
and prevalence of “integrating a touch screen into some kind of a
969
computer-controlled machine,” such as a hemodialysis machine.
The Federal Circuit explained that, “[u]nder KSR, ‘if a technique
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill
in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in
the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual
970
application is beyond his or her skill.’” The court reasoned that the
jury had “implicitly found that the prior art suggested combining a
971
touch screen with . . . a hemodialysis machine.”
That finding was
supported by substantial evidence because a reasonable jury could
have concluded that the publication contained an explicit suggestion
to combine the benefits of a touch screen interface with a
972
hemodialysis machine. Based on the testimony, the jury could also
have reasonably concluded that an “ordinarily skilled artisan would
973
have known how to make” that same combination.
2.

Reasonable expectation of success
One challenging a patent for obviousness must clearly and
convincingly prove that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
have had both “motivat[ion] to combine the teachings of the prior
art . . . to achieve the claimed invention, and . . . a reasonable
974
The Federal Circuit in Procter
expectation of success in doing so.”
& Gamble not only agreed with the district court’s finding of a lack of
motivation, it also concluded that “there was an insufficient showing

967. Id. at 1301, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173.
968. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173–74.
969. Id. at 1301, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (internal quotation marks omitted).
970. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 417,
82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389).
971. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
972. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
973. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
974. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994,
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947, 1949 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex,
Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a ‘reasonable
975
expectation of success’ in synthesizing and testing risedronate.”
3.

Obvious to try
“Obvious to try” does not equate with obviousness, even after KSR.
976
The Federal Circuit in In re Kubin addressed two scenarios where
977
“obvious to try” would not lead to a holding of obviousness. In the
first class of scenarios, a challenger to an invention’s obviousness
“merely throws metaphorical darts at a board filled with
combinatorial prior art possibilities,” though the prior art provides
no guidance or direction as to which of many possible choices is
978
likely to be successful.
That situation should be contrasted,
however, with a situation referred to by the Supreme Court in KSR
“where a skilled artisan merely pursues ‘known options’ from a ‘finite
979
number of identified, predictable solutions.’” A second “obvious to
try” scenario envisioned by the court that should not result in a
holding of obviousness occurs where “what was ‘obvious to try’ was to
explore a new technology or general approach that seemed to be a
promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only
general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention
980
or how to achieve it.”
In In re Kubin, the Federal Circuit did not find that the claimed
invention fit into either of these two scenarios. Kubin’s invention was
directed to a genus of isolated polynucleotides encoding a protein
that binds CD48 and was at least eighty percent identical to the
disclosed amino acid sequence for the CD48-binding region of
981
Natural Killer Cell Activation Inducing Ligand (NAIL). The court
found that the prior art disclosed the protein of interest,
“a motivation to isolate the gene coding for that protein, and
illustrative instructions to use a monoclonal antibody specific to the
982
protein for cloning th[e] gene.”
On that record, the Federal
Circuit concluded that deriving the claimed invention in light of the
975. Id. at 996, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951 (quoting PharmaStem Therapeutics,
Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2007)).
976. 561 F.3d 1351, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
977. Id. at 1359, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423 (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894,
903, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1680–81 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
978. Id. at 1359, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423.
979. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1397 (2007)).
980. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423 (quoting In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903,
7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1681).
981. Id. at 1352–53, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418.
982. Id. at 1356–61, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421–24.
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prior art would have been reasonably expected.
In addition, the
court declined to limit KSR to the “‘predictable arts’ (as opposed to
the ‘unpredictable art’ of biotechnology)” and noted that the record
showed that one of skill in that advanced art would have found the
984
claimed results predictable. It further noted that it would not, “in
the face of KSR, cling to formalistic rules for obviousness, customize
its legal tests for specific scientific fields in ways that deem entire
classes of prior art teachings irrelevant, or discount the significant
985
abilities of artisans of ordinary skill in an advanced area of art.”
In a case dealing with formulation chemistry and pharmaceuticals,
the Federal Circuit found that the art presented a finite number
of predictable solutions the skilled person would have tried
986
in arriving at the claimed invention.
In Bayer Schering Pharma
987
AG v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., the patent covered a micronized,
988
uncoated formulation of a known compound, drospirenone.
989
The formulation was sold by Bayer as an oral contraceptive.
990
It was known that
Drospirenone was poorly bioavailable.
micronizing could improve the bioavailability of compounds that
991
were poorly absorbed into the blood stream.
Drospirenone,
however, was also an acid-sensitive compound known to be
992
susceptible to degradation in the gastric acid juices of the stomach.
Enteric coatings, therefore, were typically used to avoid degradation
of acid-sensitive compounds, allowing them to pass through the
stomach and be absorbed through the intestines and into the blood
993
stream.
Bayer stated that the innovative aspect of the patented invention
was that micronized drospirenone demonstrated the same
bioavailability as enteric-coated drospirenone and could be
994
administered as a normal, uncoated pill. That, according to Bayer,

983. Id. at 1360, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424.
984. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424.
985. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424.
986. Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Barr Labs., Inc., 575 F.3d 1341, 1350,
91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed,
78 U.S.L.W. 3523 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2010) (No. 09-1022).
987. 575 F.3d 1341, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569 (Fed. Cir. 2009), petition for cert.
filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3523 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2010) (No. 09-1022).
988. Id. at 1345, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571.
989. Id. at 1343, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.
990. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
991. Id. at 1343–44, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
992. Id. at 1343, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
993. Id. at 1344, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
994. Id. at 1345–48, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571–73.
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995

was unexpected and contrary to the teachings in the prior art.
Defendant Barr countered that it would have been obvious to try an
uncoated micronized pill because “enteric coating is so complicated,
expensive, cumbersome to manufacture, and prone to variability that
it only would be used as a last resort by formulation scientists working
996
with an acid-sensitive drug.”
The Federal Circuit found that while Bayer argued that the “prior
art teaches away from using micronized drospirenone[,]” and Barr
argued that the “prior art teaches away from using an enteric
coating[,]” the parties actually presented the two options available to
a pharmaceutical formulator to solve the problem of acid-sensitive
997
but hydrophobic drospirenone. The panel majority explained that,
“[a]t this point, a person having ordinary skill in the art . . . must
choose between two known options:
delivery of micronized
drospirenone by a normal pill . . ., or delivery of drospirenone by an
enteric-coated pill,” and concluded that “[b]ecause the selection of
micronized drospirenone in a normal pill led to the result
anticipated by the [prior art], the invention would have been
998
obvious.”
In a decision concerning a method of managing bulk email
(“spam”), the Federal Circuit held that when a method claim is
limited to repeating previously known steps, there is a “finite number
of identified, predictable solutions” suggesting that the method
999
In Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v.
would have been obvious to try.
1000
InfoUSA, Inc., the sole independent claim of the patent at issue,
as summarized by the court, was drawn to a method of managing
bulk email distribution comprising the steps of: (1) targeting a group
or recipients, (2) sending email to the recipients, (3) calculating the
number of successfully delivered emails, and (4) repeating steps
(1)–(3) until the number of successfully delivered emails exceeds a
1001
predetermined value.
Neither party disputed that the sole prior art
reference disclosed the first three steps of the claim but failed to
1002
Additionally, both parties understood that
disclose the final step.
995. Id. at 1347–48, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573.
996. Id. at 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573–74.
997. Id. at 1349, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
998. Id. at 1350, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575–76.
999. Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1331–32,
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1849, 1855 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1397 (2007)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
1000. 587 F.3d 1324, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1849 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1001. Id. at 1326, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851.
1002. Id. at 1327, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852.
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the level of skill in the art was relatively low.
Against this factual
background, the court held that merely repeating the known process
1004
Citing In re Kubin,
to obtain better results was obvious to try.
the court found no evidence that one of skill in the art would have
needed to “vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible
choices,” or “explore a new technology or general approach . . .
where the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular
1005
form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it.”
Thus, the
1006
court concluded that the claim was obvious to try.
4.

Teaching all claimed limitations
Sometimes overlooked by parties seeking to establish obviousness is
the requirement that the resultant modification of the prior art must
embody all of the elements of the claimed invention. In Süd-Chemie,
1007
Inc. v. Multisorb Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit vacated the
district court’s grant of summary judgment that Süd-Chemie’s patent
was invalid for obviousness because the prior art did not teach using
1008
materials with a specifically claimed property.
The district court
ruled that Süd-Chemie’s patent, directed to desiccant containers
requiring a laminate formed from combining “compatible”
films/materials, was obvious over a single prior art patent to
1009
Komatsu.
The lower court construed “compatible” to mean
films/materials capable of “mix[ing] on a molecular scale” with
1010
similar “softening points.”
Komatsu disclosed materials in the
same class described in Süd-Chemie’s patent, but it failed to disclose
combining materials with similar softening points. The Komatsu
materials “are different in a way that the [Süd-Chemie] patent treats
1011
as important to the invention.”
Having failed to recognize that
Komatsu disclosed “the use of incompatible materials” where the
Süd-Chemie patent required compatible materials, the district court
incorrectly concluded that Komatsu “teaches the same container as
1012
that claimed in the [Süd-Chemie] patent.”

1003. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852.
1004. Id. at 1331, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
1005. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
1006. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
1007. 554 F.3d 1001, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1768 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1008. Id. at 1004, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770–71.
1009. Id. at 1003–04, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069–70.
1010. Id. at 1006, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
1011. Id. at 1008, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
1012. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
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In Source Search Technologies, the Federal Circuit held that material
factual disputes precluded summary judgment on obviousness with
respect to a computerized service that matches potential buyers with
1013
potential vendors over a network.
The claimed method included
sending over a data network a request for a quotation from a
potential buyer, filtering the request to ascertain a set of potential
sellers, obtaining quotes from potential sellers, and forwarding the
1014
quotes to the potential buyer.
The claimed method purported to
return a manageable and sufficient number of search results,
addressing the common problems encountered by Internet search
engines, which usually return either “too little” or “too much”
1015
information.
The district court ruled by summary judgment that
the claim was obvious over two sets of prior art references:
the e-commerce prior art (early e-commerce systems employing the
Internet for access and distribution of information), and the bricks
and mortar prior art (pre-Internet referral services, such as home
1016
contractor networks or social services networks).
The Federal
1017
Circuit vacated and remanded.
The Federal Circuit’s decision focused on the claimed term
“quotes” and on the step of “filtering.” The district court did not
specifically construe the term “quotes,” but from the context,
the Federal Circuit inferred that that term should be construed as
“price and other terms of a particular transaction in sufficient detail
1018
to constitute an offer capable of acceptance.”
The court found
that none of the prior-art-returned quotes were ready to be accepted
1019
in a contractual sense.
Specifically, the court rejected the accused
infringer’s argument that the “patent disclose[d] nothing more than
1020
a computerized version of the bricks and mortar prior art.”
The court noted that those bricks and mortar prior-art network
services merely connected the client and potential service provider
without providing any quotes before a potential client could meet
1021
with the provider.
The court further recognized that, even if the prior art included a
quoting feature, a person of ordinary skill in the art would still have
1013. Source Search Techs. LLC v. LendingTree, LLC, 588 F.3d 1063, 1066,
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1907, 1908–09 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1014. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
1015. Id. at 1066–67, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
1016. Id. at 1069, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
1017. Id. at 1066, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
1018. Id. at 1071, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1019. Id. at 1072, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
1020. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
1021. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
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to take the step of “equating the ‘filtering’ done by human judgment
in the bricks and mortar systems with the search results of the
1022
At the time of the invention,
e-commerce procurement services.”
“the dawn of the internet era,” an ordinarily skilled person “may not
have even recognized the problem addressed by the filtering feature
of the claimed invention;” and even if the problem was recognized,
1023
the solution may not have been straightforward.
The court
therefore concluded that “[g]enuine issues of material fact related to
the understanding of a person of ordinary skill, the character and
number of the differences between the claimed invention and the
prior art, and even the scope of those prior art references prevent a
1024
grant of summary judgment.”
5.

Lead compound analysis
In chemical cases, particularly those involving new chemical
compounds, the obviousness determination starts with a selection by
one skilled in the art that the chemical compound is the
1025
“lead compound” for further structural modification.
Importantly,
it does not have to be the structurally closest compound to the
invention. Rather, it is a selection driven by what the state of the art
1026
would have suggested should be the lead compound.
The “lead
compound” determination can be pivotal⎯much like claim
construction can be outcome determinative of infringement.
Patentees have subsequently used this determination effectively to
overcome what would appear to be very close structural obviousness
1027
predicaments.
In 2009, the lead compound inquiry came up in the Procter &
Gamble case, and while the Federal Circuit did not reach a decision
1022. Id. at 1072–73, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913–14.
1023. Id. at 1073, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
1024. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
1025. Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359, 87 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1452, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v.
Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1355–60, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1173–77
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting a competitor’s claim of obviousness because a person of
ordinary skill in the art would not have selected the closest prior art compound as
the lead compound for antidiabetic treatment).
1026. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1379,
81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that the state of the art
directed the skilled person away from unfluorinated compounds (the closest prior
art) because the state of the art suggested a preference for halogen containing
compounds).
1027. See Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1355, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (finding the
claimed compound unobvious over positional isomer); Eli Lilly, 471 F.3d at 1377–78,
81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329–30 (finding the claimed compound unobvious over
adjacent homolog).
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on the lead compound, it still recognized its viability. The court
noted, “An obviousness argument based on structural similarity
between claimed and prior art compounds ‘clearly depends on a
preliminary finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
1028
selected [the prior art compound] as a lead compound.’”
6.

Sufficiency of the articulated reasons supporting obviousness
After KSR eliminated the requirement that there be some
suggestion in the art to modify prior art teachings, practitioners
feared that examiners and challengers to validity would toss out any
basis, no matter how frail, to support a claim of obviousness. In a
terse, nonprecedential opinion, without much explanation,
the Federal Circuit concluded that “substantial evidence supports the
Board’s finding that each disputed limitation is present in at least one
of the references and that the Board’s opinion contained ‘articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
1029
However, in the Procter & Gamble case,
conclusion of obviousness.’”
the Federal Circuit provided some guidance with respect to what is
necessary when addressing the obviousness of new chemical
compounds:
A known compound may suggest its homolog, analog, or isomer
because such compounds often have similar properties and
therefore chemists of ordinary skill would ordinarily contemplate
making them to try to obtain compounds with improved
properties . . . . [However,] it remains necessary to identify some reason
that would have led a chemist to modify a known compound in a
particular manner to establish prima facie obviousness of a new
1030
claimed compound.

Subsequently, in Perfect Web, the Federal Circuit emphasized the
need for courts to set forth their analysis, particularly when common
1031
sense is relied on to support a determination of obviousness.
In affirming the district court’s application of common sense, the
Federal Circuit held that an obviousness determination under
Graham “may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common
sense available to the person of ordinary skill that do not necessarily
1028. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994,
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947, 1950 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting
Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1357, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175).
1029. In re Baggett, 326 F. App’x 569, 570 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1396 (2007)).
1030. Proctor & Gamble, 566 F.3d at 995–96, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950–51
(alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1356–57,
83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174).
1031. 587 F.3d 1324, 1330, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1849, 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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require explication in any reference or expert opinion.”
While the
factual basis for reliance on common sense does not need to be
explicit in any reference, the Federal Circuit specifically reiterated
that a court’s analysis with respect to obviousness should be made
1033
explicit.
The district court found that the prior art in Perfect Web
disclosed the first three steps but not the last, which required
1034
repeating the first three until a predetermined value was obtained.
On these facts, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
finding that a person of skill in the art would have applied common
sense to repeat those first three steps until a successful result was
1035
achieved.
7.

Secondary considerations
The Supreme Court in KSR instructed that an obviousness
determination turns on four factors articulated in the seminal case of
1036
The fourth of these factors refers to so-called secondary
Graham.
considerations or objective indicia of patentability and includes:
(1) commercial success; (2) long-felt but unsolved need; (3) failure
1037
of others; and (4) unexpected results.
Objective indicia of
nonobviousness “is not just a cumulative or confirmatory part of the
obviousness calculus but constitutes independent evidence of
1038
nonobviousness.”
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has stated that it
“may often be the most probative and cogent evidence of
1039
nonobviousness in the record.”
The following Subsections address the 2009 Federal Circuit cases
dealing with these secondary indicia of nonobviousness and the
particular issues they raise.

1032. Id. at 1329, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
1033. Id. at 1330, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854 (citing Ball Aerosol & Specialty
Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 993, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870,
1877 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
1034. Id. at 1326, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851.
1035. Id. at 1330, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
1036. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406–07, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1385, 1391 (2007) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18, 148 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 459, 467 (1966)).
1037. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 467.
1038. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1365,
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1039. Catalina Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d 1277, 1288,
63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Gambro Lundia AB v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
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Commercial success

An invention’s success in the marketplace can constitute
independent, objective evidence of its nonobviousness. The rationale
underlying the probative value of commercial success as part of the
obviousness inquiry is that “the law presumes an idea would
successfully have been brought to market sooner, in response to
market forces, had the idea been obvious to persons skilled in the
1040
art.”
Relying on commercial success requires showing a “nexus”
between the claimed invention and the commercial success. If the
commercial success is due to an unclaimed feature of the device, it is
1041
irrelevant to the obviousness determination.
Additionally, if it can
be shown that an impediment exists to parties other than the
patentee to bring a related product to market, commercial success
may not materially impact the obviousness analysis. A patentee
owning prior art patents that block others from practicing an
embodiment related to the patent for which commercial success is
alleged may see the probative value of the commercial success
1042
evidence become diluted.
For example, in Proctor & Gamble, as
discussed previously, the claimed invention covered compounds
1043
Proctor & Gamble’s commercial 3-pyr
known as 3-pyr EHDP.
EHDP had undisputed commercial success, having amassed
1044
$2.7 billion in aggregate domestic sales.
Yet the Federal Circuit
supported the lower court’s decision to give little weight to this
evidence. It reasoned that because the prior art, the positional
isomer 2-pyr EHDP, was found only in a patent owned by Proctor &
Gamble, the public could not freely work with and develop that prior
1045
art product.
b.

Long-felt need

Long-felt and unmet need constitutes another type of secondary
indicia of nonobviousness.
Wielded properly, such need can
demonstrate unpredictability in the art to counter a prima facie
showing of a reasonable expectation of success. But like commercial
success, the long-felt need must have a nexus to the claimed
invention. In Boston Scientific, the patentee pointed to the apparent
1040. Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1376, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1651 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1041. Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311–12, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1931, 1941 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1042. Merck & Co., 395 F.3d at 1377, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
1043. 566 F.3d 989, 996, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947, 1951 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1044. Id. at 998, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
1045. Id. at 998 n.2, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953 n.2.
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failure of others to design a drug-eluting stent as claimed, i.e., one
1046
having a drug-containing undercoat and a drug-free topcoat.
The court found that the argument and evidence offered in support
of long-felt need was not persuasive, noting that “the failure [of
others] was due to the difficulty in finding a suitable drug, rather
than an inability to conceive of a drug-containing undercoat
1047
combined with a drug-free topcoat.”
Long-felt need is assessed no later than the filing date of the patent
1048
In Procter &
application directed to the invention in question.
Gamble, the defendant, Teva, argued that “the long-felt need must be
unmet at the time the invention becomes available on the market,
1049
when it can actually satisfy that need.”
In that case, the difference
in time between filing and marketing was significant. Whereas
“in the mid-1980s [the time of filing], osteoporosis was recognized as
a serious disease and existing treatments were inadequate,” by the
time Proctor & Gamble’s product, risedronate, entered the market,
a competing drug, alendronate, was already available, allowing Teva
to contend that “risedronate could not have satisfied any unmet
1050
need.”
The Federal Circuit rejected Teva’s argument on the
timing for assessing long-felt need and affirmed the district court’s
decision to evaluate long-felt need at the time Proctor & Gamble filed
1051
its patent application covering risedronate.
c.

Unexpected results

Reliance on unexpected results most often appears in chemical
and biotechnology cases. Once a patent challenger establishes a
prima facie case of obviousness, the patentee may rebut it by
proffering “unexpected results” and essentially by showing “that the
claimed invention exhibits some superior property or advantage that
a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have found
1052
surprising or unexpected.”
The Federal Circuit in Procter & Gamble held that, “even if Teva
could establish a prima facie case of obviousness, P & G had
introduced sufficient evidence of unexpected results to rebut such a

1046. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982, 989,
89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704, 1710 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. dismissed, 130 S. Ct. 50 (2009).
1047. Id. at 991, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
1048. Procter & Gamble Co., 566 F.3d at 998, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953.
1049. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953.
1050. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952–53.
1051. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953.
1052. Id. at 994, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950 (quoting In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750,
34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1684, 1687 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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1053

showing.”
The court noted that “P & G’s witnesses consistently
testified that the properties of risedronate were not expected” and
“could not have been predicted,” including unexpected potency,
“unexpectedly improved properties,” and “properties that the prior
1054
art does not have.”
Some of the evidence in the case that
supported these positions included the “low dose at which
risedronate was effective,” that “risedronate outperformed 2-pyr
EHDP by a substantial margin,” that “2-pyr EHDP was lethal at a dose
of 1.0 mg P/kg/day while risedronate was not,” and that at a
concentration three-fold greater than the lead compound, 2-pyr
1055
EHDP, risedronate showed “no observable toxic effect.”
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion—which
was based on weighing the evidence and evaluating the credibility of
the witnesses—that the record contained sufficient evidence of
1056
unexpected results to rebut any finding of obviousness.
H. Double-Patenting
There are two types of double-patenting. The first type is statutory
double-patenting, sometimes referred to as “same invention” doublepatenting. It prevents from issuing two patents that claim the exact
1057
same invention.
If there is any variation in scope between the
claims of the two patents, then obviousness-type double-patenting
1058
may apply.
This second type of double-patenting was judicially
created and is meant to prevent unjustified extensions of patent term
1059
among patents claiming patentably indistinct inventions.
Normally, the test for obviousness-type double-patenting is applied in
one direction (the so-called “one-way test”). Under the one-way test,

1053. Id. at 997, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
1054. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952 (quoting In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692–93,
16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
1055. Id. at 997–98, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
1056. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952.
1057. See Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 197–98 (1894) (discussing
authorities that prevent patents from issuing for an invention covered by an earlier
patent); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 619, 622 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
(noting a statutory prohibition on the issuance of a second patent for an invention
covered by an earlier patent); In re Ockert, 245 F.2d 467, 469, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
330, 332 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (observing that precedent requires the granting of one
patent per invention).
1058. See In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1052, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2010, 2015
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (asserting that the doctrine of obviousness-type double-patenting
prevents “application claims to subject matter different but not patentably distinct
from the subject matter claimed in a prior patent”); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892,
225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 645, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (same).
1059. In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 1431, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
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the claims of an earlier-issued patent are applied as if they were prior
1060
If the earlier-issued
art against the claims of the later-issued patent.
claims would render the later claims unpatentable, either because
they anticipate or render them obvious, the later claims are deemed
1061
invalid for obviousness-type double-patenting.
Sometimes, due to delays in the USPTO’s examination of two
applications, the earlier-filed application does not always issue first.
In some cases, the order becomes reversed, where the second-filed
application issues first. Indeed, hiccups or irregularities in the
examination process can cause a patent that covers a subsequently
conceived improvement invention to issue before the patent that
covers the basic invention. In such instances, double-patenting may
be assessed in two directions under the so-called “two-way test.”
The rationale behind the two-way test is that “an applicant . . . should
not be penalized by the rate of progress of the applications through
the [US]PTO, a matter over which the applicant does not have
1062
complete control.”
In such a situation, the order of issuance is
effectively ignored and patentability is assessed in the opposite
direction. The relevant determination becomes whether the claims
covering the improvement invention are patentably distinct from the
1063
claims of the basic invention.
1.

The two-way test
1064
The Federal Circuit in In re Fallaux
denied Dr. Fallaux the
benefit of the two-way test, holding that “Dr. Fallaux was entirely
responsible for the delay” that caused the later-filed reference patent
1065
to issue first.
The court found that the specification of the first
application in the patent family chain supported the later claims that
1066
were rejected for double-patenting.
It noted that Dr. Fallaux
elected to prosecute other applications and delay filing the appealed
application until six years after the original filing date, during which
1067
time the reference patents were filed and issued.
The Federal
1068
Circuit held that the USPTO was not responsible for the delay.

1060.
1061.
1062.
1991).
1063.
1064.
1065.
1066.
1067.
1068.

Id. at 1432, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
Id. at 1431–32, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 593, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1292 (Fed. Cir.
Id. at 593–94, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1289 (BNA) at 1292–93.
564 F.3d 1313, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1860 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1316, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862.
Id. at 1317, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862.
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Dr. Fallaux argued that the delay should not be attributed to him
because he prosecuted the patents “in the ordinary course of
business” and did not “proactively manipulate[] prosecution for an
1069
improper purpose or to gain some advantage.”
The Federal
Circuit stated that “[t]he rule is not, as Dr. Fallaux seems to suggest,
that an applicant is entitled to the two-way test absent proof of
1070
nefarious intent to manipulate prosecution.”
Rather, the court
indicated that the two-way test carves out a narrow exception when
the USPTO is at fault for the delay that causes the improvement
1071
patent to issue before the basic patent.
Dr. Fallaux then argued that issuing his application would not
result in an unjustified extension of the patent term because the
application and the double-patenting reference, having claimed the
benefit of the same filing date, would expire on the same day, twenty
1072
The Federal Circuit, however, rejected this
years from filing.
argument, indicating that “[i]n some cases there may still be the
possibility of an unjust time-wise extension of a patent arising from
patent term adjustment under § 154 or patent term extension under
1073
§ 156.”
It also noted that double-patenting seeks to prevent
multiple lawsuits from different patentees based on patents covering
1074
Apparently, Dr. Fallaux could
patentably indistinct subject matter.
not file a terminal disclaimer agreeing to keep the reference patents
1075
and the application under appeal commonly owned.
2.

Timing to determine “patentable distinctness”
When applying the test for double-patenting, questions have arisen
concerning the cut-off date for prior art when assessing obviousness.
Specifically, should the prior art cut-off be the filing date of the
double-patenting reference, the filing date of the patent itself, or the
actual filing date of the application under attack for double-patenting
or no cut-off date? The Federal Circuit held in Takeda Pharmaceutical
1076
Co. v. Doll that an applicant can rely on developments in the art up
to the filing date of the later-filed application to show patentable
1077
In Takeda, the applicant appealed a doubledistinctiveness.

1069.
1070.
1071.
1072.
1073.
1074.
1075.
1076.
1077.

Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862 (alteration in original).
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862–63.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862–63.
Id. at 1318, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
Id. at 1319, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.
Id. at 1319 n.5, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864 n.5.
561 F.3d 1372, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1496 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
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patenting rejection of a process patent over a product patent.
Section 806.05(f) of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
provides that process and product claims are patentably distinct if
“the product as claimed can be made by another materially different
1079
process.”
The applicant sought to present postinvention evidence
of alternative processes of making the product to establish patentable
1080
distinctiveness and overcome the double-patenting rejection.
The USPTO argued that the date of invention governs the relevance
of products and processes in the double-patenting context and
1081
refused to consider Takeda’s postinvention evidence.
Takeda
appealed the USPTO’s decision under 35 U.S.C. § 145 to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court agreed
with Takeda, holding that “subsequent developments in the art [are
relevant to] determining whether alternative processes exist” when
1082
weighing patentable distinctions for double-patenting.
1083
The Federal Circuit found neither party’s position persuasive.
The court recognized that the second-filed application actually
triggers the potential for an “unjustified extension of patent term,”
and that when filing the second application, “the applicant essentially
1084
avers that the product and process are patentably distinct.”
Thus, the court concluded that the relevant date for determining
whether a product and process are patentably distinct should be the
1085
filing date of the second application.
The court articulated that
this rule gives the applicant the benefit of future developments in the
art that the applicant can rely on to show that the product and
1086
process are patentably distinct.
At the same time, this approach
“prevents the inequitable situation that arises when an applicant
attempts to rely on developments occurring decades after the filing
1087
date of the secondary application.”
The court further reasoned
that “[t]his approach should encourage the swift development of
1088
materially distinct, alternative processes.”

1078. Id. at 1375–76, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499.
1079. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 806.05(f) (2006).
1080. Takeda, 561 F.3d at 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
1081. Id. at 1375–76, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499.
1082. Id. at 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
1083. Id. at 1377, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
1084. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1085. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
1086. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
1087. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
1088. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
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The Federal Circuit clarified the principle enunciated in Takeda
regarding the use of postfiling date evidence for the purpose of
1089
In that
showing patentable distinctiveness in F. Hoffmann-La Roche.
case, the court declared that a challenger may not use evidence
produced after the filing date of the first-filed patent to support a
prima facie case of obviousness-type double-patenting, because that
would conflict with the principle underlying 35 U.S.C. § 120 that the
later-filed patent that claims priority to the first-filed patent enjoys the
1090
benefit of the earlier filing date.
The court acknowledged that this
“could ‘provide the patentee with the best of both worlds:
the applicant can use the filing date as a shield, enjoying the earlier
priority date in order to avoid prior art, and rely on later-developed
alternative processes as a sword to defeat double patenting
1091
challenges.’”
However, the court noted that there are limits to
1092
If the patentee relies on evidence developed
Takeda’s application.
after the first-filed patent to show the existence of alternative
processes to make a product, the challenger would then be free to
1093
use postfiling evidence to rebut the patentee’s assertions.
3.

Safe harbor
Section 121 provides a safe harbor against double-patenting if
(1) the challenged patent or application resulted from a restriction
requirement, and (2) the claims of the challenged patent or
1094
application are consonant with the restriction requirement.
The protected applications or patents referred to in § 121 include the
original application containing the restriction requirement and any
1095
divisional applications.
In Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., the Federal Circuit held
that the safe harbor did not apply to applications that descended
1096
solely from continuation applications.
In that case, the reference
1097
patent was an ancestor of the patents at issue.
The patents at issue
descended exclusively from applications designated as continuation
1089. Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1090. Id. at 1357, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
1091. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302 (quoting Takeda Pharm. Co. v. Doll, 561
F.3d 1372, 1377, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1496, 1500 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
1092. See id. at 1358, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303 (“Takeda is a two-way street
within its own confines.”).
1093. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302–03.
1094. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2006).
1095. Id.
1096. Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1352–53,
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1298–99 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1097. Id. at 1346–48, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293–95.
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1098

applications of the reference patent.
Since there was a restriction
requirement issued during the prosecution of the reference patent,
the patentee argued generally that the Federal Circuit should look at
the substance rather than the designation, and particularly that the
continuation applications could have been filed as divisional
1099
1100
Unlike Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,
applications.
where the patent at issue was a continuation-in-part of the reference
1101
patent, the Federal Circuit recognized that Amgen’s applications
may have satisfied all of the substantive requirements of a divisional
1102
application.
Interpreting the statute literally, however, the court
refused to extend the benefits that are accorded to divisional
1103
applications further to continuation applications.
The Federal Circuit distinguished this case from situations such as
those in Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials
1104
1105
America, Inc. and Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., where a
divisional application was properly filed in response to a restriction
requirement, and continuation applications were filed off the
1106
divisional applications.
The court upheld the principles in those
cases, stating that “intervening continuation applications do not
render a patent ineligible for § 121 protection so long as they
descended from a divisional application filed as a result of a
1107
restriction requirement.”
I.

Inventorship

1.

Contribution to the invention
1108
the Federal Circuit
In Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A., Inc.,
reversed the lower court’s dismissal of a patent infringement
complaint because of the plaintiff’s failure to join as a party to the
1109
suit an alleged coinventor.
The Federal Circuit held that
“the alleged coinventor[] provided only an insignificant

1098.
1099.
1100.
1101.
1102.
1103.
1104.
1105.
1106.
1107.
1108.
1109.

Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293–95.
Id. at 1351, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297.
518 F.3d 1353, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1358–59, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004–05.
F. Hoffman-La Roche, 580 F.3d at 1353, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
98 F.3d 1563, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
935 F.2d 1569, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
F. Hoffman-La Roche, 580 F.3d at 1353–54, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
Id. at 1354, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1299.
558 F.3d 1352, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2047 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1358–59, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2051–52.
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contribution” to the patented invention; therefore, that person was
1110
not an indispensable party and dismissal was therefore improper.
Nartron Corp. sued Borg Indak, Inc. for contributory infringement
of a patent relating to “a control system that would provide existing
1111
automobile seats with massage functionality.”
Years earlier,
Schukra U.S.A. had engaged Nartron Corp. to design a control
system that would provide existing automobile seats with massage
1112
functionality.
Nartron Corp. designed such a system and then
1113
applied for a patent, which matured into the patent-in-suit.
Borg Indak, Inc. moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the ground that a
Schukra employee named Benson was allegedly a coinventor of a
dependent claim in the patent for having suggested the use of a
component referred to as an “extender,” which the dependent claim
specifically recited and which was the sole added limitation in that
1114
claim.
1115
The court found that the extender was known in the prior art.
Emphasizing that inventorship looks to the claim as a whole,
the court noted that “a dependent claim adding one claim limitation
to a parent claim is still a claim to the invention of the parent claim,
albeit with the added feature; it is not a claim to the added feature
1116
The invention was to a “control system,” not an
alone.”
1117
“extender.”
The Federal Circuit further found that:
[T]he contribution of the extender is insignificant when measured
against the full dimension of the [claimed] invention . . . not just
because it was in the prior art, but because it was part of existing
automobile seats, and therefore including it as part of the claimed
invention was merely the basic exercise of ordinary skill in the
1118
art.

Applying this reasoning, the court concluded: “There is not, and
could not be, any claim that the addition of the extender here was
anything but obvious. Benson’s contribution therefore does not
1119
make him a coinventor of the subject matter of claim 11.”

1110.
1111.
1112.
1113.
1114.
1115.
1116.
1117.
1118.
1119.

Id. at 1353, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2048.
Id. at 1354, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2048.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2048.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2048.
Id. at 1358, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2051–52.
Id. at 1357, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2051.
Id. at 1358, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2051–52.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2051.
Id. at 1357, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2050 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1358, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2051.
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2.

“Scientific certainty” regarding conception
Proof that an invention will work to a scientific certainty is not
required for a completed conception of a claimed invention.
1120
In University of Pittsburgh v. Hedrick, an inventorship dispute arose
between the University of Pittsburgh and the defendants, who argued
that the Pittsburgh researchers’ work was inconclusive and highly
speculative until the defendant researchers helped them confirm the
1121
claimed properties.
The Federal Circuit rejected the defendants’
argument that the Pittsburgh researchers had to know with scientific
certainty that the invention contained every limitation of the claim at
1122
the time of conception.
The court noted that proof that an
invention works with scientific certainty is required for reduction to
1123
In contrast, all that is required for conception is whether
practice.
the idea expressed by the inventors was sufficiently developed to
1124
support conception of the subject matter.
Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit found that the evidence showed that the Pittsburgh
1125
researchers conceived the invention before the defendants.
VII. INFRINGEMENT
There are several components to establishing infringement as well
as several types of infringement. It all starts with construing the scope
of the claims. Since at least the Supreme Court’s decision in
1126
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., claim construction has taken
on a much more pivotal role than it has ever before taken in
1127
Indeed, its role has become so
determining infringement.
prominent that Judge Newman of the Federal Circuit referred to the
1128
claim construction process as its own “cottage industry.”
Once the claims have been construed, the alleged infringing
product or process is then compared against the claims to first
determine if literal infringement exists, i.e., whether all elements of
the claim are found in the alleged infringing product or process.
If not literally infringed, a claim can still be infringed under the
doctrine of equivalents—a judicially created inquiry that considers
1120. 573 F.3d 1290, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1423 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1121. Id. at 1299, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429.
1122. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429.
1123. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429.
1124. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429.
1125. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429–30.
1126. 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996).
1127. Id. at 372, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1463 (holding that claim construction is a matter
of law reserved for the court and not for a jury).
1128. Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 275 F. App’x 969, 980
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1662 (2009).
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whether any claim elements not specifically found in the alleged
infringing product or process are nonetheless equivalently present.
Both literal and equivalent infringement constitute forms of
“direct” infringement. The law permits a finding of infringement
even as to those who do not directly infringe a patent claim—this is
called “indirect” infringement. One may indirectly infringe by
contributing to or inducing another to directly infringe a patent
1129
claim.
The following subsections will explore 2009 Federal Circuit
decisions that dealt with these forms of infringement.
A. Literal infringement
1.

Product claims with process steps or functional language
The Federal Circuit held in Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v.
1130
Ltd. Brands, Inc. that where a claim specifically requires a particular
configuration, an accused product reasonably capable of being
configured in a manner that would meet the claimed requirement
1131
may not infringe.
In that case, the patent at issue was directed to a
candle tin with a removable cover that also acts as a base for the
1132
candle holder.
The patent claims specifically stated that the cover
would be placed as a base on which the candle tin and its feet would
1133
be placed.
The accused product was a candle tin with a removable
1134
cover and four protrusions on the closed end of the candle holder.
Though it may have been capable of being assembled or configured
in a manner that would infringe, the patentee offered no evidence
1135
that the accused product was ever so configured.
Still, the
patentee contended that it infringed because it was reasonably
1136
capable of being configured in an infringing manner.
In reversing
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
patentee, the Federal Circuit held that it was improper to find
infringement of the claims where the accused product was only
“reasonably capable” of being configured in a way that would meet
1137
The case law supports a “reasonably capable”
the claim limitations.
theory of infringement where the claims contain language drawn to a

1129.
1130.
1131.
1132.
1133.
1134.
1135.
1136.
1137.

35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2006).
555 F.3d 984, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 995, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
Id. at 986, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
Id. at 987, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872–73.
Id. at 994, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877–78.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
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1138

particular capability or functionality.
The claims of the patent-insuit were not so drawn, requiring instead a particular
1139
No proof of actual infringement of the accused
configuration.
device existed in the record, nor did the facts indicate that the device
1140
necessarily had to be placed in the infringing configuration.
1141
the Federal Circuit
In Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp.,
affirmed the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment where
1142
the defendant infringed a patent directed to a refrigerator shelf.
The principle claim element in dispute required “a relatively resilient
end edge portion which temporarily deflects and subsequently
rebounds to snap-secure one of said glass piece front and rear
1143
edges.”
The defendant argued that it did not infringe because it
assembled the shelf in Mexico, where the “temporary deflecting” and
1144
“subsequently rebounding” aspects of the end portion occurred.
The court first pointed out that the defendant, Saint-Gobain, never
disputed that the end portions of its accused frames could deflect and
subsequently rebound to accommodate insertion of the glass during
1145
manufacture.
In ultimately rejecting Saint-Gobain’s argument that
no infringing activities occurred in the United States, however, the
court construed the deflecting and rebounding requirements as
structural characteristics of the “relatively resilient end edge
1146
portion.”
Finding that Saint-Gobain’s imported shelf had these
“structural” characteristics, it concluded that the shelf infringed
under § 271(a) and dismissed the argument that the deflecting and
1147
rebounding steps of the claim occurred outside the United States.
2.

Proof of infringement
In some instances, a patentee may prove infringement
circumstantially rather than with a direct comparison with the alleged
infringing product or process. In Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova,
1148
the Federal Circuit held that the patentee did not need to
Inc.,
conduct a comparative analysis to show infringement, that the

1138. Id. at 994–95, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
1139. Id. at 994, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
1140. Id. at 994–95, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877–78.
1141. 572 F.3d 1371, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1409 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
78 U.S.L.W. 3396 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-778).
1142. Id. at 1373, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410.
1143. Id. at 1375–76, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1412 (emphasis omitted).
1144. Id. at 1380, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1415.
1145. Id. at 1381, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416.
1146. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416.
1147. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1416.
1148. 579 F.3d 1363, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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patentee “may prove infringement by any method of analysis that is
probative of the fact of infringement,” and that “circumstantial
1149
The claims at issue were directed to
evidence may be sufficient.”
specific
microorganisms
useful
in
commercially
making
1150
docosahexaenoic acid.
The trial court construed a key limitation
in one of the patents-in-suit to require that the accused culture
medium cause “less chemical wear” than a hypothetical culture
medium containing sodium chloride as the primary source of
1151
sodium.
The accused infringer argued that the patentee failed to
prove infringement because it did not conduct comparative testing
between the accused culture medium and the hypothetical
1152
medium.
Although the patentee relied on the testimony of two experts to
prove infringement, it was not pure, unsubstantiated opinion
1153
testimony.
The first expert testified that the defendant used vessels
made of a stainless steel that were “highly susceptible to corrosion,”
that the literature clearly recognized “the corrosive effects of
chlorides on stainless steels,” and that it is “scientific fact” that if one
increases the chloride concentrations in the aqueous medium
1154
present in the infringing process, greater corrosion results.
The second expert testified that he calculated (from the defendant’s
fermentation records) the concentration of chloride ions in the
defendant’s culture medium, that he compared that concentration to
the concentration of chloride ions in the hypothetical medium, and
that he found that the defendant’s culture medium had only one
1155
third of the chloride ions present in the hypothetical medium.
Because the defendant’s culture medium had significantly less
chloride ions, the second expert concluded that it would logically
1156
cause less corrosion than the hypothetical medium.
On the basis
of the experts’ testimony, the court found that Martek had carried its
burden of proving infringement without having conducted any actual
1157
comparative analyses.
1158
Similarly, in Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc.,
the Federal
Circuit held that infringement can be proven by circumstantial
1149.
1150.
1151.
1152.
1153.
1154.
1155.
1156.
1157.
1158.

Id. at 1372, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
Id. at 1367, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
Id. at 1372, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
Id. at 1373–74, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
Id. at 1373, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154–55.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
Id. at 1374, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
581 F.3d 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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evidence.
In that case, the patentee pled inducement and
contributory charges of infringement, among other infringement
1159
The district court summarily determined that the
claims.
defendant did not indirectly infringe (i.e., contribute to or induce
infringement) because the patentee failed to provide actual evidence
1160
of direct infringement.
The patent at issue was “directed to a
method of preventing the formation of an air pocket around the
1161
moving blades of a consumer food blender.”
The method involved
inserting a plunger into the body of the blender to block the air
1162
channel that creates air pockets when ingredients are mixed.
The accused blenders had an opening that could receive a stir stick,
whose configuration could, under certain circumstances, prevent the
1163
creation of air pockets.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court erred as a
matter of law in disposing of the direct infringement claims by
1164
requiring actual evidence of infringement.
The Federal Circuit
found that the district court improperly discounted the accusations of
direct infringement by two witnesses because of a lack of testimony or
1165
footage showing actual infringement.
The testimony of one of the
patentee’s expert witnesses established that these two witnesses would
1166
Because direct
necessarily infringe under certain circumstances.
infringement can be proven by circumstantial evidence, and the
district court improperly disposed of the direct infringement count
without considering the circumstantial proof, the Federal Circuit
1167
reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Restating the principle that “one cannot avoid infringement merely
by adding elements,” the Federal Circuit in Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann1168
La Roche Ltd.
rejected Roche’s position that it did not infringe
1169
because it formed its erythropoietin (“EPO”) through pegylation.
Amgen’s claims were directed to EPO, while Roche’s alleged
infringing product was directed to pegylated EPO, which essentially
1170
added PEG to recombinant EPO.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the

1159.
1160.
1161.
1162.
1163.
1164.
1165.
1166.
1167.
1168.
1169.
1170.

Id. at 1322, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343–44.
Id. at 1326, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346.
Id. at 1321, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342–43.
Id. at 1321–22, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343.
Id. at 1326, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346–47.
580 F.3d 1340, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1378, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1319.
Id. at 1347–48, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294–95.
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district court’s finding of literal infringement, holding that the
addition of PEG to recombinant EPO infringed claims reciting
recombinant EPO because the PEG was simply an additional
1171
element, not a fundamental chemical transformation.
1172
In Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Federal Circuit held
that an oral thermometer did not infringe a claim directed to
measuring internal temperature, construed as the temperature of the
1173
temporal artery beneath the skin of the forehead.
The claim at
issue recited a radiation detector comprising, among other things,
1174
“a display for providing an indication of the internal temperature.”
The dispositive evidence was the patentee’s expert/coinventor’s
testimony that the number shown on the display of the claimed
device must be the value of the internal temperature and could not
be some other value requiring further computation before arriving at
1175
Because the accused device measured
the internal temperature.
radiation from the user’s forehead and then calculated an oral
temperature, it did not determine the claimed “internal
1176
temperature” and could not infringe.
B. Doctrine of Equivalents
When a claim is not literally infringed, it may still be infringed
under the doctrine of equivalents if an accused device or
1177
process insubstantially differs from the claimed invention.
The substantiality of the differences is determined on a claimed
1178
To prove infringement by equivalents,
element-by-element basis.
the patentee must present “particularized testimony and linking
argument as to the ‘insubstantiality of the differences’ between the
[claimed invention and the alleged infringing device or process],
1179
or with respect to the function, way, result test.”
The “function,

1171. Id. at 1376, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
1172. 575 F.3d 1312, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1173. Id. at 1321, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
1174. Id. at 1320, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662.
1175. Id. at 1321, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662–63.
1176. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
1177. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733,
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1710–11 (2002) (“The doctrine of equivalents allows the
patentee to claim those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting
the original patent claim but which could be created through trivial changes.”).
1178. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40,
41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1876 (1997).
1179. Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, 580 F.3d 1340, 1382, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1289, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress
Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492, 1497–98
(Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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way, result test,” coined by the Supreme Court in Graver Tank &
1180
assesses whether an
Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.,
accused device “performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result” as the claim
1181
limitation.
For example, in F. Hoffmann-La Roche, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) overturning a
jury’s verdict of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents for a
specific claim because Amgen failed to present sufficient evidence
1182
that any limitation of the claim was equivalently infringed.
Amgen
argued that it presented equivalents evidence relating to the claimed
1183
But the Federal Circuit
therapeutically effective amount of EPO.
viewed the evidence as pertaining to Amgen’s literal infringement
argument and not to the type of particularized testimony of
equivalency sufficient to link the insubstantiality of the differences
1184
between the claimed composition and Roche’s accused drug.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding
1185
of no infringement for the specific claim.
1.

Prosecution history estoppel
a.

Amendment-based estoppel

Even if an accused device might factually constitute an equivalent
to the claimed device, a court may still decide not to apply the
doctrine of equivalents. Indeed, the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel tempers the expansive effect of the doctrine of equivalents.
The Supreme Court held in Festo Corp. v. Shokestu Kinzoku Kogyo
1186
Kabushiki Co. that arguments or amendments made for purposes of
1187
patentability could give rise to prosecution history estoppel.
Specifically, the Court held that “[a] patentee’s decision to narrow
his claims through amendment may be presumed to be a general
disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the

1180. 339 U.S. 605, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 382 (1950).
1181. Id. at 608, 85 U.S.P.Q (BNA) at 330 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v.
Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42, 3 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 40, 47–48 (1929)).
1182. Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1383–86,
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1323–25 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1183. Id. at 1384, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323–24.
1184. Id. at 1385–86, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324–25.
1185. Id. at 1386, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.
1186. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002).
1187. Id. at 733–34, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710–11.
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1188

amended claim.”
A patentee, however, may rebut that
presumption of estoppel by demonstrating that “[t]he equivalent may
have been unforeseeable at the time of the application; the rationale
underlying the amendment may bear no more than a tangential
relation to the equivalent in question; or there may be some other
reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected
1189
to have described the insubstantial substitute in question.”
1190
In Felix v. American Honda Motor Co., the Federal Circuit rejected
Felix’s argument that he rebutted the presumption of prosecution
history estoppel by showing that the narrowing amendment made
1191
during the prosecution was tangential.
The patent at issue related
1192
to a built-in storage compartment for beds of pickup trucks.
The court first considered whether the amendment adding a gasket
limitation to the claimed compartment gave rise to a presumption of
1193
surrender.
During prosecution, in response to an obviousness
rejection, Felix canceled an independent claim without replacing it
with any claim reciting the same subject matter and rewrote a
dependent claim containing both a channel limitation and a gasket
1194
limitation into independent form.
The amendment did not
overcome the examiner’s rejection, and the rewritten claim was again
1195
In a second amendment, Felix canceled the rewritten
rejected.
claim containing the channel and gasket limitations without
replacing it and rewrote another independent claim incorporating all
1196
of the canceled limitations plus an additional limitation.
The newly rewritten claim was allowed and was subsequently issued as
1197
the asserted claim.
Even though the first narrowing amendment
did not succeed and a further amendment was required to place the
claim in allowable form, the court held that the presumption of
prosecution history estoppel still attached since it is the patentee’s
response to a rejection that gives rise to prosecution history estoppel,
1198
not the examiner’s ultimate allowance of a claim.
In addition,
1188. Id. at 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713 (citing Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace
Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136–37, 52 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 275, 279 (1942).
1189. Id. at 740–41, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714.
1190. 562 F.3d 1167, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1191. Id. at 1181–85, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532–35.
1192. Id. at 1171–72, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1526.
1193. Id. at 1182, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.
1194. Id. at 1182–84, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533–34.
1195. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533–34.
1196. Id. at 1175, 1182, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1527–28, 1533.
1197. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533.
1198. Id. at 1182–83, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1708
(2002)).
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the court found it immaterial that the cancellation and the
amendment went to claims different from those that resulted in the
1199
asserted claim.
Turning to the presumption of surrender, the court held that
equivalents were presumptively not available as to any of the
1200
limitations added in Felix’s first amendment.
Noting that it was
immaterial that Felix chose to add both the channel and gasket
limitations rather than just the channel limitation Felix argued was
necessary, the court held that Felix was presumptively barred from
relying on the doctrine of equivalents to prove that Honda’s In-Bed
1201
Trunk met the gasket limitation.
Next, the court considered Felix’s argument that he rebutted the
presumption of prosecution history estoppel as to the gasket
1202
limitation because the narrowing amendment was tangential.
The
court rejected Felix’s argument that the first amendment was made
because the applicant thought the prior art lacked a channel, not
1203
because of the presence or position of a gasket.
The court then
held that it was not objectively apparent from this argument that “the
channel was the only reason for canceling [the original independent
1204
claim] and rewriting [the dependent claim] in independent form.”
The court explained that if Felix had intended only to add a channel
and not a gasket, he could have simply amended the independent
1205
claim to add that limitation.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the
1206
district court’s judgment under the doctrine of equivalents.
b.

Argument-based estoppel

Often, the same rationale used to construe claims narrowly tends to
similarly constrict the subsequent application of the doctrine of
1207
equivalents. In Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s narrow construction of the claim
term “wires,” which required that they be malleable, because the
inventor disclaimed the use of resilient, or self-expanding, wires by
disparaging prior art resilient wires in the “background art” section of
1208
the specification.
When assessing whether the accused device’s use
1199.
1200.
1201.
1202.
1203.
1204.
1205.
1206.
1207.
1208.

Id. at 1182 & n.5, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533, 1534 & n.5.
Id. at 1183–84, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534.
Id. at 1184, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534.
Id. at 1184–85, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535.
Id. at 1184, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535.
Id. at 1185, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535.
582 F.3d 1322, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1599 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1332, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606–07.
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of resilient wires infringed under the doctrine of equivalents, the
Federal Circuit decided against the patentee, finding that
“the inventors disclaimed resilient wires and cannot use the doctrine
1209
of equivalents to recapture the disclaimed scope.”
c.

Dedication of embodiments to the public
1210

In Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc.,
Lupin, a codefendant,
contested infringement under the doctrine of equivalents of, among
others, claim 1 of the patent, which recited a product unlimited by
1211
process limitations.
The claim recited a crystalline form of the
drug cefdinir and defined it by an X-ray diffraction pattern with
1212
specifically identified peaks.
The Federal Circuit construed the
1213
The bulk
claim to be directed to the “Crystal A” form of cefdinir.
of Lupin’s product contained a “Crystal B” form of cefdinir, with a
1214
question of whether it also contained some Crystal A.
But the issue
1215
Abbott
of literal infringement was not before the court on appeal.
only appealed the issue of infringement under the doctrine of
1216
equivalents.
The Federal Circuit concluded that Lupin’s product did not
1217
It stated that
infringe the claim under the doctrine of equivalents.
“the bounds of Crystal A equivalents cannot ignore the limits on
Crystal A in the . . . patent, which . . . includes a conscious decision to
1218
distinguish Crystal B from the claimed invention.”
Moreover,
1219
Abbott chose not to claim Crystal B, though it clearly could have.
As the court pointed out, “the applicant removed Crystal B from the
1220
Expanding
U.S. prosecution of the parent JP ‘199 application.”
the claim under the doctrine of equivalents to cover Crystal B would
effectively ignore the limitation directed to Crystal A, as construed by
the court, and would impermissibly allow Abbott to recapture subject
1221
matter that it could have claimed and did not.
Citing to its
previous decision in Johnson & Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E. Service
1209. Id. at 1335–36, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609.
1210. 566 F.3d 1282, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub
nom. Astellas Pharma, Inc. v. Lupin Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 1052 (2010).
1211. Id. at 1289, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
1212. Id. at 1286, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.
1213. Id. at 1291, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775–76.
1214. Id. at 1297, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780–81.
1215. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
1216. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780–81.
1217. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780–81.
1218. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
1219. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
1220. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
1221. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
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1222

Co., the Federal Circuit noted that, by removing Crystal B from the
U.S. application, the applicants “dedicat[ed] that embodiment to the
public and foreclos[ed] any recapture under the doctrine of
1223
equivalents.”
The Federal Circuit also dismissed Abbott’s assertion that “Lupin
effectively admitted infringement by equivalents when it claimed
before the [FDA] that its cefdinir generic was a bioequivalent to
1224
Abbott’s Omnicef product.”
The court noted that, “[w]hile
bioequivalency may be relevant to the function prong of the functionway-result [doctrine of equivalents] test, bioequivalency and
equivalent infringement are different inquiries,” and “bioequivalency
of an accused product with a product produced from the patent at
1225
issue is not sufficient to establish infringement by equivalents.”
2.

“Ensnaring the prior art” as a defense
The Federal Circuit in DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek,
1226
Inc., explained that “[e]nsnarement bars a patentee from asserting
a scope of equivalency that would encompass, or ‘ensnare,’ the prior
1227
In that case, the court first rejected Medtronic’s argument
art.”
that ensnarement, like infringement, must be tried to a jury when
1228
requested by the defendant.
The court held that ensnarement,
like prosecution history estoppel, is a legal limitation on the doctrine
of equivalents, and that its application is to be decided by the court,
1229
not a jury.
The court stated that this legal limitation would be
imposed even if a jury has found equivalence to each claim
1230
element.
The court also added that “[t]he ensnarement inquiry is
separate and distinct from the jury’s element-by-element equivalence
1231
analysis, and it has no bearing on the validity of the actual claims.”
Thus, the court held that the ensnarement defense is “to be
determined by the court, either on a pretrial motion for partial

1222. 285 F.3d 1046, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(per curiam).
1223. Abbott Labs., 566 F.3d at 1297, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
1224. Id. at 1298, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
1225. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781.
1226. 567 F.3d 1314, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1227. Id. at 1322, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870 (citing Wilson Sporting Goods Co.
v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 683, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1947
(Fed. Cir. 1990), overruled in part by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S.
83, 92 n.12, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721, 1726 n.12 (1993)).
1228. Id. at 1322–24, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870–71.
1229. Id. at 1324, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
1230. Id. at 1323, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
1231. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
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summary judgment or on a motion for judgment as a matter of law at
1232
the close of the evidence and after [the] jury verdict.”
As to factual issues related to ensnarement, the court drew an
“analogy to prosecution history estoppel, particularly in the context
of rebutting the presumption of surrender under the ‘foreseeability’
1233
criterion.”
The Federal Circuit pointed out that a district court
may hear expert testimony and may consider other extrinsic evidence
1234
regarding the various factors for determining obviousness.
The court explained that “[i]f a district court believes that an advisory
verdict would be helpful, and that a ‘hypothetical claim’ construct
would not unduly confuse the jury as to equivalence and validity, then
one may be obtained under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
1235
39(c).”
The Federal Circuit next analyzed whether the district court erred
1236
Ensnarement is
in denying Medtronic’s ensnarement defense.
sometimes referred to as the “hypothetical claim analysis,” which had
its genesis in the 1990s in Judge Rich’s decision in Wilson Sporting
1237
Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates.
The framework for
determining ensnarement begins with a court’s construction of a
1238
hypothetical claim that literally covers the accused device.
The court then assesses whether the hypothetical claim is novel and
1239
unobvious over the prior art.
If it is not, the patentee has
overreached, and the accused device does not infringe as a matter of
1240
In DePuy Spine, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district
law.
court that the prior art proffered by Medtronic would not have
rendered the hypothetical obvious and affirmed the lower court’s
1241
denial of Medtronic’s ensnarement defense.

1232. Id. at 1324, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1875 n.8
(1997)).
1233. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
1234. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
1235. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841.
1236. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
1237. 904 F.2d 677, 685, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1949 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
1238. DePuy Spine, Inc., 567 F.3d at 1324–25, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871–72.
1239. Id. at 1325, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
1240. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (quoting Interactive Pictures Corp. v.
Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1380, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1152, 1159 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).
1241. Id. at 1329, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875.

944

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:809

C. Indirect Infringement
There are two types of “indirect” infringement:
inducing
1242
infringement and contributory infringement.
Section 271(b)
covers inducement and provides that “[w]hoever actively induces
1243
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”
Under recent decisions, this section has been interpreted as
requiring proof that the alleged infringer knew or should have
1244
known that its actions would cause direct infringement.
Section 271(c) defines “contributory infringement” as, for example,
supplying a component for use in a patented product or process,
knowing it to be specially made or adapted for use in infringement of
the patent, and not a staple article or commodity suitable for a
1245
substantial noninfringing use.
As a general rule, a finding of direct
infringement is a prerequisite to a finding of indirect
1246
infringement.
1.

Inducing infringement
a.

Proving direct infringement

Because the patentee in Exergen Corp. failed to prove direct
infringement, the Federal Circuit found no induced infringement of
1247
Those claims required a determination of the
the claims at issue.
1248
“temperature of the temporal artery through skin.”
The accused
device measured the surface temperature of the skin that covers the
temporal artery and then converted the skin temperature to the oral
temperature, which was different from measuring the temperature of
1249
the temporal artery.
Since the accused device converted the skin
temperature measurement to the oral temperature and not to the
temporal artery temperature, a user of the accused device could not

1242. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2006).
1243. Id. § 271(b).
1244. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238,
1247 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1245. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
1246. See, e.g., Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1274,
70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners
Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687, 231 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 474, 477 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
see also Stukenborg v. Teledyne, Inc., 441 F.2d 1069, 1072, 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 584,
586 (9th Cir. 1971) (“Absent direct infringement of the patent claims, there can be
neither contributory infringement nor inducement of infringement.”).
1247. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1325, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1656, 1665 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1248. Id. at 1324, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
1249. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
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directly infringe those claims, and the potential for induced
1250
infringement on the manufacturer’s part was eliminated.
1251
the Federal Circuit
In Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,
agreed that Lucent’s actual evidence of direct infringement was
limited, but found circumstantial evidence adequate to permit a jury
to find that at least one person had performed the claimed
1252
method.
The Federal Circuit concluded that Lucent’s
circumstantial evidence of infringement was “something less than the
1253
1254
weight of the evidence,” yet was just “more than a mere scintilla,”
thus satisfying the requirements for a finding of direct infringement.
As the Federal Circuit explained, “[when there is] no evidence of
any ‘specific instance of direct infringement,’ [a patentee is] required
to show that ‘the accused device necessarily infringes the patent in
1255
suit.’”
One claim at issue in Exergen required the step of “laterally
scanning a temperature detector across a forehead” to obtain the
1256
temperature of a patient.
The parties agreed that “laterally” meant
1257
The alleged infringer’s
“horizontal relative to the human body.”
instructions for customers read: “Scan with the thermometer around
the temple area (marked as [a] dotted area in the drawing),” or “Place
the thermometer’s soft touch tip just outside the eyebrow (in the
temple region of the forehead) and slowly slide upwards to just below
1258
the hairline.”
The patentee argued that these instructions involved
1259
But the court explained that
at least some horizontal component.
even if that was true, the patentee’s argument ignored the claim
1260
language requiring the lateral scan to occur “across the forehead.”
Since no reasonable jury would have found that a purchaser of the
accused device would perform the steps as required by the claim at
issue, the Federal Circuit held that the defendant’s device did not

1250. Id. at 1325, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
1251. 580 F.3d 1301, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1555 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1252. Id. at 1318, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
1253. Id. at 1319, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567 (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar.
Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)).
1254. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
1255. Exergen Corp., 575 F.3d at 1321–22, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663 (quoting
ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfrs. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1313, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1267, 1270–71 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
1256. Id. at 1322, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
1257. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663.
1258. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1663–64.
1259. Id. at 1323, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664.
1260. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664.
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necessarily directly infringe, and that induced infringement was thus
1261
negated.
b.

Intent to induce infringement and “practicing prior art” to negate
intent

The Federal Circuit previously held in DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS
1262
Co. that proving induced infringement requires not only a showing
of direct infringement but also that the defendant “possessed specific
1263
intent to encourage another’s infringement.”
In Vita-Mix,
the court affirmed a finding of no inducement because it found the
record devoid of direct or circumstantial evidence of the accused
manufacturer’s intent to encourage customers to infringe the patent
1264
at issue.
The court found that the accused manufacturer’s product
instructions did not evidence a specific intent to encourage
infringement, since they either taught a stirring action—which the
manufacturer could have reasonably believed was noninfringing—or
1265
evidenced an intent to discourage infringement.
Looking to
product design, the court held that although a vertical position of the
stir stick—which corresponded to the claimed element at issue in the
infringement inquiry—may lead to infringing use under certain
conditions, there was no evidence that the accused manufacturer
1266
intended users to maintain the stir stick in the vertical position.
By contrast, in Lucent Technologies, although the Federal Circuit
agreed with the defendant, Microsoft, that the evidence of its intent
to induce infringement was not strong, the court was not persuaded
that the jury’s finding that Microsoft possessed the requisite intent to
induce at least one user of its products to infringe the claimed
1267
methods was unreasonable.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s denial of Microsoft’s motion for JMOL that Microsoft
1268
did not induce infringement.

1261. Id. at 1324, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664–65.
1262. 471 F.3d 1293, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1263. Id. at 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247 (quoting MEMC Elec. Materials,
Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1276, 1283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
1264. Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1328–29, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1340, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1265. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348–49.
1266. Id. at 1329, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
1267. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1323, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1555, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1268. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1570.
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1269

In i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit affirmed a jury’s
findings of inducement to infringe in another decision against
1270
The patent at issue included claims drawn to a method
Microsoft.
1271
of editing documents containing markup language, such as XML.
MICROSOFT WORD allegedly infringed the claims by including an
1272
In i4i, the
XML editor in certain copies of the popular program.
court concluded that a jury could have found direct infringement
based on the testimony of i4i’s expert, who testified that certain
copies of MICROSOFT WORD could perform all of the steps of i4i’s
1273
method claim.
Further, because following Microsoft’s instructional
materials would infringe i4i’s patent, the instructions themselves were
substantial evidence that Microsoft intended its product to be used in
1274
an infringing manner.
In contrast to the instructions in Vita-Mix,
the Court held that substantial evidence existed indicating that
1275
Microsoft knew its instructions would lead to an infringing use.
For example, internal emails indicated both knowledge of the i4i
technology and the belief that Microsoft’s product would make i4i’s
1276
program obsolete.
Often, alleged infringers proffer noninfringement defenses based
on validity. They will claim that they do not infringe because the
claims are invalid, and one cannot infringe an invalid patent.
This ensnarement defense to infringement (also referred to as
“practicing the prior art”) constitutes a backdoor way of arguing
validity in the context of infringement, where the burden of proof is
“preponderance of the evidence” as contrasted with the higher
burden of “clear and convincing evidence.” Courts tend to look
disfavorably upon such attempts to end-run one’s evidentiary burden
1277
of proof.
Nonetheless, practicing the prior art may be relied on to
manifest one’s state of mind and establish a lack of intent to infringe
in the context of indirect infringement.

1269. 589 F.3d 1246, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009), superceded on reh’g
by No. 2009-1504, 2010 WL 801705, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
1270. Id. at 1254–55, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165–66.
1271. Id. at 1255, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
1272. Id. at 1264–65, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173.
1273. Id. at 1266, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
1274. Id. at 1267, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
1275. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
1276. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
1277. See, e.g., Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d
1357, 1367, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A]ccused infringers
are not free to flout the requirement of proving invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence by asserting a ‘practicing prior art’ defense to literal infringement under
the less stringent preponderance of the evidence standard.”).
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In Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Medical Group, Inc., the Federal
Circuit, while acknowledging that “practicing the prior art” is not an
effective defense for infringement, endorsed the use of the practice
to negate the necessary intent for a charge of inducing
1279
infringement.
The court explained that, even though “‘practicing
the prior art’ is not a defense to patent infringement[,] . . . it does
not follow that a defendant’s belief that it can freely practice
inventions found in the public domain cannot support a jury’s
finding that the intent required for induced infringement was
1280
lacking.”
2.

Contributory infringement
The Lucent Technologies court also addressed contributory
infringement by Microsoft as part of the Federal Circuit’s indirect
1281
infringement analysis.
The issue under consideration in that case
was whether the “material or apparatus” required by the patent is the
entire software package or just the particular tool (e.g., the calendar
1282
date-picker) that performs the claimed method.
The court found
that a date-picker tool was suitable only for an infringing use, while
the software package as a whole was capable of substantial
1283
noninfringing use.
The court concluded that “[i]nclusion of the
date-picker feature within a larger program does not change the
date-picker’s ability to infringe,” that a jury could reasonably
conclude that Microsoft intended users to use the tool, and that the
1284
only intended use of the tool infringed the patent.
In Vita-Mix, the Federal Circuit considered whether noninfringing
use of a stirring stick in the accused blender was sufficiently
1285
substantial to avoid contributing infringement.
In deciding this
question, the court adopted, arguendo, the opinion of the patentee’s
expert and assumed that a customer’s use of the accused device may
1286
directly infringe.
Even then, the court found that no reasonable
jury could find that using the stir stick, which was specifically

1278. 554 F.3d 1010, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub
nom. Medela AG v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 624 (2009).
1279. Id. at 1024–25, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810–11.
1280. Id. at 1025, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811.
1281. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1320, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1555, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1282. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
1283. Id. at 1320–21, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568–69.
1284. Id. at 1321, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.
1285. Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1327–28, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1340, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1286. Id. at 1327, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347–48.
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disavowed by the patentee through statements made in the
1287
specification, was an insubstantial use of the accused device.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, concluding that there was no contributory
1288
infringement.
Additionally, in i4i, the Federal Circuit found that while
noninfringing uses existed, they were not substantial noninfringing
1289
uses.
Quoting Vita-Mix, the court noted that “[w]hether a use is
‘substantial,’ rather than just ‘unusual, far-fetched, illusory,
impractical, occasional, aberrant, or experimental’ cannot be
1290
evaluated in a vacuum.”
With respect to the proffered
noninfringing uses, the jury heard evidence that the uses were not
practical and that they “deprived users of the very benefit XML was
1291
intended to provide.”
As there was also evidence that Microsoft
knew its product would infringe, the court determined that a jury
1292
could have reasonably found contributory infringement.
3.

Infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) and (g)
a.

Applicability to process claims

35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) deals with inducing infringement outside of
the United States based on acts occurring in the United States.
It provides that one who:
[S]upplies . . . in or from the United States, all or a substantial
portion of the components of a patented invention, where such
components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner
as to actively induce the combination of such components outside
1293
of the United States . . . shall be liable as an infringer.

Section 271(f)(2) contains similar language directed to
contributory infringement. The language of § 271 refers generally to
the “patented invention,” without discriminating between, for
1294
example, product or process inventions.

1287. Id. at 1328, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
1288. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
1289. i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 589 F.3d 1246, 1266, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,
1174 (Fed. Cir. 2009), superceded on reh’g by No. 2009-1504, 2010 WL 801705,
93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
1290. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (quoting Vita-Mix, 581 F.3d at 1327,
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347).
1291. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
1292. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
1293. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2006).
1294. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (“Whoever without authority supplies . . . any
component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for
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In Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., the patentee,
Cardiac Pacemakers, asserted infringement under § 271(f), arguing
that the statute applied to the sale of products that were used abroad
1296
to practice a patented method.
To Cardiac Pacemakers,
a component of a patented invention—in this case, a process or
method invention—encompassed “the apparatus that performed the
1297
process,” not a step of that process.
The district court ruled in
Cardiac’s favor, holding that § 271(f) applied to method claims and
that St. Jude’s shipment of the accused product abroad for use in the
1298
claimed method violated the statute.
An initial panel of the
1299
But after
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court in this regard.
review en banc, the Federal Circuit reversed, vacating its initial panel
decision and overruling Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology
1300
Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., including any implications in other decisions
1301
that § 271(f) applies to method patents.
The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the patentee’s
arguments that a component of a patented invention within the
meaning of § 271(f) could be an apparatus that performed the
1302
process.
It first construed “component” in § 271(f) based on the
use of the term in other sections of the statute, noting that § 271(c)
uses “component” when referring to product inventions
(“a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or
composition”) and “material or apparatus” when referring to process
inventions (“material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented
1303
process”).
It stated that an apparatus used to practice a process
1304
invention is therefore not a “component” of that process.
Indicating that the components of process inventions are their steps,
the court then observed that § 271(f) further requires that the

use in the invention . . . where such component is uncombined in whole or in part . .
. shall be liable as an infringer.”).
1295. 576 F.3d 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1088 (2010).
1296. Id. at 1365, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912.
1297. Id. at 1363, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
1298. Id. at 1359, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907 (citing Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v.
St. Jude Med., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1042–44 (S.D. Ind. 2005), vacated, 315
F. App’x 273 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
1299. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
1300. 425 F.3d 1366, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2005), overruled by
Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898.
1301. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
1302. Id. at 1362, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
1303. Id. at 1363, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)
(2006)).
1304. Id. at 1364, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.

2010]

2009 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

951

1305

components be “supplied.”
It defined “supply” to mean to furnish
provisions or equipment, and since it would be physically impossible
to supply an intangible step, the court held that the “supply”
requirement effectively “eliminates method patents from Section
1306
271(f)’s reach.”
The court also noted that its interpretation was
fully consistent with the legislative history, which focused on the
1307
patented product rather than the protection of method patents.
b.

Infringement under § 271(g)

In Hoffman-La Roche, the court addressed infringement under
35 U.S.C. § 271(g), which prohibits the importation of a product
made by a patented process into the United States that is materially
changed by subsequent processes or that forms a trivial or
1308
nonessential component of another product.
The court noted
that, “[i]n the biotechnology context, a significant change in a
protein’s structure and/or properties would constitute a material
1309
change.”
For the product in Hoffman-La Roche, however, the court
found that the structure and functional differences between the
recombinant EPO made by the claimed processes and the PEG-EPO
imported by Roche were not material because the infringing product
merely contained an additional element of PEG, which did not
1310
impart a materially different function.
D. Willful Infringement
1.

Evidence of copying
In DePuy Spine, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s grant
of judgment as a matter of law because the patentee failed to provide
a “legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find an objectively high
likelihood . . . that the [accused device] infringed” the patent at
1311
Moreover, because the patentee failed to meet that first
issue.
threshold requirement, the court did not need to consider evidence

1305. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
1306. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
1307. See id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910 (“Section 271(f) will ‘prevent copiers
from avoiding U.S. patents by shipping overseas the components of a product
patented in this country so that assembly of the components will be completed
abroad.’” (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-663, at 6 (1984))).
1308. Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1378–79,
92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1309. Id. at 1379, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1319.
1310. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1320.
1311. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1336,
90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1880 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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of copying by the infringer, as it would have been relevant only to
what the infringer knew or should have known about the likelihood
1312
of its infringement.
The Federal Circuit’s rationale followed the standard set forth in
1313
In re Seagate Technology, LLC to determine the willfulness of a patent
infringement. In that case, the court held that to establish willful
infringement, “a patentee must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high
likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid
1314
patent.”
The court further held that “if this threshold objective
standard is satisfied, the patentee must also demonstrate that this
objectively-defined risk (determined by the record developed in the
infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious that it
1315
should have been known to the accused infringer.”
As pointed out by the DePuy Spine court, the “first prong is
objective” and does not look to the state of mind of the accused
1316
infringer.
Because DePuy Spine failed to satisfy In re Seagate’s first
prong, the court did not need to address DePuy Spine’s arguments
“concerning ‘copying’ and Medtronic’s rebuttal evidence concerning
‘designing around,’ both of which [we]re relevant only to
Medtronic’s mental state regarding its direct infringement under
1317
In re Seagate’s second prong.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
1318
affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law.
VIII.

INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND OTHER DEFENSES
A. Inequitable Conduct

An applicant for a patent owes a “duty of candor” while dealing
1319
with the USPTO.
A breach of this duty constitutes “inequitable
conduct,” which can lead to invalidity or unenforceability of a

1312. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
1313. 497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc),
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008).
1314. Id. at 1371, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
1315. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
1316. DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1336, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880 (“[E]vidence of
copying in a case of direct infringement is relevant only to Seagate’s second prong, as
it may show what the accused infringer knew or should have known about the
likelihood of its infringement.”).
1317. Id. at 1337, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1881.
1318. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1881.
1319. Hyatt v. Doll, 576 F.3d 1246, 1274 & n.9, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1886 &
n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, No. 2007-1066, 2010 WL 597219,
93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1871 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 17, 2010) (en banc) (per curiam).
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1320

patent.
In order to prove inequitable conduct, defendants must
present evidence of (1) an affirmative misrepresentation of material
fact, failure to disclose material information, or submission of false
1321
material information, and (2) intent to deceive the USPTO.
Both materiality and intent to deceive require proof by clear and
1322
The materiality of information turns on
convincing evidence.
whether “a reasonable examiner would consider it important in
1323
deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.”
If a defendant succeeds in proving materiality and intent to deceive,
the court must weigh these findings in light of all the circumstances
1324
and determine if there was inequitable conduct.
Over two decades ago, the Federal Circuit commented that “the
habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent
1325
case has become an absolute plague.”
While some panels seemed
to treat inequitable conduct as a “plague,” others were more than
willing to find inequitable conduct. After an incredibly busy year in
2008 for the Federal Circuit in this area, the court continued to make
new law in 2009. Various panels and judges seemed to push the court
in different directions, marking an area ripe with disagreement.
1326
In Rothman v. Target Corp.,
the Federal Circuit held that the
district court erred in upholding a jury verdict that a nursing garment
1327
patent was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.
First, the
court held that one undisclosed prior-art nursing garment supporting
the inequitable-conduct findings was cumulative of other cited
1328
references.
Indeed, the court found that at least two cited
1320. Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1363, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1705, 1708 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1321. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
1322. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
1323. Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1297,
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting eSpeed, Inc. v. BrokerTec
USA L.L.C., 480 F.3d 1129, 1136, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1183, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
1324. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1366,
57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647, 1652 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1325. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
1326. 556 F.3d 1310, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 626 (2010).
1327. The Federal Circuit noted that inequitable conduct is an equitable defense to
patent infringement most appropriately reserved for the court. Id. at 1322,
89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905 (citing Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc.,
49 F.3d 1575, 1584, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1120, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
Nevertheless, district courts occasionally delegate aspects of the inequitable conduct
inquiry to juries. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905. In Rothman, the parties agreed
to submit factual inquiries and the ultimate question of inequitable conduct to the
jury. Id. at 1323, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905. The Federal Circuit noted that this is
not the preferred course. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.
1328. Id. at 1326, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2008)).
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references were substantially more probative of patentability than the
1329
Thus, the court held that no reasonable jury
uncited garment.
could have relied on the uncited garment to support the inequitable
1330
conduct finding.
Next, the Federal Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument that
the patentee’s failure to disclose a second garment style was an
1331
alternative basis for the jury’s inequitable conduct verdict.
The court held that there could be no deceptive intent largely due to
the defendants’ conduct in informing the patentee of this second
1332
garment style.
The court said that, “[r]eceipt of threatening letters
containing vague descriptions of unsubstantiated prior art at the tail
end of a souring business relationship does not create an automatic
1333
duty of disclosure.”
Here, the accused infringer apparently did not
provide sufficient information detailing the alleged style, nor did it
1334
Thus, the
send a sample, photograph, drawing, or description.
Federal Circuit held that the patentee “cannot be charged with
‘culpable intent in withholding information that [it] did not
1335
have.’”
Of particular note to practitioners, the court focused on
the defendants’ actions in delaying notification of the prior art to the
1336
patentee.
Moreover, the court found that the patentee had a goodfaith basis for believing that the alternative style was not prior art, and
thus concluded that the record contains no substantial evidence that
the patentee intended to deceive the USPTO in withholding the
1337
alternative style.
The Federal Circuit also rejected the defendants’ third argument
that the patentee’s attorney had made misrepresentations of material
1338
fact.
In response to an obviousness argument, the patentee’s
attorney had argued that nursing garments are not analogous art to
1339
women’s garments in general.
The court held that a “prosecuting
attorney is free to present argument in favor of patentability without
1340
fear of committing inequitable conduct.”
The court noted that the
examiner has the discretion to reject or accept an applicant’s
1329. Id. at 1327, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
1330. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
1331. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
1332. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
1333. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
1334. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
1335. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909 (alteration in original) (quoting Herbert v.
Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1116, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1611, 1615 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
1336. Id. at 1328, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909–10.
1337. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
1338. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
1339. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
1340. Id. at 1328–29, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
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arguments.
The court appeared to give considerable leeway in
making arguments as long as there was no misstating of material
1342
In the end, the court held that the defendants had not
facts.
presented substantial evidence of inequitable conduct and reversed
1343
the jury verdict of inequitable conduct.
The court also held that
because the district court based its award of costs on its finding of
1344
inequitable conduct, the award must be vacated.
1345
the
In Larson Manufacturing Co. v. AluminArt Products Ltd.,
Federal Circuit again vacated a district court finding of inequitable
1346
conduct.
In that case, the district court found that the patentee
failed to disclose three items of prior art and two office actions issued
in the prosecution of a continuation application that grew out of the
1347
application that resulted in the patent-in-suit.
The district court
“rejected [the patentee’s] argument that the three items of prior art
[and the office actions] were cumulative of prior art which already
1348
was before the Reexamination Panel.”
The district court found an
intent to deceive the Reexamination Panel, and after balancing
1349
materiality and intent, held that there was inequitable conduct.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first considered the three items of
prior art, referred to as the “Genius Literature,” the “German
1350
Patent,” and the “Preferred Engineering Literature.”
With respect
to the Genius Literature and the German Patent, the court found
that the references were cumulative because their material aspects
were already disclosed in another patent before the Reexamination
1351
Panel.
The court determined that testimony as to characteristics of
the prior art was irrelevant to the claim limitations at issue, and that
1352
The
the analysis must stay focused on the claim limitations at issue.
court then considered the Preferred Engineering Literature, holding
that the limitation found material by the district court was already
disclosed in another reference that was before the Reexamination
1353
Panel.
The court thus held that regardless of whether the

1341.
1342.
1343.
1344.
1345.
1346.
1347.
1348.
1349.
1350.
1351.
1352.
1353.

Id. at 1329, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910–11.
Id. at 1329, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910–11.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
559 F.3d 1317, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1320, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258–59.
Id. at 1327, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
Id. at 1327–28, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263.
Id. at 1332–33, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266.
Id. at 1336, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268.
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Preferred Engineering Literature disclosed these references, it was
1354
cumulative of prior art already before the USPTO.
The Federal Circuit then turned to the patentee’s failure to
1355
disclose the two office actions from the continuation application.
Although the art cited in the office actions had been cited in the
reexamination proceedings, the court held that the examiner’s
adverse decisions about substantially similar claims, as in the
1356
reexamination proceedings, were material.
The court cited Dayco
1357
Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., in which the Federal Circuit
had held that a patentee’s failure to disclose contrary decisions of
1358
another examiner of a substantially similar claim was material.
The Federal Circuit held that because the examiner in the two office
actions gave a different explanation and interpretation of the prior
art, this was information that an examiner would clearly consider
1359
important and, thus, material.
The Federal Circuit then turned to the intent prong, and held that
because the district court’s finding of intent was based on the
materiality of the three prior art references, the deceptive intent
1360
finding could not stand.
The court thus remanded for a
determination of whether the patentee withheld the only remaining
material items—the two office actions—with a threshold level of
deceptive intent, and if so, whether balancing the level of intent with
1361
the level of materiality warranted a finding of unenforceability.
The court then provided the trial court with the following guidance
on remand: (1) it was not necessary for the district court to accept
additional evidence; (2) materiality did not presume intent, and
nondisclosure, by itself, could not satisfy the deceptive intent
element; (3) the district court should take into account any evidence
of good faith by the patentees—for example, that the patentees
notified the reexamination panel of the simultaneous prosecution of
the continuation application and several pleadings from this lawsuit,
which militated against a finding of deceptive intent; and (4) if the
district court found intent, it had to then balance the levels of

1354. Id. at 1337, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269.
1355. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269.
1356. Id. at 1338, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270.
1357. 329 F.3d 1358, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
1358. Larson Mfg., 559 F.3d at 1338, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270 (citing Dayco
Prods., Inc., 329 F.3d at 1368, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808).
1359. Id. at 1339, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271.
1360. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271.
1361. Id. at 1340, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271.
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materiality and intent to determine if a finding of inequitable
1362
conduct was warranted.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Linn called for en banc review of
the inequitable conduct standard, citing “[t]he ease with which
inequitable conduct can be pled, but not dismissed,” due to what he
referred to as a lower standard that has significantly diverged from
1363
the Supreme Court’s standard.
Specifically, Judge Linn opined
that a lower standard than even “gross negligence” (which alone does
not justify an inference of intent to deceive) has propagated through
1364
Federal Circuit case law.
According to Judge Linn, this lower
standard permits an inference of deceptive intent when “(1) highly
material information is withheld; (2) the applicant knew of the
information [and] . . . knew or should have known of the materiality
of the information; and (3) the applicant has not provided a credible
1365
Judge Linn noted that this test is
explanation for the withholding.”
problematic because it conflates materiality with intent and
incorrectly shifts the burden to the patentee to prove that it did not
1366
intend to deceive.
Thus, Judge Linn opined that the time has
come for the court to review the standard for inequitable conduct en
1367
banc.
1368
In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling that the patent-in-suit was not
1369
unenforceable for inequitable conduct.
Of particular note to
patent prosecutors, that case dealt in part with the issue of mistakes
made in an application that were not corrected. In the patent
figures, there were several mistakes that the district court found to be
1370
material but were not corrected prior to issuance of the patent.
After one of the employees pointed out the error to one of the
prosecuting attorneys, the mistake was corrected in one but not all of

1362. Id. at 1340–41, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1272.
1363. Id. at 1342–43, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273–74 (Linn, J., concurring).
1364. Id. at 1343, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274.
1365. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274 (alterations in original) (quoting Praxair,
Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1313–14, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1710
(Fed. Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1366. Id. at 1343–44, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1274–75.
1367. Id. at 1344, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275.
1368. 560 F.3d 1366, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1549 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Just before this
Area Summary went to print, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, confirmed the
separate requirements of written description and enablement, and thereby reversed
in part and affirmed in part its previous panel decision. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., No. 2008-1248, 2010 WL 1007369 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 22, 2010) (en banc).
1369. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
1370. Id. at 1377–78, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
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the applications which were then transferred to another firm.
The court held that the new attorney never knew of the errors, and
that the attorney who knew of the errors, but did not correct them,
was merely following the law firm’s standard procedures not to make
1372
corrections until the USPTO indicated the claims were allowable.
The court thus held that more was needed to prove that deceptive
intent was “the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn
1373
from the evidence.”
The court then held that the applicants’
failure to submit certain references that were not prior art but would
have been relevant to inherent anticipation did not prove intent to
deceive, even though Ariad Pharmaceuticals again did not dispute
1374
that the references were material.
Turning to intent, the Federal Circuit held that Eli Lilly & Co.
could not prove deceptive intent by clear and convincing evidence
1375
“simply by relying on the materiality of the errors.”
The court
noted that under existing law, “[o]nly after a district court makes
independent findings of both materiality and intent may it weigh the
two against each other in its ultimate determination of inequitable
1376
conduct.”
The court further elaborated that “[m]ateriality and
intent are different requirements, and absent a finding of deceptive
intent, no amount of materiality gives the district court discretion to
1377
find inequitable conduct.”
Thus, the court held that because
Eli Lilly & Co. failed to establish the “threshold level of intent to
deceive . . . by clear and convincing evidence,” the district court
correctly held that the patent was not unenforceable due to
1378
inequitable conduct.
The Federal Circuit affirmed a summary judgment of no
inequitable conduct in AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP v. Teva
1379
Pharmaceuticals USA.
At issue in that case was the extent to which a
patent applicant, after fully disclosing relevant prior art and
comparative data to a patent examiner’s satisfaction, must also
1371. Id. at 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
1372. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
1373. Id. at 1379, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557–58 (quoting Star Scientific, Inc. v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1007
(Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1595 (2009)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
1374. Id. at 1379, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1375. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1376. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1377. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558 (citing Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365,
88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006).
1378. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558–59 (quoting Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365,
88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1379. 583 F.3d 766, 769, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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“present any additional unpublished information in the applicant’s
possession concerning other less structurally similar compounds, and
must also synthesize additional compounds for comparative
1380
testing.”
The appellants based their argument on the omission of
test data for one compound and the submission of test data for
1381
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument,
another compound.
concluding that the evidence did not support a misrepresentation or
1382
the omission of material information.
Also, no evidence existed
that any information from the requested test data, if the tests were
1383
conducted, would have been material to patentability.
The Federal Circuit also rejected the appellants’ assertion that
showing a high degree of materiality required only a proportionally
1384
lesser showing of intent to deceive.
The court reiterated that
simple “[e]vidence of mistake or negligence, even gross negligence,
1385
Only after a
is not sufficient to support inequitable conduct.”
threshold showing of materiality and intent to deceive does the court
1386
weigh and balance the findings.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit
noted that inequitable conduct requires intent to deceive, not intent
1387
to withhold.
As the court explained, “[i]ntent to deceive cannot be
inferred simply from the decision to withhold [information] where
1388
Accordingly, the
the reasons given for withholding are plausible.”
1389
court held that appellants failed to prove intent to deceive.
Although the Federal Circuit did not change the substantive law of
inequitable conduct in Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., this case is
likely to have the most significant effect of any 2009 Federal Circuit
decision in deterring allegations of inequitable conduct. In Exergen,
the Federal Circuit specifically took the opportunity to clarify the
heightened pleading requirements of inequitable conduct under
1390
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).

1380. Id. at 770, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
1381. Id. at 776, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
1382. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
1383. Id. at 774, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
1384. Id. at 776, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
1385. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488 (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v.
Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(en banc)).
1386. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
1387. Id. at 777, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.
1388. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489 (quoting Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total
Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1367, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1808 (Fed. Cir.
2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1389. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.
1390. See supra Subsection II.C.1. (providing a full discussion of the Exergen case).
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B. Inventorship
A patent is presumed to name the correct inventors, and a party
claiming coinventorship must prove his claim by clear and convincing
1391
evidence.
An alleged coinventor must prove that he contributed to
1392
As a matter of law,
the conception of the claimed invention.
an alleged coinventor’s own statements are inadequate to prove
1393
conception and must be corroborated by independent evidence.
In Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., the defendants
attempted to show that the patent was invalid by introducing the
1394
testimony of an alleged prior inventor under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
The alleged inventor sought to corroborate testimony of prior
1395
reduction to practice by offering an abandoned patent application.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court decision that the
abandoned patent application was insufficient to corroborate the
1396
testimony.
The abandoned patent application may provide the
necessary contemporaneous documentary evidence to corroborate an
1397
This evidence, however, only goes to
inventor’s testimony.
1398
conception and remains insufficient to prove reduction to practice.
The court distinguished cases involving abandoned patent
applications with additional evidence, noting that no case existed
where an application “alone was deemed sufficient to meet the
1399
corroboration requirement.”
C. Laches
The affirmative defense of laches is an equitable determination
1400
that is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.
To prove
laches, a defendant must show that (1) the plaintiff delayed for an
unreasonable and inexcusable amount of time in filing suit, and

1391. Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 980, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1782, 1785–86 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1392. Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr. Lab.,
Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227–28, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1919 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
1393. Id. at 1461, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548 (quoting Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d
1187, 1194, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
1394. 579 F.3d 1363, 1374, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1148, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1395. Id. at 1375, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156.
1396. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156.
1397. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156.
1398. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156.
1399. Id. at 1376, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157.
1400. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1038–39,
22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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1401

(2) the defendant was prejudiced as a result of the delay.
The
length of the plaintiff’s delay is measured from the time the alleged
infringing act became known or reasonably should have been known
1402
to the commencement of litigation.
A rebuttable presumption of
laches arises when a patentee delays suit for more than six years after
actual or constructive knowledge of the defendant’s alleged
1403
infringing activity.
Laches is not a complete defense and only bars
1404
The Federal
relief with respect to damages accrued before suit.
Circuit reviewed several summary judgment decisions on laches in
2009.
1405
In Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment that laches did not
1406
apply.
Vita-Mix brought suit five years after learning of the accused
1407
Although insufficient to trigger the rebuttable
infringement.
presumption for laches, an unreasonable length of time enjoys “no
1408
fixed boundaries but rather depends on the circumstances.”
The
court reviewed the defendant’s alleged economic prejudice from the
delay, because the corporation claimed that “it would have changed
its product instructions to avoid infringement” during the period of
1409
delay.
The court rejected this argument, noting that the product
instruction changes only affect indirect infringement and not direct
1410
infringement.
Because the court ruled that the defendant did not
indirectly infringe, there was no prejudice from the defendant’s lost
1411
The court,
opportunity to change its product instructions.
1412
therefore, affirmed the grant of summary judgment of no laches.
The Federal Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment of
laches in Ultimax Cement Manufacturing Corp. v. CTS Cement
1413
Manufacturing Corp.
The dispute focused on the start date for
1414
The district court found that the plaintiff was
measuring the delay.

1401. Gasser Chair Co. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 60 F.3d 770, 773, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1822, 1824 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1402. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328.
1403. Id. at 1034, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
1404. Id. at 1041, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335.
1405. 581 F.3d 1317, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1406. Id. at 1321, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.
1407. Id. at 1333, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
1408. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352 (quoting Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1409. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
1410. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
1411. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
1412. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
1413. 587 F.3d 1339, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1414. Id. at 1349–50, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871–72.
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on “inquiry notice” at the time that the patent was issued, resulting in
1415
The district court
a delay period of twelve years before filing suit.
thus presumed prejudice to the defendant, and further “found
prejudice in the loss of testimony of a [defendant] employee who had
1416
died in the interim and the loss of records.”
The defendant did
not dispute that the plaintiff could not have tested its product for the
1417
presence of the claimed soluble anhydrite limitation.
In addition,
the court found that the plaintiff could not have investigated the
defendant’s method to determine infringement until discovery
1418
occurred in the suit.
The Federal Circuit reversed, noting that the
only relevant time period was after the plaintiff knew or should have
1419
The court determined
known of the allegedly infringing product.
that genuine issues of material fact on this issue precluded summary
1420
judgment.
Due to the claim limitation that was undetectable in the
finished product, the court found it reasonable that the plaintiff
“might not have known or been able to find out whether [the
1421
defendant] infringed.”
These genuine issues of material facts
precluded summary judgment, resulting in a remand for a trial on
1422
laches.
IX. REMEDIES
A. Permanent Injunctions
The 2006 Supreme Court decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
1423
forced the Federal Circuit to refocus upon district court
L.L.C.
rulings on permanent injunctions, and 2009 continued the trend.
In eBay, the Supreme Court vacated a permanent injunction after the
courts below incorrectly applied the traditional four-factor framework
1424
governing the award of injunctive relief.
This traditional
four-factor framework requires a plaintiff to demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity
1415.
1416.
1417.
1418.
1419.
1420.
1421.
1422.
1423.
1424.

Id. at 1348, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
Id. at 1349, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
Id. at 1350, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
Id. at 1349, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
Id. at 1350, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
547 U.S. 388, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (2006).
Id. at 394, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
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is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
1425
disserved by a permanent injunction.

Therefore, the Court held, the Court of Appeals erred when it
categorically granted such relief after finding patent infringement
1426
and validity.
1427
the Federal Circuit vacated the
In Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp.,
district court’s denial of a motion for a permanent injunction and
1428
remanded “for the district court to perform the required analysis.”
The Federal Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion
when it “failed to consider any of the eBay factors[,] . . . failed to
make any factual findings regarding those factors[,] . . . [and] failed
to apply any of the traditional equitable principles discussed in
1429
Declining to conduct the correct analysis in the first
eBay.”
1430
instance, the court vacated and remanded the case.
The Federal Circuit also briefly addressed permanent injunctions
1431
in Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter International, Inc., holding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in granting permanent
injunctive relief, but vacating and remanding so that the district court
could reconsider its decision in view of the Federal Circuit’s reversal
of a portion of the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of
1432
law.
The Federal Circuit rejected the argument that the district
court had found the injunction “all but inevitable” following
infringement, noting that the district court made this comment when
it criticized the defendant for taking no action to implement any
1433
alternative to the infringing device.
The Federal Circuit found that
this statement did not amount to legal error, particularly because the
district court properly applied the eBay factors and explained its
1434
analysis.
The Federal Circuit also rejected the defendant’s
argument that the district court “ignored” evidence, explaining that
the district court opinion need not discuss every single fact alleged by
1435
the defendant.

1425. Id. at 391, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578.
1426. Id. at 393–94, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579–80.
1427. 569 F.3d 1335, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2009), amended in part on
reh’g, Nos. 2008-1228 & 2008-1252, 2009 WL 5865679 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2009).
1428. Id. at 1351, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
1429. Id. at 1352, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235–36.
1430. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236.
1431. 582 F.3d 1288, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2009), petition for cert.
filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 09-1096).
1432. Id. at 1303, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
1433. Id. at 1302 n.4, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175 n.4.
1434. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175 n.4.
1435. Id. at 1303, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
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1436

In i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.,
the Federal Circuit affirmed a
jury verdict of infringement, an assessment of damages of over
$240 million, and a permanent injunction against Microsoft,
but modified the effective date of the injunction to January 11,
1437
2010.
With respect to the injunction, the district court granted a
permanent injunction prohibiting Microsoft from selling, offering to
sell, importing, or using trademarked MICROSOFT WORD versions
1438
that included the infringing technology—a custom XML editor.
The district court limited the injunction to copies of MICROSOFT
1439
WORD purchased or licensed after its effective date.
The effective
1440
date was originally set as sixty days from the injunction order but
was stayed by the Federal Circuit in September, 2009, pending the
1441
outcome of the appeal.
On appeal, Microsoft challenged a
number of district court findings, including the scope and effective
1442
date of the permanent injunction.
The Federal Circuit reviewed the permanent injunction under an
1443
abuse of discretion standard, using the factors set forth in eBay.
The court noted that the scope of the injunction was narrow because
it only applied to users who purchase or license MICROSOFT WORD
1444
after the date on which the injunction takes effect.
The court
agreed that i4i suffered irreparable harm, noting that it was proper
1445
for the district court to consider evidence of past harm to i4i.
The court noted that although injunctions are tools for prospective
relief, “the first eBay factor looks, in part, at what has already
occurred,” including past harm to the patentee’s market share,
1446
revenue, and brand recognition.
The Federal Circuit found that
the district court properly considered evidence that Microsoft’s
infringement rendered i4i’s product obsolete for much of the
1447
market.
With respect to the second factor—whether there were
adequate remedies at law—the court found that the losses of market
share, brand recognition, and customer goodwill are “particularly
difficult to quantify,” especially when forcing a small company to
1436. 589 F.3d 1246, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009), superceded on reh’g
by No. 2009-1504, 2010 WL 801705, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
1437. Id. at 1254–55, 1278, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165–66, 1183.
1438. Id. at 1275, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
1439. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
1440. Id. at 1278, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183.
1441. Id. at 1254, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
1442. Id. at 1256, 1277, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167, 1183.
1443. Id. at 1275, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
1444. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
1445. Id. at 1276, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181–82.
1446. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
1447. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
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1448

change its business strategy.
This led the court to agree that there
were inadequate remedies at law to compensate i4i for the
1449
In finding that the balance of hardships also
infringement.
favored i4i, the court considered a variety of factors, including
1450
“the parties’ sizes, products, and revenue sources.”
The court
explained that the patented technology was central to i4i’s business,
while the infringing XML editor related to only a small fraction of
1451
Microsoft’s business.
The Federal Circuit also noted that the
district court properly ignored Microsoft’s expenses in creating the
infringing product and the costs to Microsoft of redesigning the
1452
infringing products.
With respect to the public interest factor,
the court found that the narrow scope of the injunction substantially
mitigated any negative effects on the public, both practically and
1453
economically.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the permanent
1454
injunction.
However, the court noted that the record did not
1455
and
support an effective date only sixty days from the order
1456
modified the injunction to take effect on January 11, 2010.
B. Preliminary Injunctions
The Federal Circuit also had opportunities to clarify the
requirements for preliminary injunctions in 2009. The decision to
grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the sound
1457
discretion of the district court.
Courts consider four factors when
determining whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate:
“(1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable
harm if an injunction is not granted; (3) a balance of hardships
tipping in its favor; and (4) the injunction’s favorable impact on the
1458
public interest.”
1459
In Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a
1448. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182.
1449. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182.
1450. Id. at 1277, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182.
1451. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182.
1452. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182.
1453. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182.
1454. Id. at 1276–77, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182.
1455. Id. at 1277–78, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183.
1456. Id. at 1278, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183.
1457. Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1334, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1458. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350,
57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747, 1751 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1459. 566 F.3d 999, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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1460

preliminary injunction.
The district court found that Altana had
failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits because it
1461
Additionally,
could not rebut a substantial question of invalidity.
the district court found that the alleged harms were not irreparable
1462
and that a judgment at trial could be satisfied.
On review, the Federal Circuit first addressed the correct burden of
1463
proof for establishing a likelihood of success on the merits.
Ultimately, the court explained, the accused infringer bears the
burden of showing a substantial question of invalidity in order to
1464
overcome a preliminary injunction at trial.
At the preliminary
injunction stage, however, an accused infringer need only show
vulnerability, a lower burden than ultimately proving invalidity at
1465
trial.
The Federal Circuit rejected Altana’s argument that the
district court incorrectly placed the burden on Altana to show that an
obviousness defense lacked substantial merit, and that the district
court should have placed the burden on the defendants to establish a
1466
substantial question of invalidity.
The Federal Circuit clarified that
after an accused infringer raises a substantial question concerning
validity, the movant must then show that the defense lacks substantial
1467
merit.
On the merits, the Federal Circuit found that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the
1468
defendants’ obviousness defense had substantial merit.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that
1469
The Federal
Altana failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.
Circuit rejected the notion that the district court categorically
1470
dismissed the alleged harms.
The future harms associated with the
expiration of a Hatch-Waxman stay was found by the district court to
be “exaggerated,” a ruling that the Federal Circuit found not clearly

1460. Id. at 1002, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020.
1461. Id. at 1005, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022.
1462. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1022.
1463. Id. at 1006, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023.
1464. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023 (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk,
108 F.3d 1361, 1364, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
1465. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023 (quoting Amazon.com, Inc. v.
Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1359, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747, 1758
(Fed. Cir. 2001)).
1466. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023.
1467. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023 (citing Entegris, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 490 F.3d
1340, 1351, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
1468. Id. at 1010, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1026.
1469. Id. at 1011, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027.
1470. Id. at 1010–11, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027.

2010]

2009 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

967

1471

erroneous.
Thus, the court affirmed the denial of a preliminary
1472
injunction.
1473
In Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., the Federal Circuit
again affirmed a denial of a preliminary injunction and addressed the
1474
requirements for such relief.
The court emphasized and
attempted to clarify the first factor, where the parties’ arguments
1475
“reflect[ed] a possible misunderstanding of the applicable law.”
The court noted that the “precise meaning” of an alleged infringer
raising a “substantial question” and a patentee’s obligation to show
that the defense lacks substantial merit “is less than entirely clear, and
1476
leaves room for different interpretations.”
The Federal Circuit
clarified that the role of the district court is to “examin[e] the alleged
infringer’s evidence of invalidity” and to “consider[] rebuttal
evidence” in order to determine “whether the patentee can show that
1477
the invalidity defense lacks substantial merit.”
Therefore, the court
1478
explained, the trial court should look to both sides of the evidence.
After clarifying the trial court’s role in assessing evidence,
the Federal Circuit addressed the meaning of raising a “substantial
1479
question” of invalidity.
A “substantial question” includes views that
1480
it either represents a procedural step or a substantive conclusion.
The court stated, “Our precedents establish that the phrase refers to
a conclusion reached by the trial court after considering the evidence
1481
on both sides of the validity issue.”
Therefore, the trial court
“must weigh the evidence both for and against validity that is
1482
available at this preliminary stage in the proceedings.”
If a substantial question concerning validity exists, then a “patentee
has not succeeded in showing it is likely to succeed at trial on the
1483
merits of the validity issue.”

1471. Id. at 1011, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027.
1472. Id. at 1002, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020.
1473. 566 F.3d 1372, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1918 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1474. Id. at 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920.
1475. Id. at 1376, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921.
1476. Id. at 1377, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922.
1477. Id. at 1378, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922 (quoting New England Braiding
Co., Inc. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 883, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1626
(Fed. Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1478. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
1479. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
1480. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
1481. Id. at 1378–79, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
1482. Id. at 1379, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923.
1483. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923 (citing New England Braiding Co., Inc. v.
A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 883, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1626 (Fed. Cir.
1992)).
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In Titan Tire, the Federal Circuit further refined the trial court’s
responsibility for preliminary injunctions. First, the court explained
that the evidentiary standard of “substantial evidence” is separate
from the “substantial question” concept, noting that the “substantial
1484
question” threshold is not an evidentiary test.
Nor is it necessary
for an alleged infringer to prove invalidity by a “clear and convincing”
1485
standard.
Thus, when analyzing the likelihood of success factor, the trial
court, after considering all the evidence available at this early stage
of the litigation, must determine whether it is more likely than not
that the challenger will be able to prove at trial, by clear and
1486
convincing evidence, that the patent is invalid.

As a result, the ultimate clear and convincing evidence standard is
1487
If that
“a consideration for the judge to take into account.”
standard is met, a judge should then rule that a patentee failed to
prove likelihood of success and should deny a preliminary
1488
injunction.
If not, then the judge should look to the other three
1489
factors in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction.
C. Damages
The current version of 35 U.S.C. § 284 gives little guidance to
courts as it provides only that damages be “adequate to compensate
for the infringement but in no event less than a reasonable
1490
royalty.”
Consequently, the statute leaves great leeway for the
Federal Circuit to mold this area of patent law. The year 2009
marked another year where the Federal Circuit influenced and
changed the law with respect to damages, but many changes still lie
on the horizon. The Patent Reform Act of 2009 has multiple bills in
1491
the Senate and a counterpart in the House of Representatives.
These bills include a substantial overhaul of § 284 and aim to give
courts greater guidance and attempt to stress the real economic value
1492
of a patent.
Whether the changes represent a system overhaul or

1484. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1923–24.
1485. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924.
1486. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924.
1487. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924.
1488. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924.
1489. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1924.
1490. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
1491. See, e.g., S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 610, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1260,
111th Cong. (2009).
1492. Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patent Law Blog (Patently-O),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/patent-reform-act-of-2009.html (Mar. 3,
2009, 14:58 EST) (explaining the proposed amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 284).
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the codification of present law remains questioned and debated.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) hearings on “The Evolving
Intellectual Property Marketplace,” including discussion regarding
1493
patent damage awards, are further stoking the flames of debate.
1.

Lost profits and reasonable royalty
The Federal Circuit reviewed and clarified the law of lost profit
1494
damages in DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.
In its
decision, the court modified a damages award including unpatented
“pull-through” product damages, “which neither compete nor
1495
function with the patented invention.”
At trial, the jury awarded
DePuy Spine lost profits of $149 million for patented pedicle
1496
screws and $77 million for unpatented “pull-through” products.
The district court applied the four-factor test for lost profits from
1497
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., which required DuPuy
Spine to show “(1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of
acceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) manufacturing and
marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of
1498
profit that would have been made.”
The Federal Circuit rejected
challenges under the first two factors for the patented product and
1499
affirmed the award of lost profit damages.
Medtronic did not dispute that demand generally existed for the
products and that the products were covered by DePuy Spine’s
1500
patent.
The Federal Circuit clarified the application of several
often cited cases such as Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize1501
Products Co.
and held that the elimination or substitution of
particular features corresponding to claim limitations goes to the
availability of acceptable noninfringing substitutes under the second
1502
Panduit factor.
Medtronic had argued under the first factor that
the “requisite demand . . . is demand for the specific feature
(i.e., claim limitation) that distinguishes the patented product from a
1493. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE
(2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/may4/090504transcript.pdf.
1494. 567 F.3d 1314, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1495. Id. at 1320, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
1496. Id. at 1329, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875.
1497. 575 F.2d 1152, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726 (6th Cir. 1978).
1498. DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1329, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875 (citing Panduit,
575 F.2d at 1156, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 730).
1499. Id. at 1330–31, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875, 1877.
1500. Id. at 1330, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
1501. 979 F. Supp. 1233, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1782 (N.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d,
185 F.3d 1341, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
1502. DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1331, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876–77.
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noninfringing substitute, not simply demand for the patented
1503
The court rejected this argument as improperly
product.”
1504
Instead, the court
combining the first and second factors.
instructed that the first factor simply asks “whether demand existed
for the patented product,” not various limitations from a patent
1505
claim.
Therefore, focusing on particular features corresponding to
individual claim limitations is unnecessary when applying the first
1506
factor.
The court then turned to the second factor—noninfringing
substitutes. Medtronic asserted that DePuy Spine did not establish
the second Panduit factor because noninfringing products were
1507
available.
Because Medtronic did not “have a noninfringing
substitute ‘on the market’ during the relevant accounting period,
it . . . bore the burden of overcoming the inference of
1508
unavailability.”
The court affirmed the jury’s factual finding
“that no acceptable noninfringing alternative was available,” because
the alternative “would not have been available or acceptable to
1509
consumers before the end of the period.”
The jury awarded DePuy Spine $77 million in profits for
“pull-through” products sold by virtue of the business relationship
1510
created when customers bought the patented product.
These
products were not covered by the patent at issue, nor did they
compete, rely functionally upon, or require use with the patented
1511
1512
product.
Relying on Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.,
the Federal
Circuit found no legal basis to award lost profits on unpatented items
1513
that neither competed nor functioned with the patented product.
The court therefore reversed the award of lost-profit damages for the
1514
“pull-through” products.

1503. Id. at 1330, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875.
1504. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875.
1505. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875 (citing Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre
Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 726, 730 (6th Cir. 1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
1506. Id. at 1331, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
1507. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
1508. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877 (citing Grain Processing Corp., v. Am.
Maize-Prod. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1353, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
1509. Id. at 1332, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877–78.
1510. Id. at 1333, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
1511. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
1512. 56 F.3d 1538, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1513. DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1334, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878–79.
1514. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879.
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DePuy Spine also challenged the district court’s denial of a motion
for a new trial on the issues of reasonable royalty damages.
The Federal Circuit found that the verdict of zero percent damages
was an inconsistent verdict but held that DePuy Spine had not timely
1515
objected.
In Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. (Revolution Eyewear
1516
II),
the Federal Circuit affirmed several district court rulings on
1517
During trial, the parties advocated
damages and jury calculations.
for damages of either $11 million or $312,000, and the jury returned
1518
a verdict of $4.3 million.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected
arguments that the jury verdict was “mathematically impossible,”
that it exceeded the reasonable royalty rate, and that it was grossly
1519
excessive.
The court found that there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury verdict which was “well within the range of damages
1520
The defendant contended that a
advocated by the parties.”
“‘fatal inconsistency’ in the interrogatories of the Special Verdict
necessitate[d] a new trial,” arguing that the jury verdict of
1521
$4.3 million was not based on its average price.
The court rejected
this view, holding that the damages award based on a reasonable
royalty is “only the floor, not the exact amount,” a view supported by
1522
the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 284.
In Fresenius, the district court ordered the defendants to pay an
ongoing royalty for any infringing machine sold before January 1,
2009 (the date the injunction took effect), and a different royalty for
all disposable products linked to infringing machines that were sold
1523
from 2002 until the patents expired.
The Federal Circuit passed
on determining whether the royalty award was proper and instead
vacated and remanded the case in view of the court’s reversal of
portions of the district court’s order granting judgment as a matter of
1524
law.
The Federal Circuit ruled that the district court acted within
its discretion to award a royalty on postverdict sales of disposable

1515. Id. at 1335, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879.
1516. 563 F.3d 1358, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1733 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1517. Id. at 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
1518. Id. at 1371, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742.
1519. Id. at 1371–72, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742–43.
1520. Id. at 1372, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742–43.
1521. Id. at 1371–72, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742.
1522. Id. at 1372, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743.
1523. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1303, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1163, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Feb.
16, 2010) (No. 09-1096).
1524. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
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products in order to fully compensate the patentee for preverdict
1525
infringing sales.
1526
the Federal Circuit
In Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,
vacated a $358 million jury award to Lucent for patent infringement
1527
by Microsoft and remanded for a new trial on damages.
At trial, a
jury found that Microsoft programs (MICROSOFT MONEY,
MICROSOFT OUTLOOK, and WINDOWS MOBILE) indirectly
infringed Lucent’s patent and awarded a lump-sum royalty payment
1528
of approximately $358 million to Lucent.
Microsoft appealed the
district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law and its denial of
1529
a new damages trial.
The Federal Circuit first noted that it reviews a district court’s
decision concerning methodology for calculating damages for abuse
1530
of discretion and a jury’s determination of the amount of damages,
1531
The court began its
an issue of fact, for substantial evidence.
reasonable-royalty analysis by noting that parties commonly use two
1532
approaches for calculating a reasonable royalty damages award.
The first approach focuses on the infringer’s projections of profit for
1533
the infringing device.
The other more common approach uses a
hypothetical negotiation to calculate a “royalty upon which the
parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an
1534
agreement just before infringement began.”
Both parties here
adopted the hypothetical negotiation approach, which “necessarily
1535
Relying
involves an element of approximation and uncertainty.”
on the damages award framework from Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United
1536
States Plywood Corp.,
the court reviewed whether substantial
1537
evidence supported the lump sum royalty payment of $358 million.

1525. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175–76.
1526. 580 F.3d 1301, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1555 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1527. Id. at 1308, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1528. Id. at 1308–09, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
1529. Id. at 1309, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1559.
1530. Id. at 1310, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560 (citing Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec.
Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 n.8, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1540, 1544 n.8 (Fed. Cir.
1995)).
1531. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560 (citing SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1922, 1927 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 1989)).
1532. Id. at 1324, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571.
1533. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571.
1534. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1571.
1535. Id. at 1325, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572 (quoting Unisplay, 69 F.3d at 517,
36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1544).
1536. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
1537. Lucent Techs., 580 F.3d at 1325, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572.
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The Federal Circuit focused upon the second Georgia-Pacific factor,
which evaluates the “rates paid by the licensee for the use of other
1538
This factor “examines
patents comparable to the patent in suit.”
whether the licenses relied on by the patentee in proving damages
are sufficiently comparable to the hypothetical license at issue in
suit,” and whether the parties “would have agreed to a lump-sum
payment or instead to a running royalty based on ongoing sales or
1539
usage.”
The Federal Circuit stressed the “[s]ignificant differences”
1540
Runningbetween running-royalty licenses and lump-sum licenses.
royalty licenses tie the amount of money payable to how often the
licensed invention is used or incorporated into products and shift
1541
risks to the licensor due to an unguaranteed payment.
In contrast,
lump-sum royalties enable the raising of quick cash and cap liability
1542
for the licensee.
The lump-sum license avoids “ongoing
administrative burdens of monitoring usage” and risks of
1543
underreporting.
The Federal Circuit noted that the lump-sum
license removes the ability to reevaluate a license and can lead to
1544
remorse for under- or overvaluing the technology.
At trial, Lucent argued for damages based solely upon a running
royalty license and contended that the evidence supported the jury
1545
award on appeal.
The Federal Circuit found both the evidence
1546
and the approach problematic for several reasons.
First, the
1547
Second,
evidence did not address expectations of consumer use.
the jury did not hear factual testimony explaining how running1548
royalty agreements are probative of lump-sum payments.
Finally,
the license agreements in evidence “were created from events far
1549
The court found no evidence
different” from the current events.
from which a reasonable jury could estimate that the patented

1538. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572 (quoting Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at
1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 238)).
1539. Id. at 1325–26, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572.
1540. Id. at 1326, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572.
1541. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572.
1542. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572 (citing RICHARD F. CAULEY, WINNING THE
PATENT DAMAGES CASE: A LITIGATOR’S GUIDE TO ECONOMIC MODELS AND OTHER
DAMAGE STRATEGIES 47 (2009)).
1543. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1572–73.
1544. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573.
1545. Id. at 1326–27, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573.
1546. Id. at 1327, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573.
1547. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573.
1548. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573.
1549. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573.
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feature would have been frequently used or valued as to command a
1550
lump-sum payment of eight percent of the infringing product.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit found the explanation of Lucent’s
damages expert insufficient in that it “urg[ed] jurors to rely on
1551
speculation” for calculating an acceptable lump sum.
The eight
license agreements that Lucent argued supported the jury verdict
1552
were also found lacking.
The court concluded that the agreements
either differed “radically” from the hypothetical agreement or the
subject matter was unascertainable, leaving the court unable to
1553
understand how a jury could evaluate their probative value.
The expert testimony on these agreements provided no assistance, as
either the expert “supplied no explanation” or gave “superficial
1554
testimony.”
The court noted that “[t]he law does not require an
expert to convey all his knowledge to the jury about each license
agreement in evidence, but a lump-sum damages award cannot stand
solely on evidence which amounts to little more than a recitation of
1555
royalty numbers.”
The court found that the “jury had almost no
testimony with which to recalculate in a meaningful way the value of
any of the running royalty agreements to arrive at the lump-sum
1556
damages award.”
As a result, the court found that the second
1557
Georgia-Pacific factor weighed strongly against the jury award.
The Federal Circuit next turned to Georgia-Pacific factors ten and
thirteen. Factor ten is “[t]he nature of the patented invention;
the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and
produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used
1558
the invention.”
Factor thirteen is “[t]he portion of the realizable
profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from
non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or
1559
significant features or improvements added by the infringer.”
The court stated that these factors “aim to elucidate how the parties
would have valued the patented feature during the hypothetical

1550. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573.
1551. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573.
1552. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
1553. Id. at 1327–28, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
1554. Id. at 1328–29, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574–75.
1555. Id. at 1329, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
1556. Id. at 1330, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
1557. Id. at 1332, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
1558. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577 (alteration in original) (quoting GeorgiaPacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
1559. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577 (alteration in original) (quoting GeorgiaPacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 238)).
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1560

negotiation.”
Finding the infringing feature to be “but a tiny
feature” in an “enormously complex software program,” the court
found it “inconceivable to conclude” that the small feature
1561
constituted a substantial amount of the infringing product’s value.
Therefore, factors ten and thirteen provided little support for the
1562
jury award.
The Federal Circuit then turned to Georgia-Pacific factor eleven—
”[t]he extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention;
1563
and any evidence probative of the value of that use.”
Factor eleven
looks to how parties would have valued the patented feature in
negotiations and relies upon how much the patented invention has
1564
been used.
The court noted that evidence of usage may
“be helpful to the jury and the court in assessing whether a royalty is
1565
reasonable.”
Such data provides information that parties use
during negotiations, where parties “often have rough estimates as to
1566
the expected frequency of use.”
However, the evidence here was
“conspicuously devoid” of any such data, with the only evidence being
that “at least one person performed the patented method one time in
1567
the United States sometime during the relevant period.”
Therefore, “all the jury had was speculation,” and Lucent thus failed
to meet its “burden to prove that the extent to which the infringing
1568
method has been used supports the lump-sum damages award.”
The Federal Circuit also looked at other Georgia-Pacific factors, but
concluded that none of them overcame the “substantial infirmities in
1569
the evidence” from the other factors discussed above.
The court
was “left with the unmistakable conclusion that the jury’s damages
award is not supported by substantial evidence, but is based mainly
1570
on speculation or guesswork.”
Although creating a licensing
agreement is “at best, an inexact science,” the court stated that the
damages evidence “was neither very powerful, nor presented very well

1560. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
1561. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
1562. Id. at 1333, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578.
1563. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578 (alteration in original) (quoting GeorgiaPacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 238)).
1564. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578.
1565. Id. at 1333–34, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578.
1566. Id. at 1334, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578.
1567. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
1568. Id. at 1334–35, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
1569. Id. at 1335, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
1570. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
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1571

by either party.”
Therefore, a new trial on damages was
1572
necessary.
The Federal Circuit also addressed Microsoft’s argument that the
1573
jury erroneously applied the entire-market-value rule.
The court
began its analysis by noting that a “patentee must prove that the
1574
patent-related feature is the basis for customer demand.”
The court noted that in the 1800s, “before a contemporary
appreciation of the economics of infringement damages, the
Supreme Court seemingly set forth rigid rules concerning the
1575
entire market value rule.”
The court noted the challenge of
translating the Supreme Court’s early concerns into “a precise,
1576
When conducting this
contemporary, economic paradigm.”
analysis, “the objective of the Court’s concern has been two-fold:
determining the correct (or at least approximately correct) value of
the patented invention, when it is but one part or feature among
many, and ascertaining what the parties would have agreed to in the
1577
context of a patent license negotiation.”
The Federal Circuit
stressed that “[l]itigants must realize that the two objectives do not
1578
always meet at the same precise number.”
The court noted that the first flaw in applying the entire-marketvalue rule in the present case was the lack of evidence demonstrating
1579
that the patented invention formed the basis of consumer demand.
The court concluded that the patented invention was not the reason
1580
A second
why consumers purchased MICROSOFT OUTLOOK.
1581
flaw existed with the approach of Lucent’s licensing expert.
Originally, the expert applied the rule to the sale of “infringing”
1582
However, the district
computers at a one percent royalty rate.
1583
court granted a motion in limine to exclude such testimony.
At trial, the expert applied the rule to the infringing software but

1571. Id. at 1336, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
1572. Id. at 1335, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
1573. Id. at 1336, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
1574. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1065, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (citing several cases where the Supreme Court had
concerns about basing damages on the value of the entire product).
1575. Id. at 1336–37, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1580.
1576. Id. at 1337, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581.
1577. Id. at 1337, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581.
1578. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581.
1579. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581.
1580. Id. at 1338, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581.
1581. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581.
1582. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581.
1583. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581.
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increased the royalty rate to eight percent.
The Federal Circuit
found that the expert attempted to reach the same damages number
he would have obtained if he were allowed to use the entire
1585
computer as a royalty base.
The court determined that this
approach was unacceptable as it ignored what the district court’s
1586
evidentiary ruling tried to accomplish.
The Federal Circuit went further with its discussion of the entiremarket-value rule, instructing that “courts must nevertheless be
cognizant of a fundamental relationship between the entire market
1587
value rule and the calculation of a running royalty damages award.”
The base for a running-royalty calculation “can always be the value of
the entire commercial embodiment, as long as the magnitude of the
1588
rate is within an acceptable range.”
As a result, even patented
inventions consisting only of a small component in a much larger
commercial product may economically justify a reasonable royalty
1589
based on either sale price or number of units sold.
The court even
took on the suggestion of some commentators that “the entire
1590
market value rule should have little role in reasonable royalty law.”
The court found that these propositions “ignore the realities of
patent licensing and the flexibility needed in transferring intellectual
1591
property rights.”
The court further noted that “[t]he evidence of
record in the present dispute illustrates the importance the entire
1592
market value may have in reasonable royalty cases.”
The court
opined that “[t]he license agreements admitted into evidence . . .
highlight how sophisticated parties routinely enter into license
agreements that base the value of the patented inventions as a
1593
percentage of the commercial products’ sales price.”
Therefore,
the court concluded, “[t]here is nothing inherently wrong with using
the market value of the entire product, especially when there is no
established market value for the infringing component or feature,
so long as the multiplier accounts for the proportion of the base
1594
represented by the infringing component or feature.”
Lastly, the
Federal Circuit held that although several amici challenged the
1584.
1585.
1586.
1587.
1588.
1589.
1590.
1591.
1592.
1593.
1594.

Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
Id. at 1338–39, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
Id. at 1339, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582.
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district court’s jury instruction on the entire-market-value rule, the
1595
instructions were not challenged at trial.
The Federal Circuit reviewed another damages award against
1596
Microsoft in i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., a case in which Microsoft
unsuccessfully challenged a $200 million reasonable royalty damages
1597
award on several grounds.
Microsoft first challenged evidentiary rulings admitting expert
testimony and a survey relied on by the expert. Microsoft challenged
the ninety-eight dollar royalty rate calculated by i4i’s damages
1598
expert.
The Federal Circuit noted that Microsoft’s challenges to
i4i’s expert were directed at the expert’s “conclusions, not his
1599
The Federal Circuit noted that Rule 702 of the
methodology.”
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court ruling in
1600
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. are “safeguards against
1601
unreliable or irrelevant opinions, not guarantees of correctness.”
The combination of expert testimony based upon the accepted use of
hypothetical negotiations, Georgia-Pacific factors, and methodical
explanations of royalty-rate calculations led the court to conclude
1602
that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Additionally, the
court found that the expert’s opinion was sufficiently based on facts
1603
Rule 702 requires that experts rely on facts sufficiently
or data.
related to the disputed issue, and the mere existence of other facts
1604
does not fail this standard.
Questions over the relevance or
reliability of facts used to calculate a reasonable royalty are
1605
appropriately left to the jury.
Microsoft also urged the Federal Circuit to hold that $200 million
is not a reasonable royalty, citing the recent decision in Lucent
1606
Technologies.
The court rejected this argument because Microsoft
failed to file a preverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law on
1607
Therefore, on appeal, the court could not decide
damages.
whether there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury’s damages
1595. Id., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1582–83.
1596. 589 F.3d 1246, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2009), superceded on reh’g
by No. 2009-1504, 2010 WL 801705, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
1597. Id. at 1255, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
1598. Id. at 1268, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176.
1599. Id. at 1269, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177.
1600. 509 U.S. 579, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1200 (1993).
1601. i4i, 589 F.3d at 1269, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177.
1602. Id. at 1269–70, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177.
1603. Id. at 1270, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
1604. Id. at 1271, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
1605. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178.
1606. Id. at 1272, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
1607. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
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1608

award.
Instead, the court’s appellate authority was limited to
1609
applying the stricter standard for denials of new trial motions.
A “clear showing of excessiveness” based upon the evidence was
necessary to set aside the damages award and remand for a new
1610
trial.
Microsoft failed to meet this higher standard because the
testimony of i4i’s damages and survey experts supported the jury’s
1611
award.
Finally, Microsoft challenged the district court’s decision to
1612
At trial, the jury found
enhance damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284.
willful infringement and the district court awarded $40 million in
1613
enhanced damages on i4i’s post-trial motion.
The Federal Circuit
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion since it made
detailed factual findings, it properly declined to reapply the
1614
willfulness test from In re Seagate Technology, LLC, and it correctly
1615
factors for enhanced
applied the Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc.
1616
damages.
The court also rejected Microsoft’s argument that the
district court enhanced damages solely because of the litigation
misconduct of Microsoft’s counsel, ruling that the district court
properly considered the misconduct only after finding that the other
1617
Read factors favored enhanced damages.
1618
the Federal
In Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,
Circuit reviewed district court damage rulings and, notably,
1619
interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) to not cover method claims.
The two issues on appeal were (1) a district court ruling that limited
damages to only devices performing the claimed method steps, and
(2) a rejected motion to limit damages to only U.S. sales under
1620
§ 271(f).
On the first issue, the Federal Circuit upheld the district
court ruling that infringement damages could be received only on
1608. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
1609. Id. at 1273, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179 (citing Duff v. Werner Enters.,
489 F.3d 727, 730 (5th Cir. 2007)).
1610. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179 (quoting Duff, 489 F.3d at 730).
1611. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
1612. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
1613. Id. at 1273, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180.
1614. 497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc),
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008).
1615. 970 F.2d 816, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1616. i4i, 589 F.3d at 1274, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180.
1617. Id. at 1274–75, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180–81.
1618. 576 F.3d 1348, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 1088 (2010).
1619. Id. at 1359, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
1620. Id. at 1354, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903 (citing Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v.
St. Jude Med., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1040–44 (S.D. Ind. 2005), vacated, 315
F. App’x 273 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
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1621

devices actually performing the patented method.
With respect to
the second issue, the district court ruled that “[35 U.S.C. § 271(f)]
applied to method claims and . . . [the] shipment of [infringing
1622
devices] abroad could result in a violation of that section.”
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that § 271(f) does not cover
1623
method claims and is not implicated in this case.
2.

Attorneys’ fees
Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, a court in “exceptional cases may award
1624
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”
The Federal
Circuit in 2009 reviewed instances where attorneys’ fees were awarded
for litigation misconduct and a frivolous appeal.
1625
In ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, Inc.,
the Federal
Circuit affirmed an award of attorneys’ fees for litigation misconduct.
Attorneys’ fees may be warranted for litigation misconduct or “if both
(1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the
1626
litigation is objectively baseless.”
The district court “determined
that this case was exceptional because ICU’s [temporary restraining
order/preliminary injunction] request and the amended complaint’s
assertion of [certain] claims were objectively baseless and brought in
1627
bad faith.”
On review, the Federal Circuit found that “the district
court applied the appropriate legal standard and articulated several
1628
bases in support of the award.”
The district court had several
bases, including “multiple, repeated misrepresentations,” that were
1629
Additionally, the Federal
not shown to be clearly erroneous.
Circuit held that the district court appropriately exercised its
1630
discretion in finding that Rule 11 sanctions were warranted.
1631
the Federal Circuit
In E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3Com Corp.,
addressed the issue of frivolous appeals. The court explained that
“[a]n appeal can be ‘frivolous as filed’ and/or ‘frivolous as

1621. Id. at 1359, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
1622. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907 (citing Cardiac Pacemakers, 418 F. Supp. 2d
at 1042–44).
1623. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
1624. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006).
1625. 558 F.3d 1368, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1626. Id. at 1379, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079 (quoting Brooks Furniture Mfg.,
Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1460
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
1627. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079.
1628. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079.
1629. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079 (quoting ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys.,
Inc., No. SA CV 04-00689 MRP, 2007 WL 6137003, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2007)).
1630. Id. at 1380–81, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080.
1631. 559 F.3d 1374, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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1632

argued.’”
The court discussed that “[a]n appeal is frivolous as filed
‘when an appellant grounds his appeal on arguments or issues that
are beyond the reasonable contemplation of fair-minded people, and
no basis for reversal in law or fact can be or is even arguably
1633
shown.’”
When frivolous as argued, the “appellant has not dealt
fairly with the court, [or] has significantly misrepresented the law or
1634
facts.”
The Federal Circuit found the E-Pass appeal frivolous for a “host of
1635
First, E-Pass failed to
reasons,” but chose to focus upon only two.
explain trial court errors and did not present cogent or clear
1636
arguments for reversal.
Second, E-Pass made “significant
1637
misrepresentations of the record and the law to the court.”
The court went through a lengthy discussion of the multiple
misrepresentations, which included misstatements about the record
1638
below and misrepresentations of the legal standard.
The court
found E-Pass’s appeal frivolous and granted PalmSource’s motion for
1639
sanctions.
The court did, however, alter the amount of fees to only
those incurred in defending the appeal, including the filing of the
1640
motion for sanctions.
Additionally, due to the frivolous nature of
the advocacy, the court held E-Pass’s counsel jointly and severally
1641
liable for the sanctions.
Judge Bryson dissented, opining that although E-Pass’s briefs fell
far short of the standards expected of counsel to the court,
the shortfall was not so egregious as to call for the imposition of
1642
sanctions.
3.

Marking
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) requires “[p]atentees, and persons making,
offering for sale, or selling within the United States any patented
1643
Accordingly,
article” to give notice to the public of their patent.

1632. Id. at 1377, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170.
1633. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Abbs v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
1634. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170 (alteration in original) (quoting Abbs,
237 F.3d at 1345).
1635. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170.
1636. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170 (quoting Abbs, 237 F.3d at 1345).
1637. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170 (citing Abbs, 237 F.3d at 1345).
1638. Id. at 1378–80, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171–72.
1639. Id. at 1380, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
1640. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
1641. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173.
1642. Id. at 1382, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
1643. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006).
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a patentee failing to mark a patented article is not entitled to
damages for infringement prior to actual notice.
1644
In Crown Packaging Technology Inc. v. Rexam Beverage Can Co.,
the Federal Circuit reversed a district court ruling that had
1645
incorrectly applied the marking law.
The district court granted a
motion for summary judgment dismissing a counterclaim on the basis
1646
of a failure to mark under § 287(a).
The petition for appeal
contended that the ruling would not implicate § 287(a) due to the
1647
The Federal
assertion of only method, and not machine, claims.
Circuit agreed because precedent made clear that the notice
1648
provisions of § 287(a) do not apply for process or method patents.
1649
The court noted that Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc. mandates
that § 287(a) does not apply when only a process or method claim is
1650
asserted.
The court therefore reversed the district court because
the patentee only asserted the method claims, to which the marking
1651
requirements of § 287(a) did not apply.
The Federal Circuit also reviewed false marking under 35 U.S.C.
§ 292. Section 292 imposes a fine of “not more than $500” for
marking an unpatented article “for the purpose of deceiving the
1652
public.”
By a preponderance of the evidence, a false marking
claimant must prove that the defendant (1) marked an unpatented
article as patented and (2) did so with the intent to deceive the
1653
public.
An intent to deceive arises “when a party acts with
sufficient knowledge that what it is saying is not so and consequently
that the recipient of its saying will be misled into thinking that the
1654
statement is true.”
1655
In Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., the Federal Circuit reviewed
both a district court finding that Forest Group falsely marked its
product, as well as a fine of $500 imposed by the district court for a

1644. 559 F.3d 1308, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1645. Id. at 1310, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1187.
1646. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1188.
1647. Id. at 1316, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
1648. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192 (citing Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co.,
704 F.2d 1578, 1581, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
1649. 718 F.2d 1075, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 679 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
1650. Crown Packaging, 559 F.3d at 1316, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192 (citing
Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1082–83, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 685).
1651. Id. at 1317, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192.
1652. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006).
1653. Clontech Labs. Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1598, 1602 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
1654. Id., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602 (citing Seven Cases of Eckman’s Alterative
v. United States, 239 U.S. 510, 517–18, (1916)).
1655. 590 F.3d 1295, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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1656

single decision to falsely mark.
Bon Tool filed numerous
counterclaims at the district court, including a false-marking
1657
Bon Tool prevailed on the
counterclaim pursuant to § 292.
infringement charges, but appealed the false-marking decision on
1658
various grounds.
First, Bon Tool asserted that the district court
erred when it concluded that Forest Group did not have the requisite
intent to falsely mark prior to November 15, 2007 (the date of a
1659
summary judgment of noninfringement in a related case).
The Federal Circuit rejected Bon Tool’s arguments that Forest Group
had such intent earlier, pointing to the district court’s finding that
Forest Group genuinely believed its products were covered by the
patent prior to this date, as well the fact that the patentees did not
have strong academic backgrounds or “in-depth appreciation of
1660
patent law.”
The second question on appeal was whether the district court
misinterpreted 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) by assessing only a $500 penalty for
1661
a single decision to falsely mark.
The Federal Circuit found the
“statute’s plain language requires the penalty to be imposed on a per
1662
article basis.”
In so finding, the court rejected the patentee’s
argument, based on the First Circuit’s decision in London v. Everett H.
1663
Dunbar Corp., that the statute imposes a single fine for continuous
1664
false marking.
The Federal Circuit noted that the version of the
false-marking statute at issue in London was significantly different
than the current one and that the 1952 amendment to the statute was
1665
not taken into account in that case.
The court also rejected the
time-based approach adopted by a number of courts, where a penalty
is imposed for each day, week, or month that products were falsely
1666
marked.
The court opined that the time-based approach does not
find support in the plain language of § 292(a), which “clearly
1667
The court also noted that policy
requires a per article fine.”
considerations also support the per article interpretation of

1656. Id. at 1297, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1098.
1657. Id. at 1299, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
1658. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
1659. Id. at 1299–300, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099.
1660. Id. at 1300, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100 (quoting Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon
Tool Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57134, at *15 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 2008)).
1661. Id. at 1300–01, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
1662. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
1663. 179 F. 506 (1st Cir. 1910).
1664. Forest Group, 590 F.3d at 1301, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101.
1665. Id. at 1302, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101.
1666. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101–02.
1667. Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
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1668

§ 292(a).
False marking deters innovation, stifles competition, and
raises competitor costs; these considerations increase with each falsely
1669
The court noted that the patentee’s proposed
marked article.
statutory construction “would render the statute completely
1670
ineffective.”
The court also rejected the patentee’s argument that
“interpreting the fine . . . to apply on a per article basis would
encourage ‘a new cottage industry’ of false-marking litigation by
1671
plaintiffs who have not suffered any direct harm.”
The court noted
that “the false marking statute explicitly permits qui tam actions,” thus
1672
further supporting the per article construction.
The Federal Circuit also noted that district courts may exercise
1673
This discretion balances
discretion with the fine amount.
1674
enforcing public policy and imposing proportionate penalties.
Since the district court did not determine the number of articles
falsely marked, the Federal Circuit vacated the $500 fine and
1675
remanded for further determinations.
X. ALTERNATE SOURCES OF LIABILITY OR RELINQUISHMENT OF
RIGHTS
A. Patent Exhaustion
1676

In TransCore, LP v. Electronic Transaction Consultants Corp.,
the Federal Circuit held that “an unconditional covenant not to sue
authorizes sales by the convenantee for purposes of patent
1677
exhaustion.”
In doing so, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment, whereby TransCore, LP’s patent
infringement claims against Electronic Transaction Consultants
Corp. (ETC) were barred by patent exhaustion in view of a settlement
agreement between TransCore and the supplier of the products that
1678
ETC installed, Mark IV.
The district court had held that “Mark IV’s sales of the toll
collection systems installed by ETC were authorized by the
TransCore-Mark IV settlement agreement, such that TransCore’s
1668.
1669.
1670.
1671.
1672.
1673.
1674.
1675.
1676.
1677.
1678.

Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
Id. at 1302–03, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
Id. at 1303, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
Id. at 1303–04, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
Id. at 1304, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103.
Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103.
Id., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103.
563 F.3d 1271, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1274, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375.
Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374–75.
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patent rights were exhausted as to those systems.”
The Federal
Circuit agreed, relying on the Supreme Court’s recent
“unequivocal[]” reiteration in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics,
1680
Inc.
that “[t]he longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion
provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates
1681
all patent rights to that item,” and that “[e]xhaustion is triggered
1682
only by a sale authorized by the patent holder.”
TransCore argued that the “sales under a covenant not to sue are
not ‘authorized,’” citing previous case law differentiating the roles of
licenses and covenants not to sue, but the Federal Circuit dismissed
1683
the argument because the case law was inapposite.
Instead, the
court observed that “a patentee, by license or otherwise, cannot
convey an affirmative right to practice a patented invention,” but it
1684
can “convey a freedom from suit.”
Equating a nonexclusive license
to a covenant not to sue, viewing both as authorizations, the court
framed “the pertinent question here [as] not whether but what the
TransCore-Mark IV settlement agreement authorizes [and whether
1685
it] authorize[s] sales.”
The Federal Circuit held that it did, noting
that the “language of the TransCore-Mark IV settlement agreement is
unambiguous: ‘[TransCore] agrees and covenants not to bring any
demand, claim, lawsuit, or action against Mark IV for future
1686
infringement.’”
The court concluded that “[t]his term, without
apparent restriction or limitation, thus authorizes all acts that would
otherwise be infringements: making, using, offering for sale, selling,
1687
or importing.”
As a result, the Federal Circuit agreed with the
district court’s finding that the sales were authorized and that
1688
TransCore’s patent rights were exhausted.

1679. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375.
1680. 128 S. Ct. 2109, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (2008).
1681. TransCore, 563 F.3d at 1274, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375 (alteration in
original) (quoting Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2115, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677).
1682. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375 (quoting Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2121,
86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681) (alteration in original).
1683. Id. at 1274–75, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375.
1684. Id. at 1275, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375–76.
1685. Id. at 1276, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.
1686. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376 (alterations in original).
1687. Id., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.
1688. Id. at 1277, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
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B. Implied License
1.

“Have made” rights
1689
In CoreBrace LLC v. Star Seismic LLC, the Federal Circuit held that
a licensee did not breach the license by contracting with a third party
1690
to have the licensed products made for its own use.
The court
found that “[t]he right to ‘make, use, and sell’ a product inherently
includes the right to have it made by a third party, absent a clear
1691
indication of intent to the contrary.”
That was so despite an
express prohibition of sublicensing and despite a clause in the
agreement that all remaining rights not expressly granted (i.e., those
other than rights to “make, use, and sell”) were reserved to the
1692
patentee.
The Federal Circuit’s decision was grounded on Court of Claims
1693
precedent established in Carey v. United States.
Nevertheless, the
patentees attempted to distinguish Carey, arguing that inherent,
have-made rights should be limited to exclusive licensees that also
1694
have the right to sublicense.
For two reasons, however, the Federal
Circuit dismissed that argument. First, the court found that the court
in Carey did not base its conclusion on exclusivity or the right to
1695
sublicense, but on the right to “produce, use, and sell.”
It noted
that the Carey court specifically stated that
“[a] licensee having the right to produce, use and sell might be
interested only in using the article or in selling it; in order to use it
or sell it, the article must be produced; to have it produced, his
1696
license permits him to engage others” to produce it for him.

Second, the court noted that the distinction between having an
exclusive and nonexclusive license is of no importance here, because
it has “no relevance to how a licensee obtains the product it is
1697
entitled to make, use, and sell.”
Thus, the court held that the logic
of the holding in Carey was not limited to exclusive licenses or
licenses that include a right to sublicense.

1689. 566 F.3d 1069, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
1690. Id. at 1072, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211.
1691. Id. at 1072–73, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211.
1692. Id. at 1070, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210.
1693. 326 F.2d 975, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 345 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
1694. CoreBrace, 566 F.3d at 1073, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
1695. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
1696. Id., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212 (alteration in original) (quoting Carey, 326
F.2d at 979, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 348).
1697. Id. at 1074, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
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C. False Advertisement
1698

In Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten USA, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit,
applying Ninth Circuit law, held that Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
1699
1700
Fox Film Corp. precluded Baden Sports’s false advertising claim.
1701
Baden
Both Baden Sports and Molten sold high-end basketballs.
Sports owned a patent directed to a ball with “raised seams” and a
1702
“layer of padding underneath the outer covering.”
Baden Sports
sued Molten for false advertising under section 43 of the Lanham
1703
Act
based on Molten’s use of the term “innovative” in its
advertisements for basketballs utilizing Baden Sports’s patented
1704
Baden Sports claimed that using “innovative” in
technology.
Molten’s advertisement falsely implied that the dual-cushion
1705
technology was a Molten innovation.
The Federal Circuit explained that the Supreme Court in Dastar
held that “‘origin of goods,’ as that term is used in § 43(a), does not
refer to ‘the person or entity that originated the ideas or
1706
communications that ‘goods’ embody or contain.’”
Instead, the
Supreme Court read “‘origin of goods’ as referring ‘to the producer
of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author
of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those
1707
goods.’”
Because Dastar was “the ‘origin,’ or producer, of the
products it sold, the Court held that Dastar was not liable for false
1708
advertising under the Lanham Act.”
The Federal Circuit then evaluated “whether Molten’s advertising
refer[red] to the ‘producer of the tangible goods,’ in which case a
claim under § 43(a)(1)(A) would be proper, or whether it refer[red]
to ‘the author of’ the idea or concept behind Molten’s basketballs, in
1709
which case the claim would be foreclosed by Dastar.”
The court
found that Baden Sports did not argue “that someone other than
1698. 556 F.3d 1300, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1878 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 111 (2009).
1699. 539 U.S. 23, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (2003).
1700. Baden Sports, 556 F.3d at 1305, 89 U.S.P.Q.2s (BNA) at 1880–81.
1701. Id. at 1302, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
1702. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
1703. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
1704. Baden Sports, 556 F.3d at 1302–03, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
1705. Id. at 1303, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
1706. Id. at 1306, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882 (quoting Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (2003)).
1707. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882 (quoting Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37,
66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647).
1708. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882 (citing Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1647–48).
1709. Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882.
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Molten produce[d] the infringing basketballs, and nothing in the
record indicate[d] that Molten [was] not in fact the producer of the
1710
Thus, the court concluded that “Baden’s claims [were] not
balls.”
actionable under § 43(a)(1)(A) because they d[id] not ‘cause
1711
confusion . . . as to the origin’ of the basketballs.”
The Federal Circuit then explained that § 43(a)(1)(B) also did not
apply to Baden Sports’s claims, as the Ninth Circuit does not
interpret this section to apply to false designation of authorship.
The court noted that, following the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
1712
§ 43(a)(1)(B) in Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., to read the
section otherwise would create an overlap between the Lanham and
1713
Section 43(a)(1)(B) applies to the characteristics of
Patent Acts.
the goods, the court explained, and authorship is not a nature,
characteristic, or quality of the goods as those terms are used in
1714
§ 43(a)(1)(B).
The court concluded that Baden Sports had
alleged nothing more than false designation of authorship because
no physical or functional attributes of the basketballs are implied by
1715
Molten’s advertisements.
In the court’s view, the term
“‘[i]nnovative’ only indicate[d], at most, that its manufacturer
created something new, or that the product [was] new, irrespective of
1716
who created it.”
Thus, the court concluded that Baden Sports
could not “avoid the holding in Dastar by framing a claim based on
false attribution of authorship as a misrepresentation of the nature,
1717
characteristics, and qualities of a good.”
D. Assignments
1718

In Euclid Chemical Co. v. Vector Corrosion Technologies, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit ruled on a patent ownership dispute, applying
state contract law to construe a patent assignment agreement and
vacating a district court’s summary judgment regarding Vector
1719
Corrosion Technologies, Inc.’s ownership of the patent-in-suit.
The district court held that an assignment that specifically listed a
named patent and “any and all divisional applications, continuations,

1710.
1711.
1712.
1713.
1714.
1715.
1716.
1717.
1718.
1719.

Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1882–83.
517 F.3d 1137, 1144, 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008).
Baden Sports, 556 F.3d at 1307, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883.
Id., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883.
561 F.3d 1340, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1341, 1343, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221, 1223.
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and continuations in part [‘CIP’]” unambiguously conveyed a patent
that issued from a CIP application of the named patent before the
1720
The Federal Circuit disagreed, reversing
assignment was executed.
and remanding the case for further consideration because the
assignment was not unambiguous, being subject to “at least two
reasonable interpretations,” and because the district court erred by
not having considered “[e]xtrinsic evidence . . . to ascertain the
1721
parties’ intent.”
The assignment, dated December 20, 2001, named one patent,
U.S. Patent No. 6,033,553 (“the ‘553 patent”), and assigned it and
“any and all divisional applications, continuations, and continuations
in part . . . and any and all Letters Patent which may issue or be
1722
reissued for said invention” to Vector.
The patent-in-suit, which
was a CIP of the ‘553 patent, existed before the execution date of the
1723
While the patent-in-suit
assignment, having issued in April 2001.
was unambiguously a CIP of the assigned patent, the court did not
1724
consider its transfer unambiguous.
The court noted that the
assignment’s language suggested that it was not intended to effect an
assignment of the patent-in-suit for it referred to “applications for
1725
patents” in the plural and “issued U.S. Patent” in the singular.
The court reasoned that “[h]ad the assignee intended, through the
assignment of ‘continuations in part’ to assign other issued U.S.
patents, it would be expected that the Assignment would have said
that the inventor was assigning ‘his issued U.S. patents’—plural—and
1726
even recited the patent number of the issued [patent-in-suit].”
Because the assignment was susceptible to at least two reasonable
interpretations, it was ambiguous, and the lower court erred in not
1727
considering extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the case for
the district court to consider the extrinsic relevance regarding
1728
transfer of ownership of the patent-in-suit to Vector.
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